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Disclaimer

This report to the Virtual Elimination Task Force of the International Joint
Commission was prepared under the direction of the Task Force s Economic
Subgroup. The statements and views presentedin this report are those of VHB
Research and Consulting and do not necessarily represent the views or policies
of the International Joint Commission. its Boards or its committees.

The Task Force notes that some of the information contained herein has been

superseded by more recent information. Also. the use of older data does not
correctly reflect the name and location of some of the mills. Nonetheless. this
does not detract from the main message of the report, nor its conclusions and
recommendations.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study examines the roles that economic instruments might play in achieving the "virtual elimination" oi discharges

of persrstent toxic substances to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem. The specific objectives of this study are:
1.

To define and assess the role of economic instruments as a means to the virtual elimination of emissions of persistent
toxic Substances to the Great Lakes environment.

2.

To assess economic instruments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of PCBs and mercury entering the Great

3.

To assess economic instruments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of persistent toxic emissions to the Great
Lakes by the pulp and paper industry in Canada and the United States.

Lakes environment.

There are many types oi economic instruments for achieving environmental obiectives. The emphasis in this study is

on efiluent charges and tradeabie emissions though several other instmments are also considered (Le. user.

administrative charges. lax differentiation. subsidies. deposit-refunds systems and financial eniorcement incentives .

oduct and

Economic instruments are best seen as a complement to rather than a substitute ior the traditional command and
control approach. Accordingly. the study includes a brief account of the existing regulatory system for controlling toxics in the

Great Lakes basin. The study also reviews several examples of the use of economic instmments in practice and concludes

that. with a law notable exceptions. eiiiuent charges have only been used to raise iunds rather than to provide an incentive for
abatement. On the other hand. where tradeabie emissions have been used (exclusively in the United States). revenues have
been low or non-existent and the incentives for more etficient and speedier watement, provided by the instnlment. have been
:
more signliicant.
An evaluation framework, in the form oi a decision tree. was developed for this study. The iramework is general and it

can used to assess the role oi economic instruments ior achieving environmnetai objectives in a wide range oi circumstances.

The most substantive parts oi the study address PCBs, mercury and all persistent toxics entering the Great Lakes

Basin. Although the data for PCBs and mercury is very incomplete, it is clear that a very substantial proportion oi these

contaminants reach the Great Lakes through atmospheric deposition rather than direct discharge. This iactor complicates any
effort to achieve virtual elimination since the sources are diverse, geographically dispersed and oiten unknown.

information on discharges of persistent toxics from pulp and paper mills has improved recently for Ontario owing to the

monitoring requirements of MISA (Munic'pal industrial Strategy for Abatement). Similar detailed inionnation ior discharges

irom U.S. mills is not avaiidsle.

The following recommendations are based on an analysis oi the iniormatfon on sources of persistent toxics. on

abatement technologies. process changes and costs, and on the economic prospects of the pub and pqser sector:
General
1.

Efforts should continue to enhalce the iniormation on sources, abatement costs and damages that is necessary for the
iurther waisal and design of economic instmments.

Mercury
2.

For mercury, priority should be given to economic instruments that will reduce the use of mercury in manufacturing
process that are not closed cydes. Measurement of the use of mercury is iar more reiiwle than measurement of the
sources and fate of mercury discharges. A tax on mercury might be the simplest incentive to administer, though to be
helpful. it would have to apply to all rms throughout Canada and the US and possbiy to imports from other countries
as well.

3.

The leasibiiity ofa deposit/reiund system for batteries containin mercury over 30% oi all mercury used in consumer
roducts) should be investigated. n particular. the prospects or developng the necessary infrastructure should be

ooked at in detail.

4.

Mercury emissions from electrical utilities. copper smelters and incinerators (over 85% oi all industrial sources) in

Canada and the US. could be subiected to an ef uent charge it the reilmility oi monitoring is improved. Revenues
could be used to deal with contaminated sediments in the Great Lakes basin and other bodies oi iresh water.

wruso (August s. 1991)
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5.

PCBS shOUid b9 063" With through regulation. There is no obnous role ior the use oi an economic instrument.

Pulp and Paper
6.

it is in this sector that economic instruments appear to have the most to oiier. Priority should be given to the detailed
design and iurther analysis oi a program oi economic instruments ior the pup and paper industry consisting oi:
-

Financial enlorcement incentives to support regulations designed to virtually eliminate 2.3.7.8 TCDD/TCDF.
A tradeable permits scheme to reduce the use oi chlorine.
An eiiluent charge on adsorable organic halide (AOX).

WP+50 (August 9, 1991)
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PCBs

1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objectives
The main oblective of this study is to provide the Joint Task Force on the Virtual Elimination of Persistent Toxic
Substances with an understanding of t e roles that economic instmments might play in achieving the virtual elimination' of
discharges of persnstent toxic substances to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem.

The use of economic instruments to achieve the objectives of the Great Ldtes Water Quality Agreement does not imply

any change in these objectives. The pu 059 of this study is simply to explore whether the goal of virtual elimination can be
achieved more uidity, more cheaply a or with lesssocial dismption by employing economic instruments than by only usmg
more traditional orms of environmental regulation.

The specific objectives of this study are:
1.

To define and assess the role of economic instruments as a means to the virtual elimination of emissions of persistent
toxic substances to the Great Lakes environment.

2.

To assess economic instniments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of PCBs and mercury entering the Great

3.

To assess economic instruments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of persistent toxic emissions to the Great
Lakes by the pup and paper industry in Canada and the United States.

Lakes environment.

1.2 Approach
The argument for the use of economic instruments in environmental policy is one that has long been made in the
journals of the economic and legal professions. Recently, economic instruments-traceable permits in particular-- have shown
signs of becoming popular in the political and bureaucratic milieux as well.
However. actual experience with economic instruments to induce the reduction of emissions of wastes into the
environment is quite limited. As a result. policy mdters have a very limited empirical basis for deciding whether and how to
make use of economic instmments for achieving environmental objectives.
Such instruments include:

-

effluent charges

-

tradeable emissions

-

user charges

-

product charges

-

administrative charges

c

tax differentiation

-

subsidies

-

deposit-refund systems

-

financial enforcement incentives

(a fee per unit of emission)
(allowing sources to trade emissions)

(a fee per un'n ofservice obtained)

(added to produa price)
(paid for government approvals)
(different tax rates for different activities)
(grants, soft-loans and tax allowances)

(refunddile deposits charged on products)
(non-compliance fees and performance bonds)

Economic instruments can sometimes be a substitute for the more traditional

ractlcal terms. they should be seen as complementary to rather than a substitute for so

ulatory approach. However, in

through regulation. indeed, one

important criterion for assessing an economic instrument is its compatiiilify with the existing regulations. in particular. the
application of any instrument to deal with persistent toxics in the Great Lites will have to be gained on to a regulate system
t Lures system. oreover.
deals with similar problems in adlacent and/or competing regions that are not part of the
these regions may or may not contain sources which. through airborne dispersion, affect the Great Lates.

wmso (August 9. 1991)
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instrument. This evaluation iramework takes the lorm ol a how chart or 'decision tree" (Figure 5.1).

While this "decision tree" sets out criteria and lntonnation requirements for decision making, it does not provide a
lormula tor producing answers automatically. The criteria span a wide range oi social, political. environmental and economic
issues and the relative weights to be given to the various criteria cannot be decided in advance. Weighing the survival oi one
industry towns against envrrcnmental damage or either one against wider macroeconomic impacts requires a sensitivity to a
wide range at considerations and should be undertaken by people who are well inlormed and responsible to those who will
leel the consequences of any resulting decision.

The second part of the report is an attempt to show how the "decision tree" can be used to stnlcture an evaluation oi
economic instruments. The merit oi using economic instruments is considered with respect to three roblems involving
rsistent toxics in the Great Lakes basin. it each case. a summary oi the available inlonnation is given; t

n the iniomiation

is reviewed using thedecision tree to consider whether the use oi an economic instrument might be appropriate.

1.3 Scope
The Virtual Elimination Task Force has been charged with the task ct advising the lntemational Joint Commission on
the choice at a strategy for the virtual elimination oi persistent toxic substances from the Great Ldies Basin Ecosystem. in
developing such a strategy. the Task Force is laced with the problem that a very large number at toxic substances may be
accumulating and doing harm within the Great Lures basin.
This study tocuses upon the applicability oi economic instruments to a limited number oi persistent toxics. Ultimately. it
may be that any change in the rggulatory regime should apply to all persistent toxics at once rather than be developed one
is larger question is not addressed here. A lurther consideration is that most attention is
substance by substance basis.
given in this. study to eitluent charges and emissions trading. The role that other instruments might play is also considered but
in less detai.

in developing a virtual elimination strategy. the Task Force has chosen to locus on the eleven Critical Pollutants

identitied by the Water Quality Board oi the International Joint Commission in 1985 (Table 1.1).

Tails 1.1 IJC Critical Pollutants
Total polychlorinated b'phenyis (PCBs)
DDT and metabolites
Dieldrin
Toxaphene

2,3,7,8- Tetrachlorodibenzo-pdioxln (2.3.7.8- TCDD)
2.3.7.8- Tetrachlorodbenzoiuran (2.3.7.8- TCDF)
Mirex
Mercury
Alryiated Lead
Benzotaipyrene
Hexachlcrobenzene

Source international Joint Commission, Great Lakes Water Quality Board 0987)

Each one ol these critical pollutants is associated with some detrimental eiiect occurring in the Great Lakes basin.

These pollutants have also been the smiled oi regulation, so that some lessons have already been teamed about how they

should or should not be regulated. The tact that none oi these substances has yet been eliminated irom the Great Lakes
basin. in spite oi the iact that much eilort has gone into their control. may in ltselt be instructive.
For the purpose oi evaluating scenomic instruments as a tool tor the achiwement of virtual elimination. the Task Force
has proposed that the study locus won two persistent toxic substances: PCBs and mercu . The Task Fome has also

proposed that economic instruments be assessed for their potential as means to induce the v rtual elimination oi persistent

toxic emissions trom the pup and pwer industry in the Great Lates basin.

wruso (August 9, 1991)
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The evaluation oi economic instruments tor achieving virtual elimination oi persistent toxics is considered on two levels.

rst. a generalized lramework tor evaluation is oilered that can be used to evaluate economic instruments tor attaining
environmental agedives under a very range oi circumstances. This iramework sets out the issues which should be taken into
account in con 5 ering whether to mate use oi a articular economic instrument. For instance, an ei uent charge may only be
operable where emissions can be measured rel ably: emissions trading may only work where a competitive market tor the
errnits can be assured: a deposit-retund system may only be practical where used goods can easily be collected. The
ramework also gives some guidance as to what sort oi iniormation must be gathered in order to make a choice oi policy

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII H

1.4 Plan of the Report
Chapter 2 offers working definitions oi a number oi the terms used in this paper--'virtual elimination." 'zero discharge"
and persistent toxic substance -- and provides a description oi each economic instrument considered.
Chapter 3 descnbes the general nature oi the regulatory framework currently being applied to control emissions oi
persistent toxic substances in the Great Lakes basin and discusses the limitations oi that iramework.
Chapter 4 gives a bnei overview oi the use oi economic instruments in a number oi jurisdictions. Some conclusions are
drawn from the experiences oi these jurisdictions.

Chapter 5 presents the general evaluation iramework.

Chapter 6 takes u the speciilc issue of the applicability oi economic instruments to the virtual elimination oi discharges
oi mercury to the

reat Lakes basin.

Chapter 7 does the same as Chapter 6. but for P083.
Chapters 8 and 9 provide a description oi the pulp and paper industry in the Great Lakes basin and consider the
possibility oi using economic instruments to virtually eliminate toxic discharges irom pup and paper mills.

The study concludes with Chapter 10 which otters recommendations for the consideration oi the Task Force and other
interested parties.

we+5o (August 9, 1991)
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2.0 DEFINITIONS
This chapter otters definitions oi various terms and concepts that are used throughout the report.

2.1 Persistent Toxlcs
A persistent toxic substance is deiined in the Great Lakes Water Quality A reement oi 1978 as "a substance which can
cause death. disease, behavioural abnormalities. cancer. genetic mutations. p ysiol lcal or reproductive maliunctions or
physical detormities in any organism or its oiispring. or which can become poisonous (agar concentration in the iood chain or
in combination with other substances" (toxic) and has a halt-lite in water oi over eight weeks (persistent).

The persistence oi many toxic substances is poorly understood. it can safely be said, thou ii, that persistent toxics

exist in large numbers. in 1987. the Great Lakes Water Quality Board identilled the presence of 332 toxic chemicals in the

are
waters oi the Great Lakes basin. 01 these 362. eleven were designated as 'critical pollutants. These eleven
'
characterized by adverse eitects on mammalian or aquatic species, bloaccumuiation, and persistence at 'unaoceptable

levels. The eleven ~critical pollutants are also deemed by the Board to be representative oi a wide variety oi sources.
pathways. uses. and chemical iamilies. 'Action taken ior one could be expects to concurrently control: or q>ply to other
substances with similar propenies' (lntemationai Joint Commission. Great Lakes Water Quality Board 1987).

2.2 Zero Discharge
Annex 12 oi the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement oi 1978 states the
lor control oi mute oi persistent toxic substances shall be zero discharge." No
A reement a

neral principle that the philosophy adopted
iinition oi zero discharge is contained in the

virtual
attempts to deiine it are under way. One perspective 3 that zero discharge is a means for achieving

elimination in that it reiers to all controllaile inputs oi persistent toxics. Even ii zero discharge is achieved tor these inputs.
other possible sources such as contaminated sediments and runoii remain.

2.3 Virtual Elimination

United
Article it at the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement oi 1978 states that it is the 'pollcy' oi Canada and the
" has not been
States that "the discharge oi...all persistent toxic substances be virtually eliminated. "Virtual elimination
things to
deiined in the Agreement. nor has it been deiined elsewhere. As a result. the term has come to mean very diiierent

dliierent people.

Bishop,
According to the ionner Director oi Water Resources at the Ontario Ministry oi the Environment, Dr. Jim
is no
there
when
reached
is
substance
a
oi
elimination
"virtual
that
view
the
take
representatives oi industry generaliy
any
that
implies
deiinitlon
This
1991).
(Bishop
environmental damage oi any kind as a result oi discharges oi that sibstance'
quality.
water
on
impact
oi
evidence
regulation will be based upon scientific
that
Proponents 01 this view would also place the onus oi proving any inpact on water quality on the regulator, holding
until such onus is met. no lurther redualons irt discharges should be required.
indicate
Environmental oups. on the other hard. late the view that the word 'vlrtual' is used in the Agreement only to Total
proposed.
being
not
is
Ecosystem
Basin
Lakes
Great
the
from
substances
toxic
persistent
oi
that the total eiiminat
in the Lures as well as by the
elimination being made impraaical by the tact that some persistent toxics occur natur
.
reieas
already
swstances
toxic
oi
quantities
large
the
Lakes
the
irorn
diiiiculty oi removing
istent toxic)
(
in this view, 'virtual elimination can only be achieved by preventing any ditional discharge oi these an institute tor
substances (is. by implementing a zero discharge strategy)...

Environmental Law and Policy. 1991).

(National

lite Federation and Canad

wide range oi goals for
in the absence of any agreed won deiinitlon oi "virtual elimination." it is recognised that a lairty
that. as a goal oi
assumed
is
it
study,
this
01
purposes
the
for
However,
e.
the abatement oi rsistent toxics may yet emerg
the Great Lakes
to
s
discharge
environmental poi y. virtual elimination means i at concentrations of persistent toxics in all
should approach zero.

2.4 Economic Instruments

lnstmments can be
Following Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 1989). economic
ent incentives.
eniorcem
linancial
and
creation
market
systems.
tund
depositre
subsidies.
charges.
as
classitied
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Traditionally. the use of the environment for waste disposal has been 'iree' In the sense that no finandal payment is
all kinds. By
required. This is one explanation fer the excessive use of the environment as a depository for wastes of
(eg.
environment
the
on
burden
the
reducing
for
methods
all
environment
the
into
wastes
of
discharges
on
charge
imposing a
process change. reduction. recycling, reuse and wate treatment) can become cheaper than waste disposal.

Further. such a charge on effluent not only provides an immediate economic incentive for reductions in the discharge of

wastes into the environment. but it can also provide an added incentive for the development of new. cleaner production
processes and more effective waste treatment technologigs. The prects e nature of the economic incentives offered depend
classified into four types. effluent charges, user charges, product
on the type and level of charge imposed. Chuges can
charges and administrative charges:
all Clip are phages paid on discharges into the environment and are based on the quantity and/or quality of

-

discharged pollutants. E uent charges are normall expressed as $lunlt of ef uent discharged. The rate may vary
according to the quality oi the discharge as measur

by the concentration of contaminants or toxicity.

normally
User angel are payments for the costs oi collective or pwlic treatment of effluents. User charges are by the

-

expressed as Slunlt of effluent treated. The rate may vary according to the quality of the disdiarge as measured

concentration of contaminants or toxicity.

es added to the prices of products which are polluting when manufactured or consumed or
Pruitt Guys are
disposal system. (A similar approach is to impose lower tax rates on produas which are
organ
an
for which there is
less damaging to the environment so to encourage their use.)

'

oi certain
m GI-gee are payments for services provided by the authorities such as for registration
fatalities.
treatment
waste
of
on
chemicals or ior the certificati

i

2.4.2 at

Subsidies
Subsidies provide iinanciai assistance to encourage changes in behaviour. i.e. actions to reduce pollution.
(e.g. accelerated
can late the form of grants (non- repaymle), soft loans (at reduced interest rates) and tax allowances
is not considered In any
depreciation on llution control equbment.) The role of subsidies in achieving virtual eliminalon
detail in this stu .
24.3 W8,"

centre for proper
A surcharge is imposed on a product that is refunded when the product is returned to an approved
treatment, reuse and/or disposal.

24.4 MTm'
' to dispose of wastes into the environment can
There are several ways in which markets can be created whereby '
iwastesthatcanbeemittedintothe
quantityo
et
acedonth
lmitispl
tform,al
lnlts
sold.
th
bebough
a
enmadeby
unongsouceshasbe
oiwaetes
talquamy
ndttesto
erarihlhlalocdio
environmentiromallsources.
trades may
Such
emissions.
allotted
their
trade
to
allowed
are
sources
various
the
auction).
or
fit
by
leg.
agency
regulatory
made. each
to additional restrictions to provide a further level of environmental auction. After a trade has been permitted
be su '
n of
reallocaio
a
.
approaches
Under
lirnlt.
emission
alowabie
new,
Its
reflea
to
modified
is
source s permit
quantities can tateplacewlthlnaplumislhlnafirm oramong differentftnnsorothersources.

2.4.5 m mm
There are two mater types of ftnmdal enforcement incentives:

-

. ifthesefeesare
mehlchareimposedwhen polltnersdonotcomptywithcenain regulationsauthorized
level. they

-

payments are
Perm Bulb are payments to authorities in expectation of compliance with regulations. The
refunded when compliance is achieved.

rtional to the degree of non- compliance. as measured by discha'ges in excess oi the
come equivdent to m effluent charge imposed above some limited level of dischuge.

rights or
' Emissions trading is sometimes referred to as a system of tradeable permits. maritth permits, tradedile
synonyms.
all
are
terms
These
emission rights.

wp+so (August 9, 1991)

12

Jllllllllllllllllll

24.1 Git-gas

u
U

u
y
u
U

I.
u
I;
I.
I.
U

in
in
'l

3.0 THE REGULATION OF PERSISTENT TOXICS
IN THE GREAT LAKES
The purpose oi this chapter is to provide a briei description of the existing approach taken to regulating the discharge oi

persistent toxlcs into the Great Lakes with special relerence to the pulp and paper sector.
3.1 Canada

Canadian water pollution regulation rests on two pillars: general prohibitions on the discharge oi pollutants to any

watercourse: and individualized. negotiated agreements between dischargers and regulatory authorities on exemptions irom

the general prohibition. which deiine permissible and oi the ope eliiuent loadings. Both Canadian iederal and Ontario

provmcial law place general prohibitions on the discharge oi harm ul substances to surfer» waters. in Ontario, these laws are
enlorced primarily by the provincial government.
While large numbers oi industrial and municipal dlschargers continue to produce effluents which are toxic to marine iile.
prosecutions do not normally ioliow. For instance. in 1988. nearly three decades alter the passage ol the Federal Fisheries
Act which requires that eliiuent be non-lethal to iish, 12 oi 18 pub and paper mills discharging to the Great Lates basin still
produced an eliiuent that is acutely lethal to lish.

in many cases ladx ol prosecution is due to the tact that the discharger has negotiated an individualized 'Control Order'

which dellnes permissible eliiuent loadings and oiten speciilc technolo les to be used to achieve those limits. These
e permissible loadings deiined by Control Orders
agreements are. however. oiten violated without attrading prosecution.
0 en permit hi h discharge rates oi conventional pollutants and oiten place no restrictions on the discharge at persistent toxic
substances.

luent quality standards can vary greatly irom source to source, even within an industry. Control Orders lor

'

pulp and paper mills show particularly great variation.

it is only very recently that the province oi Ontario has begun to develop a detailed and systematic list oi the toxic

substances which are being discharged to its suriace waters. Once it has determined what is going into its suriace waters.
Ontario intends, under its Munlcpal-lndustnai Strategy lor Abatement (MISA), to deiine the Best Available Treatment

Technologies Economically Achlevmle (BATEA) lor each at nine industrial sectors and lor munlcval sewage treatment

plants. Attalnable discharge limits based on BATEA lor each sector will then be used by the province to write regulations
setting abatement limits on all dischargers in Ontario.
in the near luture. the Canadian Federal Government intends to tighten its standards lor discharges oi conventional

pollutants irom pulp and paper mills. The Federal Government intends to

uire krait mills to restrict emissions oi dioxins

and iurans to a non-detection level by 1994. The rule would also restrict tot organochlorine discharges. By 1992, Ontario
will limit kralt mill organochlorine discharges to 1.5 kg per tonne oi production.
3.2 United States

n oi an administratively selected control
is based upon the
United States water pollution control
industrial category and
eliiuent limits. Eifiuent standards are determined
technology to achieve plant and industryProtection
nvironmental
us.
the
category.
each
For
subcategories.
33
into
subcategory: the US. aper industry is divided
AgenCy (US. EPA) es

s the best practical control technology avaiidale lor the reduction oi conventional pollutants as well

as the best avaiiwle technology lor the abatement cl priority pollutants. Eliiuent standards are then based on the
periormance that these technologies are expected to produce.
in addition, more stringent eliiuent limitations can be laced on point sources in order to achieve selected water quality

al t attainment oi swimmdale and lishdsle waters. The attempt to
standards. The United States has set as a national
on
achieve this goal along with the obiectlves oi indlv' ual states comprise the basis lor media-quality based restrictions

discharges.

Effluent limits set according to the lower oi these two criteria become the basis ior discharge permits which must be
held by anyone discharging pollutants to water. These pennlts are nonnaily issued by state pollution control agencies.
although unless it waives the right, the US. EPA may review individual permits ior compliance with its guidelines and
requirements. Eniorcement oi compliance with the terms oi the permits is done both by sell-reporting and on-site lnspedlons.
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The US. EPA is currently

mills in the United States. Best 329

in a review of technology-based effluent limits for all pup, paper and

Technology (BPT) and Best Conventional Pollutant Technolo

moar

Como? (BOT?

effluent limits lor the regulation of traditionalmoments are under review for all mills. Best Avaiiwie Control ochnology (BAT)

and New Source Performance Standards l SPS) effluent limits for priority pollutants released from mills which bleach pulp
with chlorine are also under review. Pretreatment standards for chlorine bleaching mills which discharge to sewage treatment
plants are being reconsidered. The US. EPA will decide whether to revise existing regulations as well as whether to regulate

dioxins. iurans and organochlorine compounds. Final new rules are not expected to be promulgated until mid~1995.

There are several other r ulatory initiatives that will have an impact on toxics in the Great Lakes. Under the Great

Lakes Critical Programs Act oi 1
uniform water quality standards are to be prepared for the US. by June 1992. Draft
standards will be published in the Federal R later in June 1991. States are to adopt water quality standards at least as strict

as the federal standards by June 30, 1992.
e Great Lakes Critical Programs Act also sets deadlines for the completion of
Remedial Action Plans in the US. and for the Lake Michigan Management Plan. Late cleanup plans are to be incorporated
into state water quality plans by 1993 or 3.5 years after designation.

On February 7. 1991 the US. EPA announced its industrial Toxics Protect. Under this protect. 17 toxic chemicals have

been identified on the basis oi seriousness oi effects. actual ex sure levels. high release volume and recognised potential for
reducing releases. (Mercury is included but PCBs are not.) he goal of this voluntary pr ram is to achieve a one third
reduction in total releases and transfers (to sewage treatment

ants and landfills) of these 1

chemicals by 1992 and a one

half reduction by 1995 a ainst a 1988 baseline. A 90% vo untary reduction earns a six-year deierrai of Clean Air Act
technology-based standar s.
The emissions targeted under this program are 73.3% to air, 19.7% off-site transfer, and 7.0% to 'other media' and

over 600 companies have been asked to participate. A total of 1,402 million pounds of chemicals are involved, including

mercury releases oi 320,000 pounds. The pup and paper industry's contribution is 98 million pounds.

3.3 Problems With the Current Regulatory Framework
The most striking aspect of the current state of toxic substance control regulations is the contrast between the very
large numbers of chemical substances which may cause human or environmental ealth effects and the very small number 'of
toxic substances whose release is even monitored let alone regulated.
The pace at which regulations are currently developed is in some measure to blame. Many years tend to pass between
the first recognition that a substance may be doing significant harm and the actual implementation of controls. Add to this the
fact that virtual elimination has to this day not been achieved for a single persistent toxic substance being discharged to the
Great Lakes, and a trawling picture of the side of current regulation emerges.
At some point. the methods of regulation currently used in Canada and the United States will have to be adapted to the
dramatic growth in the number of chemicals and the number of sources of chemicals that need to be regulated.

Most new regulatory proposals. such as Ontario's Clean Air Program and MISA Program and the US. Clean Air Act

continue to rely primarily upon the detailed prescrptlon of pollution control technologies or plant-specific emission standards

based upon a standard believed by government officials to be achievdiie with the use of a specific control technology.

These new proposals continue to perpetuate the use of a method of regulation known as "direct regulation' or
"command and control. Direct regulation effectively requires governments to tare part in decisions tout the more detailed
aspects of plant design and redesign. production technology, roduct design and waste treament technology at every
idors end tp engaged in mcnt or years of negotiation over the development oi complex
ctice,
regulated facility. in
rules. Then they are required to defend their decisions at administrative appeals and in
plant
process changes
court actions.
As virtually every mater industrial recess involves the release of some toxic substances. the task of the regulator « if

the task is taken seriously -- is overwhe

ing. Governments have not had, nor are they litely ever to have. the resources to

involve themselves in so much detdled decision-muting across such a wide r
regulated industries of having to win specific governmental certification of t
technologies is also potentlaly very high.

e of production processes. The cost to
choices of production processes and

The use of economic instruments has been proposed as a way to induce environmental improvement without having
regulators become bog ed down in the finer details of individual firms' decision-mating processes. This report now turns to
review the ways in whic such economic instruments might be put to use.
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4.0 ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN PRACTICE
4.1

Overview
Economic instruments are now widely used in environmental re uiation. in a survey oi 14 countries in the Organization

tor Economic Cooperation and Development. done in 1986 and 19 7, the use oi 153 dtiierent instruments was identitied

lOECD 1989). Charges. emissions trading, and other economic instruments are currently being considered ior application to

a wide variety oi environmental problems. Appendix A provides a summary of the OECD 1989 survey in tabular lorrn.

The application ol most oi these instruments to the problem oi achievin "virtual elimination oi a toxic substance is.

however. quite limited. Most oi the instruments identitied are used largely tor lnanclal reasons -- to raise money to pay ior
administration oi programs or to pay ior cleanups. These money-raising instruments have a limited incentive eiiect.

Oi these measures which are explicitly designed to have an incentive eilect. most have been

lied to shift

consumption activities in gradual ways. For instance tax dillerentiation has been imposed between leaded an unleaded luel

or between more and less energy-eiiiclent vehicles; and product charges and relundmle deposits have been applied to
containers. car hullrs and batteries.

While eiiluent char as have been applied to direct discharges oi eliluents from m

r industrial and munic al sources.

in every instance but two (lite. ior water lution control in the iorrner West Germany and t e Netherlands) these c arges have
been too low to have any signiiicant e set on discharges. Even in the West German case, where these incentives have been
the most successiul. charges are levied at only mout one quarter ol average abatement costs.

The one lonn oi economic instrument which has been applied to a
llutant lor the specific purpose ol reducing
discharges to a ne llglbie lovel ls emissions trading. in the United States, em sslons trading has been used to bring about a
rapid decrease in t e level oi lead in automotive luel and it is currently being used to reduce emissions oi ozone depleting
substances.

The use oi economic instruments to cover administrative program costs, to reduce the use oi materials whose

production creates pollution and to reduce the disposal ol

tentlally harmlul products such asmercury-containin batteries

may rove oi no small assistance in achieving the "virtual e lmlnatlon' of persistent toxic discharges to the Great L as basin.

But i e dramatic reductions in discharges which are necessary to achieve 'virtual elimination can only be brought about by
the systematic application oi either direct regulation or economic instruments, or a combination of the two, to all at the maior

sources oi a given persistent toxic.

This chapter takes a closer look at live applications oi economic instruments lrom which lessons can be learned
regarding the potential eiiectlveness oi these instruments ior achieving vlnual elimination. While eliluent charges have not
been demonstrated to be able to produce the necessary reductions in and oi themselves-4i only because no government has
yet been repared to institute an eltiuent chuge high enough to induce such aresult -- the German water oilutlon eliluent
charges 0 provide an exarrple oi an instance where charges have at least hoped to encourage a sign ant degree of
pollution reduction. in addition to eilluent charges on discharges to water in West Germany, three applications oi emissions
trading are reviewed: to reduce lead in gasoline, to reduce the release oi ozone depletl substances, and to control 800
lbiological oxygen demand) disdwges into the Fox River, Wisconsin. A brlei outline ol t emissions trading provisions oi
the US. Clean Air Act is also included.

4.2 Effluent Charges in West Germany
The West German eilluent change scheme was announced in 1976 and implemented in i981. It miles on a
nationwide level to any ef uent source. although it is applied by provincial ('Laender') authorities.
Originally the scheme mplied to five pollutants and pollutant groups: oxygen depleting substances,
high-organic-content solids. low-org anlc content solids. mercury and cadmium: as well as to discharges toxic to iish. in 1989,
A X iadsorbable organic halide), c romium, nickel. lead and copper were also included.
Ever; dischar r oi a re

European

urrency

latedfollutant is r uired to have a germit. Fees are assessed per 'damage unit" (19.20

nits (ECUyuor 40 eutsch mark i M) or $16.70 U. .) and damage units are calculated lor each r

ulated

category. However, the actual lee paid also varies according to whether the disoharger meets a lederally set mnlmum
standard ior its type ol iaclllty.
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Estimate/6.1

Over standard

75-100% oi standard

50-75% oi standard

Under 50% ct standard

Use state oi the art technology"

Fee Paid

1.0 x Expected drscharge'

0.5 x Standard

0.5 x Actual discharge
No tee

0.2 x Expected disdrarge'

'ii "expected discharge is exceeded. a corrective payment is required. Source: O.E.C.D. (1989)
West German water quality is believed to have improved signiiicantiy since 1976. By 1981. alter a long introduction
period, 10% oi dischargers met federal minimum standards. By 1987, roughly 50% oi dischargers were meeting those
standards.

While the treatment cost of German dischargers averages about tour times higher than applicrtle charges. suggesting
that direct regulation is the moving iorce behind the improvements. the charges do exceed many llnns marginal abatement
costs. A number oi large dischar
are known to have exceeded minimum requirements to achieve reduce payable tees
and one third oi all aliected mun
alittes claim that the charge was their main reason tor intensifying wastewater treatment.
In 1986. the charge system produced ECU 135 million (U.S.S 111 million), wout hall oi which was spent on administration oi
the program.
According to the Economic Councillor Europe (ECE) Council oi Experts. the German system results in a saving oi one
third in companson with a System oi uniiorm statement.

lmtluu

was

in the mid-19703 the U.S. EPA introduced an emissions trading program des nod to minimize the cost oi attaining air
pollution standards under the Clean Air Act. Seven types oi non-hazardous contam ants are now regulated under this Act:
articulates. suphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, ozone. lead and volatile organic compounds. The Act allows
or tour kinds oi trades:
Nelltg:
An internal trade where plants making modiiicatlons or additions can avoid various techno
requirements by reducing emissions 'rom other points within the same plant. By 1989.
transactions had taken place bringing savings estimated at more than U.S.Sl billion.
-

ical and administrative
.000 to 12.000 netting

Glad Trullg:
New sources entering a non-attainment area' must arrange ior an even reater reduction irom existing sources in the
10% external), bringing savings oi at least
same area. By 1986 at least 2,000 ottset transactions had occurred (

U.S.st million.

-

Bum:
An imaginary bubble is placed over multple emission points in one or many plants or firms in an air quality district. The
total emissions tor the bubble is tixed and the controls at each source can be adjusted to meet the total emissions in the
most cost-etiective way. in praalce. most bubbles are applied to individual plants and sometimes two. 89 State
bubbles had been approved by 1986, with savings estimated at U.S.S435 million.

mm llrm earning emission reduction credits can save them ior later use or sale. By 1986 only live state banking
systems had been waved by the U.S. EPA.
One Canadian commentator (Environment Canada 1990) has observed that trading works best it:
-

trading is introduced at the start at a program;

'

the rules are stable. clear and comprehensively specilled;

-

rms are allowed to lreely use internal or extemai trading to meet all emission requirements;

-

the approval process is kept as simple as possible:

i

at the introduction oi the program the baseline emissions tor a source do not exceed actual emissions;
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-

baseline emissions are defined in terms of quantities not rates;

-

actual emissions are calwlated in a manner not subject to interpretation;

'

a market is estdiiished whereby buyers and sellers or permits can easily identify each other:
a banking program is established and banking regulations are designed that encourage external trading;

-

the banking is secure - there is no danger that the credits will be devalued.

4.4 United States: Lead In Gasoline
Perhaps the most clear cut example of an economic instrument being successfulty used to reduce emrssrons to a

desrred level is that of the U.S. program to reduce gasoline lead content.

Before 1982, United States gasoline lead limits were enforced on a refinery by refinery basis: each refinery's gasoline
output had to meet an individualized average lead content standard. in 1982. the U.S. EPA promulgated a rule which
permitted refiners to produce gasoline with a lead content h her than their original limit, if they could buy the right to do so

from another refiner who would produce gasoline with a lower

ad content.

In earty 1985. a new U.S. EPA rule required that, between earty 1985 and January 1986. gasoline lead content be
reduced from 1.1 to 0.1 grams per gallon, with a midpoint of 0.5 grams per gallon to be achieved in mid-1985. The rule
paramitted refineries which reduced lead content ahead of schedule to save any excessrights for use or sale during 1986 and
1

.

During 1985. refiners actually banked 10.6 billion rams of lead rights. Between 10 and 20% 01 all avaiimle rights were
traded during each quarter of 1985. (Hahn and Hester. 1 9) it has been estimated that these lead trades resulted in a saving
of over 20% of the asst of meeting the rule (U.S.: 226 miiiion)(NEFlA 1990).
What is most interestin tout this example is that it is an instance in which trades did actually occur at about the

expected rate (U.S. EPA ha estimated trades of about 8 million grams), (U.S. EPA 1985.) Banking and trading were
considered to be desirable, in this case. because some smaller refineries would have had a much harder time than most in

meeting the U.S. EPA schedule for reductions. It was felt that U.S. EPA was faced with a choice cl: 1) delaying the
im lementation of the nrle so that all refiners could meet the standard; 2) bring the standard into effect according to the same
out of business (althou h U.S. EPA was
r costs and possibly
so edule and accept that some refiners would pay much h
of the view that no refiner would be put outof business by aving to meet the stan

by January 1986) (U. . EPA 1985); 3)

allow trading. (There is no indication that a variable timetdile for meeting a dim: regulation standard was considered).

In comparison with lead. the levels of banking and trading of emissions under the old U.S. Clean Air Act (superseded in

1990) have been far more modest (Hahn and Hester, 1989). it is interesting. therefore. to censider the reasons why they were
so effective in this particular case.

For one thin . trading was virtually unconstrained and administrative requirements were minimal. This com res with
). This is
the very substantia restriaions and long administrative delays for Clean Air Act trades (Dudek and Palmisano. 1
not necessarily to suggest tha these restrialons are unreasonmle. They may well be necessary to ensure that the emissions
banked represent emissions adually reduced rather than 'peper credits' or for keeping emissions below a standard which
would normally be required by variwilly in pedormance of a pollution control system.

Also of importance is the fact tha the right being traded could only be used for a limited time and the market for the
iy diminishing. As a commence. sale of a right did not in any way surrender the
ultimate product. leaded gasoline. was
market was growing, i.e. unleaded gasoline. This
of the product for which
right of a seller to expand future
might be risking restricting their ture ability to
sellers
where
Act
Air
Clean
the
under
trades
with
contrasted
be
can
situation
expand. (However. each market is different For example. there are other, more significant barriers to competition in North

American electrith markets so that trades in rights to emit $02 and NOx are unliter to be restriaed merely to protect future
opportunities to expend produdion.)

4.5 United States: Potential Ozone Depletere
Emission trading by producers and importers oi chlorofiuorocarbons (CFCs) was inplemented by the United States in
the spring of 1988. Permits were allocated on the basis of historical data on production and imports. Permits were given
away, apparently because the U.S. EPA did not believe that it had the authority to auction them.
Permits reauired vary with the ozone depleting potential of the substance involved. Each permit is good for one year

and the number

permits avalldile will decline on a regular basis overtime.

The gradual restriction of the avaiidiility of CFCs is likeiy to result in an increase in the value of the CFC permits. It is
interesting to note that the United States has sought to recapture some of this windfall by placing a tax on the pennrts. in
theory, as long as the tax is less than the market price of the permits, CFC prices md use levels will not be atteaed and the
tax will effectively transter some or all of the windfall to the government.
17
WP+50 (August 9, 1991)

Eaify in 1981. the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources instituted regulations allowing the transfer of 800
(biological oxy engsmand) discharge permits among ten puip and paper mills and four municipalities located along a 22 mile
stretch ol the

ox

err

in many respects. the choice at a permit trading
roach seemed perfectly suited to the chosen settf . Marginal
abatement costs varied widely between dischargers: each ischarger also had a number oi options for producing ncrementai
reductions in BOD discharge. On the basis 01 studies which concluded that biological oxygen demand (800) control costs

could be lowered by 40% l reducing a predicted annual saving of $6.7 million per year), permits were issued to ten pulp and
paper mills and to four mun cipalitles.

The results of this experiment have. however. proved diswpointing. One trade was made in 1981. Since then there
have been no further trades. The unwillingness of dischargers to trade has been attributed both to the design and
administration of the trading structure (permits expire alter live years, dischar e

hts may be sold only upon demonstration

that no additional abatement technology can be installed by the seller. admin trat e wproval of trades is slowi (Hahn and
Hester. 1989 and to the unwillingness of business competitors to give up permits which may be necessary to future
expansion (0 CD 1989).
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4.6 Wisconsin: Fox River Biological Oxygen Demand

5.1 Outlining the Approach
The literature on economic instniments commonly uses several standard criteria to evaluate the instruments and
systems of direct regulation which they are intended to complement or replace. These criteria include: their capacrty to meet

environmental objectives, the level and distribution of compliance costs. administrative practicality and compatibility with the
existing institutional framework

it is usually difficult to reach conclusive results as to the instrument(s) of choice from an evaluation in terms of these

criteria Much depends on the specific environmental problems to be addressed and the circumstances within which the

instruments are expected to operate. A feature of the present study is that it is focused on a specific set of contaminants in a
well- identified region for which the environmental objectives are reasonably clear: virtual eiirnination of persistent toxics.

A second and related consideration is that the study is intended to assist in deciding whether and in what way economic
instruments can help in achieving virtual elimination of selected contaminants. Rather than simply list the strengths and
weaknesses of each candidate instrument. an «preach has been developed which shows how the evaluation criteria bear on
the choice of which instrument to use. The next section descrbes a 'decrsion tree' which systematically evaluates the options

through a series of linked questions. Depending on the yes or no answers to the questions. the selection of direct regulation
or any one of a number of economic instruments is indicated.
To be clear, it is not the purpose of the decision tree to show how the selection of a regulatory option. La.

3 of direct

regulation of one of several economic instruments ought to be made. Neither is it the purpose to show how decis s actually
are made. Rather. the decision tree is simply a way to organise the issues and criteria into a framework that is helpful for
com arin the alternative regulatory options. Obviously, the actual selection of an economic instrument cannot be reduced "to
a r ative simple set of questions to which yes or no answers can be en. However. the advantage of the decision tree
approach is that it shows how the various considerations can be
ad and. depending on the circumstances, hops
determine the suitdiility of a particular instrument or molt. Also, the decision tree is general enough to be of use in
evaluating the role that economic instruments mm: play in achieving environmental ob
s under a very wide rangeof
circumstances only some of which are relevant to
specific toxics considered in this stu .
in the next section an explanation is lgig/en of how the decision tree operates. The discussion proceeds along each

branch of the tree in turn. in later waters.

main considerations that emerge from the decision tree are used to evaluate

the application of the economic instruments to the virtual elimination of mercury, PCBs and persistent toxics from the pup and
paper industry.

5.2 The Decision Tree
Figure 1 shows the decision tree. it consists of 13 pairs ofquestions (01 to 013) and sets of criteria (C1 to 01:!) upon
which answers to the questions depend. The decision tree is intended to be wplied on a contaminant-by contaminant basis.
This section of the report shouidbe readwthfrequent reference to Figure 1.
D

MkaMRM?
The first question to decide is whether virtual elimination is the wopmte regulatory objective for a particular
contaminant.

i

'{llli {I lllllllllll

5.0 AN EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

m1: HMMWI

MbNm

Within the domain of the Great Lites basin. a contaminant is to be virtually eliminaed if it is a persistent toxic
according to the definition given in section 2.1. Priority for action has been given to the if 'criticai poiiutants. If virtual
elimination applies continue to question 2, otherwise deal with the contuninant under a different framework.

D

MZBWMDNMW
The timing over which virtual eliminaion is to be achieved is critical for deciding whether economic instruments (apart
from non-compliance penuties) have arty role to play at all. Clearly, if it is decided that discharges of a persistent toxic
are to be eliminaed immediately. the simplest and most powerful appaach is through an outright ban on such
discharges. swported by a system of monitoring. progecution and fines.
financial burdens imposed on sources by
such an approach our be alleviated through subsidies .

2The effectiveness of direct reguldion for achieving virtual elimination from nonpoint sources is more questionable but then
the scope of economic instruments is also more limited for dealing with nonpoint sources.
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There 1'5 0'79 Circumstance in which a tax (effluent charge or tradeabie emissions) IS
seit-evrdently intenor to a standard (direct r war/on), This is where the pollutant is so
damaging that an outnght ban on its use is caled ior...Aliemative/y, there is such uncertainty
thatjwzddteCIde it is too risky to use the pollutant, Th/s situation tits a number of ecotOxins and
00 a
was.
(Pearce and Turner, 1990: 107)

Crimea WWWWMBEMWW
The pace at which Virtual elimination is to be achieved will be determined largely by the health and environmental risks
whic continued discharge oi a contaminant into the Great Lakes environment is expected to bring. Additional

considerations include the magnitude and impact oi compliance costs and the opportunity tor learning from experience
as virtual elimination is approached. At present. although the use at some substances has been banned in Canada and

the US (eg. Mirex) no contaminants that are in industrial products have been completely banned lrom entering the

Great Lakes. By implication, there is no regulatory requirement in Canada or the United States lor prohibition oi the
discharge oi any persistent toxic into the Great Lakes environment.

In Figure l. the outcome "direct regulation" (with no role ior economic instruments) lollows trom a 'yes' to question 2. A

"no" response calls tor a phased reduction in discharges and the means for achieving this reduction is pursued in
question 3.

0mm MMWNMMMW?
The review in Chapter 3 at economic instruments in practice showed that the use oi economic instmments for achieving

envrronmental objectives. as distinct irom raising revenue, has been limited. Regulatory agencies throughout the wortd

have traditionally relied on direct regulation, usually with economic instruments in a stpponing role or in no role
whatsoever. A crucial question that must be addressed therelore, is whether to rely on direct regulation lor achieving
virtual elimination oi persistent toxics?
"
Orlerta3: WWMEMMMNMGIWW
The usual prelerenca lor direct regulation over economic instruments is based on a number at lactors. some oi which
are very relevant to an evaluation ot economic instruments as a means tor achieving virtual elimination oi persistent
toxics. These factors provide criteria tor helping decide whether reliance on direct regulation alone is the best way to

achieve virtual elimination.

amuse!
All parties to regulation: politicians. civil servants. industry. environmental interest groups and the general public are
iamiliar with a re ulatory woadi that sets standards and enloroes them through

a certain type

behaviour is unwanted, most people think in terms of inlorm

ovals. prosecutions and lines. it

n/educatlon programs to secure

voluntary compliance and legislated limits to oblige those responsble to chmge their ways. Apart lrom deposit/reiund
systems tor retumwie bottles. people have a very limited experience with economic instruments as tools at public

policy and probably think that the term reiers only to these deposit/reiund systems and to subsidies.

Despite the tact that in Canada and the United States people are exposed to the decision making power at the market,
the idea oi using economic instruments. such as an etliuent charge or emissions trading. is alien to most peopie and
lacks immediate and obvious and. Moreover, by taking away some at the decision making authority oi those
administrators currently respons
tor giving
vats under existing 3 stems oi direct re ulation, economic
instruments may be seen as a threat to the very pe
without whose support t
are unlltely to be mplemented.
For all these reasons, lamillarlty with direct regulation is seen as a reason ior continuing to rely on it let achieving
environmentd obiectlves. Against this, however, is the record at direct regulation which has seldom met the obiectives
set tor it. and the growing interest in various quarters in economic instruments as a way oi promoting the achiewment
oi environmental and economic objectives.

Symbolism

Not only are people iamiliar with direct regulation but they think that It conveys the right message: something as
threatening to the environment and health as the discharge oi persistent toxlcs should be declared tor what it is. ie.
dangerously anti-social and anti-environmental. and should be declared illegal and punishd'ile in the courts. In other
words. whether or not direct regulation works ettectively. it carries the message pe
want to hear. Otlenng polluters
the opportunity to buy their way out at reducing their discharges is anathema to sue people and they are not prepared

to entertain the possibility that the environment might be better sewed through economic instruments. The oit heard but

Inappropriate use at the term license to pollute' as a description ol an eiiluent charge testlties to this problem. After all.
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economic instruments to achieve virtual elimination will lllrey have to be accompanied by direct regulation to cover

abnormal occurrences such as leaks and spills. but also to give the right message.

Monitoringjeguiuameots

it is sometimes believed that the monitoring requirements for economic instruments exceed that for direct regulation.

This is a moot point. in the case of the virtual elimination of persistent toxics it is likely that both direct regulation and

most types of economic instruments require that discharges be monitored. in general. if a monitoring system is
sufficient to support a successful prosecution then it should also be sufficient for an effluent char e or emissions
trading. However, there are several possible exceptions to this position which could favour reliance on

root regulation:

'

One or a few cases oi non-compliance with a regulation can be sufficient to support a prosecution whereas an

-

if emissions are traded, the regulatory authority has to monitor the trades as well as the individual discharges;

effluent charge requires that discharges over a period of time be estimated and for this a statistically valid
sampling procedure should be used;

A regulation can require the installation oi certain types of equipment for reducing discharges. The presence or

absence lbtrt less so the operation of) this equ'pment can more easily be monitored than the discharges
themselves.

With non-point sources oi persistent toxics. monitoring of discharges can be impossible or very costly. The use of
chemicals such as mercury or PCBs can be limited through direct regulation or charges on the use of the chemical
rather than. or as well as, on its disposal. Except in the case oi complete and immediate prohibition (where direct

regulation again has the advantage) the monitoring requirements for each wproach are similar.

MmMMuiLments

The administrative requirements for direct regulation are well known. Administration of economic instruments is less
well understood though much can be ieamed from the more limited experiences of the various jurisdictions that have

made use of them. Some proponents of economic instruments believe that they are administratively simpler than direCt
regulation. especially if attempts are made in direct regulation to achieve a cost-effective outcome. The amount and

type of information on abatement costs required by the regulatory agency that wishes to minimize total compliance
costs. if available at all, can only be obtained and analyzed at considerwle cost. (This point is explored further under
the heading oi cost minimization.)

esibliilx

ach that takes account of each
Depending on the mode oi direct regulation. it can be an extremely flexible
individual source's circumstances as well as such factors as the condition of t receiving water body and local
ciimatolo ical conditions. The system of direct regulation in Ontario has given ample opportunities for firms and
municipal s to negotiate their compliance programs with the Ministry of the Environment. This is a strength and a
weakness of the system. it is a strength because it allows the Ministry to be sensitive to the ability oi a firm or
munic'pallty to pay for the required level oi control with clue consideration belngtgixen to the impact oi the sources'
resulting in unacceptable delays
emissions on the environment. it is a wedrness because it lends itself to manpula
in the achievement of the Ministry's environmental protection oblectlves.

Recent initiatives in Ontario such as the Munlcbal industrial Strategy for Abatement (MlSA) program and proposed

revisions to Regulation 308 under the Ontario Environmental Protection Act have been designed to emphasize
prevention rather than abatement and to increase the likelihood of compliance by restricting opportunities for individual
circumstances to be allowed for. This change in wproach has required some forfeiture of the llexbiilty that was
characteristic oi the older system of regulation.
Proponents of economic instntments stress that one of the advantages of these instruments is that they introduce a
that is beyond the sc e of any system of direct regulation. For example, emissions trading
degree of flex
and selling the right
dings but sources are (ri e to determine their own share of this total by buy
total
systems limit
'ate
ain an app
to discharge contaminants into the environment. Further. new firms entering an area must
not
loadings
total
that
ensures
This
them.
hold
who
those
from
them
purchasing
by
emissions
quantity of tradeable
having to intervene. (Contrast this with direct regulation where a new entrant
increase without the regulatory
(lowest achievable emission rate) standards are met unless the r ulatory
R
LA
'
even
s
loadi
will add to total

agency speciilcally re uces the allowdale discharges at one or more existing sources to oftset these a ditionai
loadings.)

Effluent cha es bri a diiferent type of flexibility. Sources can select their own level of discharge but must payif
e c ics of effluent charges believe that this offers too much flexibility but this is less of a problem
accordingly.
the regulatory agency retains the option of raising the effluent charge to secure whatever level of total discharges is
required.
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a "Certificate of Approval or a Discharge Pennlt' really is a license to pollute. Economic instruments merit a different
label. Nonetheless. the symbolic role played by direct r ulation should not be under estimated and any use or
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One congtderation which has traditionally favoured the use of direct regulation is the belief that such regulations bring a
degree of certainty that economic instniments lack. However, for a number of reasons expectations that requrred limits

set DY 9911mm M" be met have often been frustrated in practice. These include: a lack resources devoted in
monitoring and enforcement, a reluctance to prosecute, unfavourable decisions in the courts. low penalties. and a

concern about the socro-economic consequences of high compliance costs. Nevertheless. the perception that direct

llmgis set bydfegulatlon bn'ng assured results remains and should be considered when a decision about direct regulation
is eing ma 9.

it is not only the public that wants to see direct regulation. Such regulations can reduce the uncertainties facmg

dischargers who like to know what is being required of them. At the same time, this desire to know "the rules of the
game" can also make it difficult for the politicians and administrators to change the rules even when new evidence
suggests that Such changes are justified.
Qost Minimization

Perhaps the strongest argument against relyin too much on direct regulation is that it is not cost effective. The

argument that economic instruments are cost 9 ective is directly related to the flexibility of these instruments that was
described above. Under a conventional permrttin System it can easily happen that two sources of the same
contaminant face different marginal (i.e. incrementa mate of reducing discharges. By allowing the source for which

costs are higher to increase its level of dischar e and requiring the other. lower cost source to reduce its level of
discharge from both sources, the same combined evel of discharge can be maintained but at a reduced total cost.
To achieve an economically efficient allocation of discharges through direct regulation requires that the administration

has detailed knowledge of control costs at each source. However, if the sources are allowed to trade permits, the
sources themselves, who only have to know their own costs of control, will determine whether ermit trading is to their
mutual advantage. If it is, the savings in total costs will be realized without intervention by the ministration.
A similar argument can be made in favour of effluent charges. Faced with an effluent charge per unit of emission.
sources can be expected to reduce their emissions as long as it is cheaper to do so than to simply pay the effluent

charge. Providing different sources face the same effluent charge, the will all tend to reduce their emissions to the
point that the incremental costs of doing so are equal to the effuent ergo and therefore equal to each other. This
result will minimize the total costs of reducing the combined emissions from all sources that are subiect to the effluent
charge since no reduction in the total cost of emission reduction could be achieved by transferring emissions from one
source to another.

The degree to which economic instruments will. in practice. reduce the costs of meeting an environmental obiective
depends upon many factors not least of which is the variation in incremental reduction costs among the various sources
subject to control. The greater is the variation in these costs, the greater will be the potential savings from tradeable
permits and effluent charges. in the event that these costs are very similar, there will be little or no advantage in using
an economic instrument to meet an environmental obiective.

. LechnoiszaisaLErmss

Although efforts have been made to mate direct regulation technology forcing' by requiring increasingly high levels of
performance, there remains a concern mm, for the most part, direct regulation actually discourages the development of
new technologies. One agument is that, for contaminants of reatest concern, regulatory agencies require sources to
meet standards at least equal to the best treatment techn
y available. Therefore. the development of a new.
expensive technolo by a firm may actuallyopenalize the firm if it is obliged to install it. Since the cost of new
technologies cannot
predicted in advance their development, firms have little incentive to invest resources into
developing technologies which may tum out to be costly to implement.

A corollary to this argument is tha firms other than the sources themselves may respond well to direct regulation which
insists on the use of the best available technology since it assures them of a market for new technologies if regulatory
agencies can be convinced of their efficacy.
Economic instruments seem to have a consideraiie advantage over direct regulation in stimulating the development

and adoption of new technologies. Sources with tradeable emissions or those paying an effluent charge can make or

save money by reducing discharges. Knowing this. they have an ongoing lnoentive to find ways and means of reducin
their discharges and one such means is the development of new to nologies. Simli , firms in the business 0
developing new technologies can expect to find a ready market for products or processes w

reduce emissions.

mammal irtual Eimiaatism

This discussion of criteria for deciding whether exclusive reliance should be placed on direct regulation for achieving
virtual elimination began with several reasons why direct regulation may be favoured over economic instruments. The
discussion then considered arguments that suggest that economic instruments may have advent as over exclusive
reliance on direct regulation: cost minimization and a stimulus for technological development being e most important.
ram to achieve virtual elimination of persistent
There is one more reason for including economic instruments in a
y. There are two reasons why this is so.
toxics: that is they may allow virtual elimination to be achieved more r
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mildly and so the reduction schedule is set according to what the highest cost abater can afford. When emissions
trading is allowed such sources can buy cheaper abatement at other, lower cost sources thereby reducing the financial
obstacle to a more rapid wproach to virtual elimination.

Secondly, the traditional reliance on permits, monitoring, inspections, prosecutions, convictions and court imposed
penalties. with each stage subiect to considerable uncertainties and possible delays. hasu generaily failed to bring
compliance with environmental objectives at the rate expected. An effluent charge of s icient magnitude or an
emissions trading system based on a declini

total loading could greatly increase the incentives for compliance. One

reason is that under direct regulation there is ittle or no incentive to control discharges beyond the permitted level if to

do so adds to costs. With emissions trading or effluent charges there is always a financial gain to be made from further
reductions.

As stated earlier. the choice is not necessarily between direct regulation and economic instruments, only between an

exclusive reliance on direct regulation and other wproaches. As subsequent stages in the decision tree will show,

financial enforcement incentives can be grafted on to a system of direct regulation which underlines the fact that. in

reality. the choice will be between exclusive reliance on direct regulation and some mix of direct regulation and

economic incentives. (Allowing emissions to be traded does very little per se for ensuring compliance and even with an

effluent charge direct sufficiently high to offer a real incentive for reduction. direct regulation w if still be required to deal

with unusual events such as leaks and spills.)

At this point. the decision tree branches either to direct regulation as the on tool for achieving virtual elimination or to
economic instruments to play a maior role in achieving Virtual elimination. ven if it is decided that direct re ulation
should be relied upon as the primary component in a regulatory Egogmm. the decision tree subsequently cons era the
role that financial enforcement incentives could play. On the of r hand. if the arguments in favour of some form of
economic incentive for achievi virtual elimination seem compelling when applied to a specific case. then the selection
of economic instruments at this ranch in the tree should not be seen as irrevocwle. if further analysis of the economic
options reveals that. while promising,they are unsuitable for any of a number of reasons which will soon come to light.
then reversion is still possible.
'
To continue, therefore, with the analysis. it is assumed that a negative answer is given to question 3: is. there will not
be exclusive reliance on dired regulation. (Question 12 pursues the direct regulation option assuming that a positive
answer is given to question 3.)
D
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The main difference between emissions trading and an effluent charge is whether the regulatory agency sets the total
quantity or unit price of emissions. Under an emissions trading system, the re ulatory agency establishes a limit on
total allowable emissions and the market in tradeable emissions sets their price gand therefore the price of discharging
an additional unit). Under an effluent char 0, the regulatory agency sets t e price of discharging an additional unrt of
emission and the sources themselves if
on their discharges.
in principle the two schemes are symmetrical and can be used to achieve the same results although the distributional

implications may be very different if
Ing on what mechanism is used for the initial allocation of the tradeable
emissions and what is done with any funds received by the government.

When a dedslon has been listen to achieve virtual elimination over a period of tlme ills to be expected that a timetable
for achieving virtual elimination wil be established. Such a timetable may be restricted to an enqziolnt by which time
virtual elimination is to be achieved. it may also include milestones. expressed in terms of reducingthe quantity and/or
concentration of discharges. so that progress towards the ultimate goal can be monitored. owever, even this
app roach does not require that the discl'iarges be limited directly. This is a matter doout which a decision must be
ma 9.
MtFUWMIIT

MMNWM

The most important criteria for dedding whether waste emissions should be limited directly (to. at interim. declining
non-zero levels on the way to virtual elimination relate to what is known about a) the emission reduction cost functions
in material and one y inputs in production, d' erent tecl'inologies. differences in the age and condition of equipment.
differences in plant 3 2e and differences in operating efficiency and the damage function .
3 The emission reduction cost function (which is somewhat broader in scope than a control or abatement cost function) is a

quantified relationship between reductions in emissions and costs. The function will be different for each reflectin differences
in material and energy i uts in production, different technologies. differences in the age and condition
equipment.
differences in plant size an differences in operating efficiency.

A damage function is a quantified relationship between a cause and a consequence. The cause might be the level of

discharge of ambient concentration and the consequence might be the increased incidence of mortality or morbidity in any

living species.
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Firstly, under direct regulation where iirrns in very different financial situations may be required to incur similar. high
compliance costs. there may be a concern that some plants will be forced to close if virtual elimination is achieved too

{{CIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

if the emission reduction cost functions are relatively steep, small variations in the allowable total il.9. from all sourcesi
emissions can have a dramatic effect on the Costs of compliance which will be reflected in the prices of tradeable

permits. An effluent charge has the advantage in this case by avoiding UfdelY high emission reduction costs without
sacrificing much in terms of the resulting level of total emissions.

However. if the damage function displays the existence of critical thresholds above the level of virtual elimination, a
strong case can be made for limiting emissions below these thresholds in the approach towards virtual elimination. For
example. once the concentration of a persistent toxic is reduced below one such threshold some uses of the water may

be considered sale. in this case. considerable benefits could be obtained prior to virtual . ninatlon providin the total

level oi emissrons is reduced below this critical level. Fie onses to an effluent charge can only be estimatet? and may
prove to be insufficient to meet the interim threshold.
here may be delays before this is known and it may be
administratively difficult. if not impossible. to raise the effluent charge quickly to secure the desired result.

in contrast, an emissions trading system can be geared directly to the achievement of interim thresholds and can give
somewhat greater assurance that they will be met. It only requires that the total permitted level of emission be reduced

from one threshold level to the next until virtual elimination is achieved. (In most cases such thresholds, if they exist at
all, are more likely to exist in a relationship between ambient concentration and effect rather than quantity or quality of
emissions and effect. This detracts somewhat from this advantage of emissions tradin over effluent chargesi
Furthermore. the market price of the tradeable emissions will reveal useful inforrnatlon on t e costs of compliance as
the objective is achieved.

The absence of evidence oi thresholds and/or indications of steeply rising discharge reduction cost functions will
indicate that an effluent charge may be more suitable than emissions trading for achieving virtual elimination. Another
consideration that may lavour effluent one as is the absence of a large enough number of sources to ensure
competition in the emissions trading market. rom an economic standpoint. the benefits of trade are more likely to be

achieved the more competitive is the market. This general rlncble from economic theory applies to trades in
erelore, consideration should be 'given to the likely
emissions as much as to trade in any other good or service.
number and relative strength of the likely participants in an emissions tradin market. Possibil' fee for using the
ownership of tradeable emissions to restrict new entrants and limit competition 3 uld a matter of concern. Even if a

persistent texlc emanates from a large number of diverse sources, not all of these sources will necessarily be abieto

participate in 3 permits market. it may be especially difficult to design a system which can involve non-point sources
(eg. agricultural and urban runoff. ion range transport) and/or point sources for which no-one is responsble (e.g. some
so lmentary and groundwater sourcesg.

Whereas economic considerations call for a large number of potential buyers and sellers who are free to make whatever
trades are in their mutual interests, there can be environmental reasons for restrictln the trade in emissions even
though the total level of discharge is unaffected. For example. if there is a concern that t combined discharges within
a sub-region may become excessive either trading zones will have to be estwllshed, which reduces market
competitiveness. or all trades will have to be subjected to checks that specified levels of local discharges and/or
ambient concentrations are not exceeded. By requiring administratively imposed limits of this sort the possibilities for

trade are reduced and transaction costs are increased, again lessening the gains from trade. (This feature of an
emissions trading system is pursued further in question 7.)

As this discussion has shown. many considerations have a bearing on whether emissions trading or ef uent charges
are more appropriate for achieving virtual elimination, assuming that some loan of economic instrument is to be
selected. The option of using an effluent char Or some other form of charges system (deposit/refund or product
charges) is tdten is) under question 9. At ths point. it is assumed that emissions trading is indicated and the
consequences of selecting such an instrument are explored.
D
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There are two main ways of designing a system of emissions trading to achieve virtual elimination. The first way
requires the regulatory agency to progressivefy limit the total quantity of tradedale emissions available. This can be
accomplished by issurng permits for a fixed period of time after which the allome emissions are revised downward
until the total quantity is consistentth virtual elimination however it is defined.

A second method described by Tletenberg (1985) is for the regulatory agency to issue permits that must be retired
when they are used. The number of permrts issued corresponds to the total ailowdsle discharge between the time the

system is initiated and virtual elimination is achieved. Tietenberg refers to this as a system of cumulative emrssion
permits.

The permits themselves do not have a time dimension; the holder has complete freedom when
to emit. However, cumulative emisswn permits do not regulate emission rates; they llmlt total
emissions (tons rather than tons per yearl

in this market the permits are an exhaustble

resource; once used they are withdrawn from circulation.

(Tletenberg 1985: 29)
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For pollutants that mix uniionnly location does not matter. if mixing ls not uniform then the scheme may have to be

mod led by imposing additional constraints on trades at the sip-regional level.

For the case that Ttetenberg does consider he shows that the standard result obtained from the theory of exhaustible

resources éHotelling 1931) applies to the price of a cumulative emission permit and to the total quantify1 of emissions per
year provi ing competition prevails. This result is that as the unused permits diminish over time. t e real price of a
permit will rise at a rate equal to the rate oi interest and the quantity emitted in each year will decline until virtual
elimination is achieved. (Technical change can modify this result.)

CrlarhS:ForDedhgontrUehWBnissimPemls
The apparent simplicity of cumulative emission permits is most obvious when the contaminants mix unilonnly and the

location of the discharges is irrelevant. Whether or not this situation applies depends on mixing patterns and on the
relevant damage functions. in the absence of the necessary information it may be wise to assume that location does
matter and that local as well as regional effects of persisth loxics are ol concern.
Even when a contaminant is persistent and toxic. it seems unlikely that the eftects of discharges on the ecosystem will

be independent oi their timing. Without additional constraints. a trading system does allow for the entire permitted

quantity of a contaminant to be discharged at one time as well as in one place. Unless there is extremely high
confidence in the belief that the tem

ral pattern of discharge has no real bearing on the ecosystem effects it would be

unwise to leave decisions about tim ng exclusively to market forces. There is also the possb lit that once all permits
have been used q) pressure will be brought to beer for additional permits to be issued. T is possibility may be
sufficient to reject this tom of tradeable permits for achieving virtual elimination.

The imposition of local limits on discharges in combination with cumulative emission permits is taken up in question 7.
As Fl ure 1 shows rejection of cumulative emission permits results in the selection of a system wherein the allowable
emiss ons declines over time. Both systems require a method for allocating the initial allowdsle emissions and this is
the topic of question 6.
allusions: MTmhbeBudmlieEx
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Under a system ot tradeable emissions, where the total permitted emissions decline over time, the simplest way of
initiating the system is to allow existl sources to start trading their permitted or actual quantities (whichever is less).
To achieve virtual elimination the qua
oi discharg'e allowed by aJiermIt would have to decline over time such that a
permit which allows x Kg of discharge this year wi only allow a ischarge of y K next year (y < x). Through this
means. emissions trading could tdte place but eventually virtual elimination woud be achieved according to the
predetermined timetable. One example at such a system is the trade in "emission reduction credits" used in the United
States (see section 3.2 above).
0M6: WWWTMMNMNNMWM

There are two posslb conflicting criteria to be considered in deciding this question: i) whether an initial distribution of
allowwie emissions
equitable and ii) whether any other initial distrbution could be introduced without strong
opposition from existing sources.
There are several implications oi givlrtg the right to trade existing emissions according to the existing permits. First. it

converts the right to pollute into a right which has a realizwle economic value. This economic value accrues to the

polluters rather than to those aauahy or potentially exposed to the eflects of the persistent toxics. is this fair?

Second. the largest reallzdile economic value amrues to the largest sources. These may be the very sources that
have done the least in the past to reduce their discharges. This seems lite a perverse way to reward such behaviour
and it may have implications for further extensions oi emissions trading: sources may deliberately increase their
emissions in mtlcbatlon of receivin a raster share of the tradeable emissions. (To some extent this behaviour can
be avoided b dlstr'butlng the mantis emissions according to some historical level oi emissions but to do so
introduces a

ltional cements not only tout the current relevance of these historical levels of emissions but also about

the accuracy oi the measurements.)

Third. by conferring an economic advantage on the exislin sources, new firms wishing to establish themselves in the
Great Lakes basin may be discouraged, even it the techno ogies they planto use are less polluting than those of their
competitors.

Despite the possible inequities in ailocatln tradeable emissions according to current permitted or actual emissions. it
may be infeasble to do any thing gery d erent (e.g. auction the emissions) owing to the opposition that this might
evoke from the sources. Even if t overall advantages that emissions trading might bring is accepted by the existing
sources they will be determined to reap some portion oi these advantages.
a most obvious lorrn that these
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Tietenberg discusses a cumulative emission permit system in the context of "uniformly mixed acoumulat rve pollutants.
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advantages will take is in cost reductions. However. no source can be assured of a cost reduction if. in addition to the
costs of reducing emissmns. they also have to pay for their initial. re trade share of the tradeable emissions. The

possibility of imposing a tax on the level of tradeable emissions h

by an source to return some of their economic

value to the government may also be difficult to introduce for this reason. i

e issue of what the government might do

with the revenues accruing from an auction or a tax on tradeabie emissions is taken up under question it.)

Decisions about the initial allocation of the tradeable permits are inextricably tied to decisions about the level and

allocation of the financial burden that such schemes involve. Whatever decision is made on this matter. and the
decision tree in Fi ure 1 shows two possibilities. itrade based on existl
permitted or actual discharge and a permits
auction). the quest on of additional limits to protect local areas must be ad ressed.

W7: anldUnlsmTradeebelupoeedIoPmtedLodNea?
Additional limits to protect local areas have been imposed with respect to air emissions. where trading systems have

been most extensively used. These limits are designed to ensure that ambient concentration standards are met and/or
that ambient concentration levels do not increase. There may well be a concern that ambient concentrations should be
limited even as virtual elimination is approached. One of the risks of trading systems is that. in the absence of specral
measures to protect local environments. ambient concentrations of persistent toxlcs in these environments may rise
unacceptably.

Crlerh7: FwDediliglenlsonTmhsSfuldbeWbPrMLodNeu
if there is evidence that shows a relationship between ambient concentrations leg. in sediment or in benthic
communities) and effects on species h her up the food chain that is charaderized by thresholds. then there are good

grounds for restricting trades such that t ese critical ambient concentrations are not exceeded. Even in the absence of

such evidence. it may be deemed grudent to prevent an accumulation of tradedile emissions at specific locations which

are believed to be at risk if am lent concentrations rise. Proximity to sensitive ecological areas leg. wetlands.
spawning areas. breeding grounds. municipal water empties) might be reason enough to regulate trades such that
ambient concentrations (or combined discharges) do not rise.

This concludes the discussion oi the portion of the decision tree that deals speci cally with emissions trading. (The

possibility of combining financial enforcement incentives with emissions trading or direct r ulation is idien up under
question 13.) Previously. a 'no' in response to question 4 (should quantities be limited direc ?) would have lead to the
selection of effluent charges (or some other charges system) for achieving virtual elimination once it was decided that

exclusive reliance on direct regulation was unwise. There are several questions and criteria for evaluating the role that
charges might beginning with question 8.
came MmE
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in principle. an effluent charge can be used to achieve virtual elimination. This can be accomplished by increasing the

level of the charge to induce greater and greater reductions in the quantity and/or concentration of emissions. An

announcement that the effluent charge will e raised periodically. say every year. until virtual elimination is achieved
may hasten the process since the expectation of an ever increasing effluent charge will justify a greater level of
expenditures to reduce emissions than an effluent charge which may or may not be raised in the future.
Crier : FaDedlqlmEtht-pmuwaedmm
if virtual elimination is the god but the precise path towards it is unimportant (or there is insufficient iniorrnation to know
what the path should be) then an effluent charge that increases over time may be referable to emissions trading. First.
the administrative requirements of an effluent char 9 may be more modest. ( or the reasons given in response to

question 7. the local environment may only be a equately protected if trades are regulated.) Second. an effluent

charge is not wedtened if only a few sources. which may not compete effectiveiy in an emissions trading market. are
involved. Sources large or smal. many or few. all have to pay the charge end will all have an economic incentive to
reduce their discharges.
Third. an effluent charge wil generate revenues. Question 9 examines whether this is an advantage or not. it is
certainly one reason why governments are taking a iresh look at effluent charges and magmas them more acceptable
than emissions trading in which no revenues accrue to the government. (if the em slons 'rights' are auctioned
revenues will be generated but. as dismissed under question 6. such a scheme may be difficult to introduce.)

It should be noted that the asparem slm iicity of an effluent char e may be confounded by a need to impose different
charge rates for different contaminants. ifferent concentrations. d erent locations (to take account of local conditions).
different times of the year (to tire account of the seasonality of ecosLstem processes). as well as different total
quantities of emission (to tire account of nonlinear damage functions.) A o. the requirement to pay an effluent char e
in addition to abatement costs may have adverse effects on a sector s competitiveness. A concern with this possibil
may limit the level of the effluent charge below that which is required to induce the required reductions in emissions.
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is in compliance with a speciiied level at emission than t e precise level oi emission. Furthermore. it sell-monitonng is
used there would be an increased incentive ior under reporting than with direct regulation since every unit reported
would add to a source's costs.

Despite these complications, an eiiluent charge has the potential to be an extremely powerlul tool in the arsenal oi
instruments aimed at virtual elimination. What to do with the revenues is the next question it charges are to be
considered iurther.
A negative answer to this question does not necessarily entail a reiection oi all systems oi charges. One possibility is a

charge on speciiic materials to discourage their use. This possibilit is addressed in question it. For now. an
aiiirmative answer is assumed and the issue oi what. it anything, to o with the possible revenues from an eiiluent
charge is considered.

C]

mam-immumm
The success oi an eiiluent charge to achieve virtual elimination oi persistent toxics will be marked by the diswpearance

oi any substantial revenues. However. belore that point is reached the potential revenues irorn a system oi eiiluent

charges could be considerable. Hence. the interest oi some governments in "green taxes."

The danger in using an eiiluent charge to raise revenues is that the achievement ol virtual elimination will coniiict with a
government s revenue requirements and this might mdte it diiilcuit or even impossble to continually raise the charge
until all toxic emissions are eliminated.
An ef uent charge can be revenue neutral (i.e. generate no additional revenues ior government) it a commitment is
made to adjust other tax rates downwards so that total government revenues remain unchangz d. in pradice this may

be diiticuit to do because it requires adiustments to the rates irorn what they would otherwise
oi an ef uent charge and this is a matter oi speculation not tact.

e been in the absence
.

One approach to revenue neutrality that should be analyzed very careluiiy before implementation is to reimburse the
sources that pay the eiiluent c
e thro h some ionn oi subsidy to hep deiray the costs oi reducing emissions. The
danger with t is approach is thatt e says may undermine rather than reinlorce the very incentives ior action that an
eiiluent charge is sipposed to olier.
Crlulat Whammth
Revenue neutrality is important it revenue generation threatens to compromise the eiiectiveness oi an eiiluent charge.

It may also be a heblu feature in persuading sources to accept an eiiluent charge because total revenues paid to
government will not be allected. (Moniehal sources may be problematic in this regard.)
Revenue neutrality may be a deilnlte handlch ii revenue generation is one oi the main reasons why a broad
constituency supports the introduction oi an eiiluent ch e. in such circumstances. an eiiluent char may still be very

eiiective in inducing some reduction in disdiarges thou
elimination.

other instruments will be needed to go a the way to virtual

ll revenue neutrality is reiected a dedsion must be made about what to do with the iunds generated which is the topic at
question to.

D

thmmhMbMPw-u?
The revenues inom an eiiluent charge (or irom auctioned emission " hts') can be tied to speciiic government
expenditures or go into the consolidated iund as one oi many categories 0 revenue out at which government iunds its
programs.
cilarhlo: ForDedrltglmee

edePIw-u

Opinion polls indicate that 'green taxes' may be the only ty oi new taxes that the public will ay without much
resistance. However. the same polls also indicate that the pu ic wants to know how the iunds will e spent. Ii these
polls show a widely held view that will endure then revenues may have to be tied to speciiic programs it there is to be
an eiiluent charge on persistent toxics.

On this question it should be remembered that traditionally government revenues and expenditures have been
separated ior two inportant reasons: i) decisions about revenues and expenditures are alien su

to diiierent

criteria. and ii) there is no guarantee that the revenues required by a pr ram bear an relation to the level oi iunds that
might come from an eiiluent charge. Also. it a pr ram becomes depeggent on an luent charge as a source ol iunds
then those responsible tor the program 0r bene iciaries oi the program may become extremely distressed at the
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The iinai consideration to be considered is whether or not emissions can be monitored reliably enough to support an

eiiluent charge. Monitoring is also required ior direct re uiation but it may be less demanding to determine ii a source

prospect of their funding drying up as virtual elimination is achieved and the revenue from the effluent charge
approaches zero.
The final step in the decision tree goes back to question to which asked if a charge should be put on the effluent.

Previous questions examined the implications of a positive response to this question. Question 13 examines those of a
negative response.

Cl

Qies mltzgnMaNmmaugebethdepedhm?
it effluent monitoring is too unreliable or too expensive to support an effluent charge. or their is a risk that a charge will
result in intermedia transfers. a reasonable alternative can be a charge on a product that is used as an input to
production providing that it is closely correlated with the emission oi the unwanted persistent lexic. (For example. a

E

charge imposed on the use oi mercury or P083 will discourage their use and encourage a search for aftemativesi

Altematively. a depcsmrefund system on products that can cause a release of persistent toxics (e.g. batteries) can be
useful for ensuring reuse. recycling and proper disposal.

i

The problem with charges on inputs is that they provide very little incentive for improved management of a material
once it has been purchased (except to make internal recovery and reuse mar inaily more attractivel In particular. input
charges do not directly penalize the action that is to be deterred which is t discharge of persistent toxics into the

environment. Therefore. their effectiveness is thought to be less than that oi an effluent charge though their range of
application may be greater. Non point sources are seldom amenmle to an effluent charge but they can sometimes be
effectively discouraged with a charge on specific products. A charge on toxic chemicals used in agriculture is but one
example.

I

Product charges can also be imposed at the oint of sale to final consumers. Ideally. such a charge would be related to
the quantity of persistent toxics discharg at all stages oi production. consumption and die sal of the product.
However. unless an extremely detailed sc edule of charges is used. which differentiates not only y product but also by

V

production process. a product charge will generally be too remotely related to the emission oi persistent toxics to be

effective for achieving virtual elimination.

Crierhii: WWMIWMMhMme
v

The main criteria for deciding this question are whether effluent monitoring is problematic and whether there is a close

correlation between the quant

of a product purchased (either as an input or final consumption) and the quantity of a

persistent toxic released. if a lgh proportion of a persistent toxic entering the Great Lutes environment comes from

non-point sources then a charge on specific products could be useful in achieving virtual elimination. Also. some

non-point sources such as agricultural runoff. may be responsive to product charges even when effluent charges are
impractical.

Similar issues relating to revenue neutral as were discussed under an effluent charge also aply to a charge on
specific products. One way of imposing suc a charge that avoids revenue is through a deposit/refund system.
A deposit/refund system imposed on products which contain persistent toxics can hep ensure that the materials are
recovered and reused and then ultlrnately d
386 of in a
arattvzl zmsafe manner by physical and chemical
treatment. incineration or in a secure landfl . hese measures d hep
nate persistent toxics from entering the
environment.

The main Criterion for assessing the solubility of a deposit/refund system for persistent toxics is whether the requisite

infrastnicture exists or can be created. Care must be taken to ensure that the various steps in the system can be

undertaken safety without risking unwanted and possbly large discharges of the contaminants into the env ronment.
I

This concludes the section of the decision tree that deals with economic incentives except in the loan of financial
enforcement incentives. These are a possibility in coniunctlon with direct regulation or tradeable emission permits.
Question 12 reverts to a further consideration of direct regulation assuming that the conditions for economic

S

instruments, particularly emissions trading and effluent charges are not met.

CI

WIZMM

WTWNW

Regulations can be promulgated that llrnlt the allowed quantity that a source may discharge into the Great Lakes
environment. Such regulations leave it to the individual sources to determine how they will meet the limits imposed on

them. This is the approach usually followed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Another mproaoh is to have

regulations which specify those processes (including raw materials and produa characteristics) and/or control
technologies that are allowed or prohibited.
The first approach allows a greater range of choice to the sources sub
to regulation which lowers overall compliance
costs. it also makes clear that responsibility for meeting the re ulat ns rests unambiguously with the sources. This
clarity can be lost it official governmental approval is given fort e adoption of a process or mntrol technology which
later proves inadequate. Under these circumstances. sources may request and be granted an exemption from a

non-compliance penalty on the grounds that these actions received government approval.
WP+50 (August 9, 1991)

29

A second reason why regulations that specify dprocess or control technologies can be ineffective is that, unless

equipment is properly operated and maintains . it may not periorrn to expectations. Additional regulations and
compliance incentives may be required to ensure that this problem does not arise.

Despite these drawbacks. there are situations when regulations specifying technologies are appropriate. First. it may
be costly or technically impossible to adequately monitor emissions of some persistent toxics especially as the goal of

virtual elimination is approached and emission quantities become very small. This is not a problem when technologies

are specified. Second. if sources do not have the necessary expertise for selecting processes and control technologies.
and there is concern that bad choices cannot easily be reversed. requirin approval oi these technologies may be
appropriate. Third. measures to avoid spills may best be mandated. and yourth, it may be advisable to restrict the
adoption of technologies which simply transfer toxics to other media.
MIZTOMMPWMWTWMNW
The economic rationale for allowing sources to make their own selection of process and control technologies. subject to
regulated limits on emissions. is compelling. Nevertheless. if discharges cannot be monitored to the level required for
enforcement or it the administration has more expertise on the various technologies which cannot easily be transferred
to sources, then the technologies should be speaiied in the regulations. To do so may bring a more assured approach
to achieving virtual elimination providing responsibility for non-compliance does not pass to he government if approved
technologies do not work as well as planned.

Whatever is decided at this point, there remains the potential role for financial enforcement incentives. This is the issue
raised in question 13.
Mi tm mm mm w
Financial enforcement incentives can

lace or complement the more traditional penalties of fines and imprisonment.

Two such financial enforcement incent as are performance bonds and emission charges imposed only on excess
.

quantities.

Performance bonds already exist in some jurisdictions (see Chapter 4). They are intended to remove any financial

incentive that sources may have for not complying with a r ulation. Cha es on excess emissions work the same way
its rather than technologies. (Periormance
except that they can only be apiled when regulations spggfy discharge

bonds can be effective in both cases). Unlike a performance bond. the amount of the excess charge is closely related
to the extent of the non-compliance as measured by the excess emission.
As with most economic instruments. there is always a question of what to do with any revenues that accrue to the
government. This question was raised in connection with the auctioning of traceable em salons. and will be looked at in
more detail in response to question if. One feature of financial enforcement incentives is that their effectiveness is
inversely related to the revenues that theyagenerate. if they work as intended so that sources comply with their
permitted limits. they generate no revenue at .

Grails: WWM MWW MNM
Since the main rationale for economic non-compliance penalties is to improve compliance rates. the main criterion for
deciding on their use is whether compliance rates have istorlcaily been inadequate. Of course. a satisfactory record in
the past is no guarantee that stronger non-compliance penalties will not be required as progress is made towards virtual
elimination. if nothing else, the incremental costs of compliance can be expected to rise as the level of discharge
declines so that a stiffening of non-compliance penalties may be required to induce an ever declining level of emission.
This com ietes the discussion of the decision tree and the evaluation framework that it offers. A summary of the main
ing from this evaluation framework is given in Title 5.1. in the following chaters, the applicability of
points
economic instruments for achieving virtual elimination if mercury, PCBs and several persisth toxics from the pub and
paper industry is examined using the questions and decision criteria discussed in this chatter.
TABLE 5.1A Summary of Evaluation Framework (Questions 1 to 3)

QUESTION
f.

is GOAL

DIRECT REGULATION

ECONOMlC INSTRUMENT

In
In
I

In
q
q
I

q

I

In
In
I

q
q

I
I

ANSWER

Yes, already decided

VIRTUAL
MM?
Continued
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TABLE 5.IA Summary of Evaluation Framework (Questions 1 to 3. continued)
QUESTION
2

AT ONCE?

DIRECT REGULATION
II done at once. outright ban

SimDiest

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT

ANSWER

Financial burdens can be

No, not at once so can

alleviated with subsidies

use economic instruments,
(Here. subsidy would not
encourage Increased
production}

11
USE DIRECT
REGULATION
EXCLUSIVELY?

Stakeholders are iamiliar with
direct regulation. Growing
sense that direct regulation is
not achieving goals. Leaves

increasing interest in using
economic Instruments

more authority with current

decision-makers.

Gives appearance at iinn
action

Gives appearance oi putting
environment up lor sale.

Arguable, lust putting an
explicit price on what is

already being sold or given
away, implicitly

May require more extensive
monitoring. ii there is:
-a need to demonstrate statistically the likelihood oi
a continuing violation over
a period oi time
-a need to monitor trades as

Monitoring requirements
should be similar. except
In case of noted
exceptions

well as discharges
-technology-based regulations

can be monitored simply by
ensuring Installation at a
piece at equipment

Nonpoint sources are

dif cult to monitor; may

require regulatory or use

charges

Administrative requirements are
well understood. More dltilcult
to regulate cost etiectively

Administrative requirements
are uncertain. Easier It
goal is to regulate cost
effectively

Negotiations allow tor conslderable ilexblllty In lmplementatlon. but may result in
considerable delay

Allow decentralized decisionmaking about how to achieve
reduction targets

Continued
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TABLE 5.1A Summary of Evaluation Framework (Questions 1 to 3, continued)

QUESTION

DIRECT REGULATION

:1
(mused)

Appears to give certainty oi
result. but track record does

USE DIRECT
REGuATm
EXCLUSIVELY?

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT

I

ANSWER

not bear this out. Appears to
increase predictability oi
regulatory outcomes

Less cost-eiiective. Very

dif cult to administer to gain

detailed knowledge oi control
costs

.

Allow equalization oi marg-

inal abatement costs.

Sources have incentive to
minimize costs to same
marginal level. it marginal
abatement watement costs are
similar for all Iirms. much
oi the advantage is lost.
(Still retain advantage oi
speeding the process with

.

economic instruments)

Development oi new control
technology/technique may
increase doaternent costs. Disincentive to innovation

'1

innovations will save money,
so are encouraged (but in
both cases, standards are set
on basis oi known technology)

.

Environmental objectives may
be achieved more quickly as
all need not move at pace oi
highest cost tater. Eiiiuent
charge is a bigger incentive
to act than lines lor noncompliance

.
Continued on Tmle 5.18

TABLE 5.13 Summary oi Evaluation Framework (Questions 4 to 13)

.

QUESTION

DlSCUSSlON

CONCLUSION

4.
LMT
W
BY QUANTITY
OR MAM
ABATBBIT
COST

iii cost lundions are steep. eiiiuent
charge gives better control over reduction
charges
oil damage iunotlon has critical threshold
and ii response to etiluent charge is
uncertain. may be better to iix total
discharge level with a permit. However,
thresholds are likely to be ambient; setting
trademle permits with an eye to ambient

In princple, the two schemes are symetrical

needs is more diiilcuit

i

in the absence oi steep costs or thresholds,
etiluent charges may be moresuitwie. (In
practice, there will be a significant
level oi uncertainty as to the result that

will be achieved. The question becomes: is
it more costly to be uncertain mout the

resulting ievei oi watement?)
oi abatement?)

Continued
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TABLE 5.18 summary of Evaluation Framework (Questions 4 to 73, continued)

QUESTION

DISCUSSION

4. (Catered)

Market only won<s it there are enough sources

CONCLUSION

LMTT
DlSCHARGES
BY OUANTTTY
OR MAXNUM

to ensure competltlon in the market ior permits
May be potential to use permits to exclude new
entrants. Some emitters may not be in a position to trade (nonpolnt oi past dumping sitesl

5.

in the absence oi evidence to the contrary, it

(This creates a signiiicant burden on the

GMDUAL REDucnorr 0F

oi discharges does matter. Concern that all
of pollutant may be discharged at once in one

reason to believe that cumulative permit
is particularly burdened?)

TOTAL PERJITS

place

ii
TRADE BASE
As CURRBiT
PEMTTED on
CURRENT ACTUAL
DiSCHARGE?

Should economic value oi permit go to the class
oi polluters? And, in particular, to the
biggest polluters? May discourage new entrants
too. It may be impossible to do anything else
due to opposition from existing sources. Could
impose a tax on the permits to recover some oi
the value

7.
TRADES:
LN" TO
PROTECT LOCAL
AREAS?

May wish to ensure that local thresholds are
not exceeded

a

ll the precise path toward virtual elimination is

CHARGES:
USE Bil?

creasing eiiluent chage may be preierable. Wlil
require less administration. Market size won't
matter. The more a charge has to be reilned to
account ior varialons in local or ambient eiiects

ABATBAENT
COST?
TRADE: BY

AVAlA E OR
BY ISSUNG
ALL PBNTTS
AT 0465 AS AN
EXHAUSTABUE
RESOURCE?

EFFLUENT

is salest to assume that timing and location

use oi any economic instrument. Any

(Could auction the permrtsl

unimportant (or lndetermlndalel, a gradually in-

or tlrne or yea. etc., the harder it will be to

implement. Requiring dischargers to pay a tee
over and above abatement costs involves a redistributlon oi income which will be resisted.
Monitoring requirements may be higher

9.
EFFLUBiT
CHARGES:
REVBOUE
PEUTRAL?

May have political consequences -- aliectlng
grow/budget

Continued
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QUESTION

DISCUSSION

CONCLUSION

10.
EFFLUENT
CHARGES: USE
TO FIND
SPECIFIC
PROGRAMS?

Revenues required by a given program may and
up differing from revenues received. Revenue
shortfall when goal achieved

(Tax could be instituted to raise revenues
notwithstanding virtual elimination by
direct regulation)

If.

Spread net too widely. Don t locus on dlsc n-

(Does cost of further monitoring exceed

USE
NON-REFWDARE
PMDUCT
CHANGES?

arge. Mates sense only where monitoring
discharge ls difficult, eg. nonpoint. It a
high proportion ol sources are nonpoint. may
be useiul. Deposit/refund option would avoid
putting burden on nondischarger and be nonrevenue raising. FIe: deposit/refund: How
easy will It be to set up the necessary
infrastructure?

1?.

9mm: Less range oi choice lirer leads

SPECIFY
PMCESS
COMM

TECHOOLOGY?

cost of casting not too wide?)

to higher compliance costs. Still needs to
ensure proper operation, maintenance of
equipment.

AWE: ll monitoring is difficult; it

sources have less expertise than government

in selecting tedinologles; may need to mandate
spill avoidance
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Examples are performance bonds and emission
charges on excess quantities. Excess charge
is more closely tied to level of exceedence

(Q
A

13.
USE FNANCW.
NCBITIVES?
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TABLE 5.18 Summary oi Evaluation Framework (Questions 4 to 13. continued)
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6.0 ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND VIRTUAL
ELIMINATION OF DISCHARGES OF MERCURY
At one time. the discharge oi mercury to the Great Lakes basin was almost entirely irom chlor-alkali plants. These

plants were lirequently located near pulp and paper mills. due to those mills' need for bleaching chemicals. Brine was
eiectrolyzed to mercury cells to produce c iorine as well as sodium hydroxide and hydrogen.
Today. neariy all oi the old chlor-aikali plants have either closed or they have been convened to non-mercury cell
processes and the law plants that continue to use the old process have reduced their mercury emissions markedly. However.
mercury levels in iish are still a matter of concern in many areas oi the Great Lakes basin (lntemational Joint Commission

1989} and iurther reductions in discharges of mercury to the basin are being sought.

in the early 19705, reducing merCUry discharges seemed a strai htiorward matter. In Canada. ior instance. chlor-aikali
plants were required to limit their mercury discharges to a certain quant per tonne oi chlorine production capacity. For other
industries. mercury dischages became a matter to be considered in the grantingeoi discharge permits. The lirst section oi this
chapter will indicate that a ieving iurther reductions in mercury discharges will more complex.
The mercury which is now enterin the Great Lakes basin comes irom diverse sources the relative importance of which
is pooriy understood. Contaminated s ments. the i acy oi past discharges. are certainly a prominent source. Deposition
irom the air is also important. apparently accounting or about three quarters oi depositions resulting irom ongoing human

activity. The main source oi emissions oi mercury to the air is its evaporation irom a wide variety oi mercu containing
iinished products such as batteries. paints. electrical switches. dental sippiles. control instruments and rIIghts. The
incineration oi products in which mercury has been used. in particular batteries. is also a signiilcant source 01 emissions. The
combustion oi coal also releases substantial quantities oi mercury to the air. Mercury discharged diredly to water appears to

be enterin the basin mainly through sewage treatment plants. The sources oi the mercury entering sewage treatment plants
are not we I known.

The control oi the discharge oi mercury. considered in the second section at this chwter. can be achieved In a number

oi ways. Many local memory contamination problems can probably be cleared ip by remediation oi sediments in a iew
locations u particulariy near the sites oi the old chlor-aliaii plants. The non-essential use oi mercu in products such as paint
and batteries is currently virtually unregulated. These uses could be reduced and ultimateiy en
entirely. incinerators and

coal-tired power plants could install more eiiective pollution control devices to reduce mercury as well as other metal
emissions.

6.1 Sources oi Mercury
Estimates oi the quantity oi mercury discharges into the Great Lakes irom industry (direct discharges). sewage
treatment lame. and atmospheric deposition are summarized in Tables 6.1 (all ldtesl to 6.7 ior each lake and the t.
Lawrence

iverl. It is important to realize that these data are iar irom complete and are not cons

red to be very accurate.

Nevertheless. the overall picture that emerges is believed to be reasondaie and Is oi some use in assessing the role that
economic instniments could play in achieving virtual elimination oi mercury discharged into the Great Luise.
TABLE 6.1 Sources at Mercury Discharges to the Great Lites Basin (Total)

SOURCE

Tonnes/year
Dolan 1985

KIlograms/day
Dolan 1985

Kilograms/day
Dolan 1988

Percent 9
Dolan 19

iNDUSTRiAL DIRECT
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION
TRIBUTARIES

0 05
1 23
8.08
1 27

0%
12%
76%
12%

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

10.63

100%

Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datwase, US EPA; TRI Toxic Release inventory. U.S. EPA
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The total discharge oi 10.6 tonnes estimated lor 1985 is known to be an underestimate oi the actual total. For example.
Dolan (personal communication) reports with some coniidence an tnd'rwdual estimate oi 4.6 tonnes/year oi mercury entering

lake Ontario from the Niagara river in 1985. Much oi this amount is believed to come irom contaminated sediments in the

river. Unlonunately, no data on sedimentary sources 01 mercury are available though much oi the mercury entering irom

tributaries could come irom sediments. Similarly. data tor non-point sources at mercury are also lacking so the overall

signiiicance oi the sources ior which data are available remains in question.

Tables 6.2 to 6.7 suggest that the individual sources oi mercury are widely scattered. This is true 01 the sewage

treatment plants and the atmospheric sources. (Though it should be noted that in Late Erie, where iniormaticn ior a large

number 01 sewage treatment plants is available. six plants account ior most oi the mercury discharges.) Glass et al. (1990)
indicate that the incineration oi municipal reiuse is a signiiicant source oi the atmospheric deposition oi mercury in the Great
Lakesé incinerators in the U.S. and ten in Ontario. Five U.S. and one Canadian incinerator in the r ion have capacities over
18.000 kg/hr oi waste. The U.S. National Emission Standard lor Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAG33) aliows 3.200 g/day oi

mercury to be emitted to air b a sewage slu

average 3-403 oi Hg/ tonne,

countries. so

e incinerator. European domestic garba e has been iound to contain an

ut 50% oi whch is accounted ior by used batteries ( eimann 1986). Some individual

as Denmark, however, separate dry-cell batteries irom household wastes through a collection system operated

through the retail outlets where the batteries are sold.

TABLE 6.2 Sources oi Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes Basin (Lute Superior)
Tonnes/year
Dolan 1990

SOURCE
lNDUSTRlAL DiRECT/lNDlRECT
Michigan
Callahan Mining
White Pine C
Minnesota
U.S. Steel .
-Ontan o
James River Marathon)
TE -Corunna

0.00
0.0079
0.0004

SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT

N/A

ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSiTiON

2.64

TRIBUTARiES

0.74

Minnesota

Western Lake Stperior

Ontario

Black Sturgeon

0.0001

Percentggg
Dolan 1
0%

0.0008
0.0001
N/A
78%

0.092

0.065

Pic
White

0.113
0.220

22%

1.296

Nemadii

TOTAL FOR AVAiLABLE DATA

Kilograms/day
STORET 1988

0.400

Little Pic

Npigon

Wisconsin

Kilograms/day
STORET

0.231
3.38

100%

Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datwase. U.S. EPA; TRi Toxic Release inventory. U.S. EPA
6.1.1 Soidede
The importance oi atmospheric deposition oi mercury in the Great Lakes requires that the likely sources oi this deposition

be ldentliied ii the relevance oi economic instruments is to be properly assessed. Table 6.8 provides iniormation on
5_______
This iindlng was discussed with a swim oiiicial at the Ontario Ministry oi the Environment who believed it to be correct.
However. the Ministry has very little iniormation on the sources oi this atmospheric deposition.
6 Detroit-Windsor/Port Huron-Semis Air Pollution Advisory Board (1991) estimates that rreglon's mercury air emissions to total

94 tonnes/ ear. Much at this comes irom incinerators: 1.678 incinerators in the U.S. a ten in Ontario. Five U.S. and one
Canadian ncineratcr in the r ion have capacities over 18,000 kg/hr oi waste. The U.S. National Emission Standard ior
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NE APS) aliows 3,200 g/day oi mercury to be emitted to air by a sewage sludge incinerator.
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On the basis 01 the available dgta, it is apparent irom Table 6.1 that atmospheric deposition is a major source or

mercury deposition in the Great Lakes . At the same time. direct industrial discharges oi mercury are extremely low and
sewage treatment plants also mate only a modest contribution. Much the same pattern rs shown ior each individual lake.

U
"

y
W
V
V
y
'1
v

W

U
'1
U
y

mercury emissmns tor the US.7 seem far too low. What emerges from Table 6.8 is that anthropogenic sources oi air

emissions of mercury (650 lonneS/year) exceed emissions irom natural sources (500 tonnes/year). The use oi linished goods
I352 tonnesxyear. most of Which comes irom aim and electrical equrpment), coal tired power stations I113 tonnes/year).
municipal and sewage sludge incinerators l 8 and 36 tonnes/year. respectively) account lor almost 90% oi the total

anthropogenic sources. Although similar data do not exist lust tor the Great Lakes basin it is likely that a similar pattern 01
emission sources exrsts there too.

TABLE 6.3 Sources 01 Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes Basin (Lake Michigan)

SOURCE
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT
Michigan

Wisconsin

Hitachi Ma netic

TonneSIyear
Dolan 1990

Kilogram/day
STORET

0.00

0.0251
0.0018

Bergstrom aper

Neenah Menasha

0.0021

0.40

Racine

ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION
TRIBUTARIES
lndlana

0%

0.0059

Waupaca Foundry
Wisconsin

Percenta 9
Dolan 19

0.0153

J.I. Case

SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT

Kilogram/day
STORET 1988

23%

0.6400

1.1000
1.29

Burns
Trail

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

0.05

74%
3%

0.019
0.123

1.74

100%

Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datmase, US. EPA; TRI Toxic Release inventory, US. EPA

TABLE 6.4 Sources 01 Mercury Discharges to the Great Lures Basin (Lake Huron)

Tonnes/ ear
Dolan 1

SOURCE

Kilo rams/day
ST RET

Kilogram/day
STORET 1988

Percent
Dolan 1

INDUSTRIAL DIRECT

N/A

N/A

SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT

N/A

N/A

ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION

2.15

91%

TRIBUTARIES
-Ontario

0.21

French
Mississauga
Nottgwasaqa
au
8%
The Cut

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

0.203
0.157
0.027
0.071
0.084
0.038

2.36

9%

.
100%

Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datwase. US. EPA; TRI Toxic Release inventory, US. EPA
7 Similar data was obtained ior Ontario irom Jacques 11987) but arenot considered very reliable. The estimated totals oi live
tons per year irom Ontario and 31 tonnes per year irorn Canada seem far too low.
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TABLE 6.5 Sources 01 Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Erie)
Tom

Doian1

SOURCE

INDUSTRIAL DIRECT/iNDiRECT
-indiana
Gn dcra
Stanscrew
0010
BP OiI-Oregon
LCP Chemical-Ammonia
Summit! Comm. Fish

-Pennsy1vania

ear

0.00

A

nac

etroit
Port Huron

-Ohio

Akron
Archboid

0.0001
0.0001

0.80

0.0000

Bryan
meme
C e
Conneam

.
0.0100
0.0000
0.0000

Defiance
003

0.0100
0.0100

Findlay
Foetaria
Geauga 00.. Madariane
Kent
Ldre Co., Mentor
Law 00.. Madison
Linwood
Lima

0.0200
0.0000
0.0200
0.0000
0.0100
0.0000
0.0100
0.0200

Lucas Co.
Medina Co. $01
Medina Co. 02
Middleburg Hews
ilan
Mompeiier
Nmoiean
North Oimstead

0.0100
0.0000
0.0000
0.0100
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Lomin. East Side

Norm Royaiton

0.3113
36%

-

0.0000

0.1100

0.0000

0.0000
0.0900

N.E. Ohio. R

0.0400
0.0100
0.0000

ion #4
orwak
0dr Harbor

0.3113
0.0075

0.0500

N.E. Ohio. Region #1
N.E. Ohio, Region #2

NE Ohio. Region #3

0%

0.1100
0.0000

0.0000
0.0100
0.0100
0.0000
0.0000
0.0100
0.0000
0.0000

lyria

A

0.6200
0.0200

Aehtabuia
Avon Lake
Bedtord
Bedtord Heights
Beiievue
Berea
Blufton
Bowling Green

Cuyahoga

Kilogram/day

TRI1988

0.0000

Maiinckrodt-Ene (to STP)

Michigan

rams/day Percent

ST RET 1985 ST BET 1988 Doian1

0.0017

Gunnieon Bros. Tannery

SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT

Kilo rams/day Ki

~

0.1100

Continued
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TABLE 6.5 Sources of Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Ens. continued)
Tonnesgear
DoIan 1 85

SOURCE
Ohio. continued
OhIo Water DeveIopment Authority

00000

Ottawa
PainesviIIe

0.0000
0.0000

PembervIIIe

0.0000

Pe sburg

0.0100

linton

0.0000

Ravenna

0.0000

SoIon CentraI
SpencerviIIe
St. Marys
Summit 00., #1
Summit 00., #2
' Toledo Bay
Twinsburg
Upper Sendusky
Vennillon
wmdronete
Willard
Warren

0.0000
0 0000
0.0000
0.0100
0.0000
0.3800
0.0100
0.0500
0.4000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0200

Sandusky

Michigan

0.0100

ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION

1.20

TRIBUTARIES

0.24

-Ontano

Big Otter
Grand
Sydenham
Thames

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

Kilogram/day
TRI 1988

0.0000

Oregon

Port

Kilo rams/day Kilogram/day Percenta e
ST BET 1985 STORET 1988 Man 19

54%
11%

0.029
0.231
0.165
0.231

2.24

100%

Data Sources: DoIan 1990; STORET (Idiom, U.S. EPA; TRI ToxIc Retenee Inventory. U.S. EPA

TABLE 6.6 Sources at Mercury DIscharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Ontario)
Tonnes/year
DoIan 1985

SOURCE
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT
-New York

Abex
Dwont
Eastman Kodak
Hooker
New York Stae Electric 6 Gas
- MIIIIten 6.8.
- Somerset 6.8.
Rochester Gas & Electnc
- (Indirect)
- (DIrect)
GMC - Fisher Body
Evens Chemettce

0.03

KI
s/dey KIIogreme/dey Percentgg
ST RET1985 STORET 1988 DoIan 1

0.0000
0.0908
0.0000
0.0029
0.0016

Kilogram/day
TRI 1988

3%
0.0000
0.0000
0.0030
0.0253
0.0861
0.3709
0.0002
0.0001
0.0001
Continued
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Tonnes/year

SOURCE

DoIan 1985

Kilogram/day Kilogram/day Percent

Ki

STORET 1985 STORET 1988 Doian 133;

INDUSTRIAL DIRECT, continued
New York
Goulds Pumps
AIIled Chemical

0.0004
0.0009

Oneida Limited
SCA Chemical SVC

0.0011
0.0007

Clark Specialty
Olin - Niagara Falls
Olin - N.F. {to STP)

0.3796

0.0037
0.0299

Occidental - N.F.

0.0062

Occidental - N.F. (to STP)
LCP Chem - Solva
LCP Chem - Solvay (to STP

SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT
New York
Amherst
Niagara Falls
Field Mam. WPCP
Lockport
Syracuse

0.0012
0.1370
0.0112

0.03

0.0100
0.0700

0.0100
0.0400
0.0700
0.0100
0.0900

Niagaa Co.

0.0300

wwstor WS PH

0.0100

ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION

0.80

TRIBUTARIES
Ontario

0.03

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

3%

0.0200

West

Don
Etobiooke
Humber
Twelve Mile
Welland Shh

rams/day

Tim 988

90%
3%

0.010
0.006
0.020
0.274
0.298

0.89

100%

Data Sources: Doian 1990; STORET dwase. U.S. EPA; TRI Toxic Release Inventory, U.S. EPA

TABLE 6.7 Sources of Mercury Discharges to the Great Lute: Basin (St. Lawrence River)
Tonnes ear
Dolanl

SOURCE
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT
-New York
Ontario

St. Joe Mineral
C.I.L.

K rams/day
ST RETI985

K runs/day
8% ET1988

0.0000
0.0433

Percent
Dolan1
N/A

SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT

N/A

ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION

N/A

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

N/A

Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET database. U.S. EPA; TRI Toxic Release Inventory, U.S. EPA
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TABLE 6.6 Sources of Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Ontario. continued)

III IIIIIIIIIIIII

TABLE 6.8 Estimated Sources of Air Emissions oi Mercury in the US. (tonnes/year)
EMlSSiON

souace

(tonneSIyear)

Natural

500

1991

18
1

1985
1985

3
3

1985
1985

5
5

1980
1980

1

1982

Marco Mining and Smeiting
Fossil uel Combustion

Utility coal

Industrial coal
Commercial/residential coal

Utility oil

Smelting

Industrial oil
Commercial/residential oil

Battery Manufacture

1

Copper

41

Sewage sludge
Municipal waste

36
68

Lead
Zinc

incinerators

<1
113

Mercury Recovery Retorts
Mercury Chlor-Alkali Plants
Use of Finished Goods
TOTAL ANTHROPOGENIC SOURCES
TOTAL ALL SOURCES

<1
3
352
650
1,150

YEAR
1983
1985

1985

1980

1980
1986

1982
1983
1980

Source: Bloxam 1991

One important feature of air emissions of mercury is that ditierent forms of mercury have very different deposition rates.

In particular. elemental mercury may stay in the air for many months. so that distant. even global sources can be as im
to local sources in determining how much mercury is deposited into the Great Lates from the air. Accordi to

(personal communication) the importance of extra-regional reductions in mercury emissions is indicated by a h

of elemental mercury releases. Twle 6.9 shows that all of the merwry released from the use of finish

elemental. At the other end oi the spectrum. only 25% ct mercury from munlcpal solid waste falls into this category.

hi
xom

proportion

products is

TABLE 6.9 Speciation of Mercury by Source
SOURCE

Finished Products

ELEMENTAL
HG (gaseous)

BIVALENT
HG (gaseous)

PARTICULATE
HG

100%

0%

0%

Power Generation/industrial Coal Burning

75

20

5

Non-ier'rous Smeiling

90

10

0

Chlor-Akall Production

45

45

10

MSW

20

75

5

Source: Domier 1990.

6.12 mmumumuum
From the above analysis. the way in which mercury is used has emerged as a major determinant of the quantity of this

persistent toxic that ultimately finds its way into the Great Lakes. Estimates of the use of mercury in Canada or any 01 its
sub-regions are not avaiidile. However, quite detailed estimates do exist lor the 0.8. as displayed in Table 6.10.
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6.3 Appllcablllty of Economic Instruments
This section considers the mplication of economic instruments to achieve the virtual elimination of mercu enterin the

Great Lakes based on the information given above. The analysis follows broadly the analytical framework of
concentrates on the issues most pertinent to mercury.

hapter

but

it is clear that mercury is an apgrggnate candidate for virtual elimination in that it is a persistent toxic and has been

identified as a critical pollutant by the

L 08. While efforts to reduce the discharge of mercury into the environment have a

long history in Canada and the U.S., no generalized prohibition has been introduced. A phased reduction of mercury
discharged into the Great Lakes reflects an attempt to find a balance between protection of the environment and the benefits
obtained from the use of mercury in modern economies.
There are two considerations which affect any attempts through direct regulation or economic incentives to achieve

virtual elimination of mercury discharge into the Great Lakes:
-

the available data for mercury on uses (especially in Canada), sources. quantity discharged and quantity entering the
Great Lakes is very partial and unreliable:

'

much of the mercury entering the Great Lakes is transported by air from sources outside the Great Lakes basin.
Any effective approach to reducing mercury in the Great Lakes must begin with a better

reciation of where the

mercury is coming from than the lnlorrnation currently available allows. Furthermore. any 3 me to achieve vrrtual
elimination oi mercury discharged into the Great Lakes will have to be applied to jurisdictions that are outside of the Great
Lakes basin. Conceivably, national programs in Canada and the US. might be required just to solve a regional problem.

However. reductions in mercury discharges anywhere in the two countries might well bring benefits that would justify programs

that are continental in scope.

Although recise uantitative information is unavailable. it is clear from the tabl9s presented earlier in this Chapter that

mercury is use in a wi e range of industrial and agricultural sectors. Much of the mercury ends tp in finished products en
route to the environment unless the roducts are recycled and the mercury recovered, or they are disposed of in secure

landfills. This suggests that there is l eiy to be very substantial differences in the costs of reducing the mercury emanating

from these various sources. Also. it is possible that there are good prospects for substitutions to be made and for new

technologies that can be developed to reduce the use of mercury and its discharge into the environment. As ex alned in
Chapter 5. these considerations: large differences in discharge reduction costs andI Liossbilities for tec nological
developments. provide important grounds for using economic instruments to achieve virtual ell atlon.
all MTra IgormMCfi-p?
The main criterion suggested in Chapter 5 for choosing between these two types of economic instruments concerned

the shapes of the discharge reduction cost functions and the damage functions. Based on the limited lnlorrnation available.
and given the general downward trend in mercury use suggested by Table 6.11, there is no compelling reason to select
emissions trading over an effluent charge. or vice versa. Both instruments can hep secure a continuing reduction in mercury
discharges.

The competitiveness of an emissions trading market is not llrety to be a providing1 the scheme extends to
sources outside the Great Lakes basin. which it would have to do for it to be e ective in eliminat 9 air deposition into the

Lakes. Even if such a scheme was restriaed at the outset to the larger sources (coal fired power stations.
smelting.
incinerators and possibly, sewage treatment plants) there are plenty of these to ensure a reasonwly cornpet ive market in
emissions.

Cumulative emission permits are unllrefy to be suitwle for mercu and local concentrations of mercury in air may well
have to be regulated through ambient air quality standards enforced t rough court action. (The same would apply if an

effluent charge on mercury emissions is irnpiemented.)

in practice. familiarity with emissions tradin in the US, and their proven success in cost-effectively reducing the lead
in gasoline, may make this mach more rea y acceptable than effluent ch es. However, based on what is currently
known about mercury and its sources, there is no obvious reason to think that an e ent charge would not be just as effective
as emissions trading. (The reduction of lead in gasoline could probdily have been achieved just as well with an effluent
charge that increased with time.)
One possible advantage of an effluent charge on mercury is that there is an obvious use of the funds should it be

agreed that the use of such funds be decided in advance. Much of the mercury in the Great Lakes is believed to come from

contaminated sediments some of which could possibly be dredged, treated and/or disposed of in a secure landfill. This is a
costly procedure that must be undertdren with great care since dredging can stir W the sediments and aggravate the

problem. However. the possibility of using revenues from an effluent charge to further eliminate mercury from the rest Lakes
could be attractive. (Revenue from auctioned permits could also be used for this purpose.)
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The previous discussion of emissions tradl

and effluent charges was predicated on an assum ion that steps can and

would be taken to drarnaticaiiy improve the reliabiity of information on sources of mercury entering t

Great Lakes. In the

absence of such data. all regulatory wproaches which focus on the discharge of mercury will suffer. An alternative which

should be considered is to apply economic instruments to the use oi mercury. Two 0 tions are: tradeable permits or product
charges to reduce the use of mercury in manufactured products. Table 6.10 shows t at a relatively small number of product

categories account for most oi the mercury consumption in the US. with batteries alone. accounting for mout one third oi the

total. A System oi tradedale input permits similar to that used to eliminate lead in gasoline could also be effective in this case

Similarly. a charge on the use oi mercury would also stimulate a reduction in its use.
Finally, the possibility of a

oslt/refund System for some gas oi products containing mercury should be considered.

in Toronto. for example. a limited nfrastructure for retumlng us

batteries for proper disposal is already in place and is

operated entirely on a voluntary basis. it would have to be substantially expanded and regulated to cope with a
comprehensive de sit/refund system just for batteries. If the system was extended to other products the complexity of the
infrastructure requ red could greatly increase.
6.3.3 m Edam W

Effective direct regulation of mercury discharges to achieve virtual elimination is handicmped by the same data
problems as the use of emissions trading and effluent charges. However. if these problems are solved and the advantages of
these economic instruments found not to be compelling, there may still be a role for financial enforcement incentives to
increase the likelihood that r ulated sources will, in fact. comply, with the increasingly stringent discharge limits that will be
required to achieve virtual ellmnation.

wp+5r (August 2. 1991)

7.0 ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND VIRTUAL
ELIMINATION OF DISCHARGES OF PCBs
Polychionnated biphenyls iPCBs) are odourless. colourless organic chemical compounds synthesized from the reaction
oi bipnenyi with anhydrous chlorine. Characterized by a high degree oi stability and resistance to heat and pressure. PCBs
make excellent lubricants and hydraulic iiuids lor industnai processes such as aluminum die casti

where h' h pressures are

exerted. in addition. PCBs have been lound useiul as insulating fluids in transiormers and C8386 013, 83 DastICIZBFB Where

iieme resistance is requrred. as constituents oi ink and paints. as hardeners in metallurgical processes and even as dust

suppressants.

It has been estimated that by the late 19603, when PCB use reached its highest levels. about 61% oi US. use was in
'closed' electrical systems. 13% was used in "nominally ciosed' processes (largely hydraulic iiuids) and 26% oi use was in
'open' systems (ior instance. ink) (Lamay 1990).
Since that time, growing concern over the health shoots of long term exposure to PCBs has lead to increasing
restriction upon their production and use. By the late 19703 the manuiacture. im nation and resale oi PCBs were banned in
Canada and the United States iexe tions were and are available ior narrow deiined research uses). The storage and
disposal oi PCBs is also strictly contro led in both countnes. However, the use d PCBs in materials or equpment where they

are already in service continues to be permitted. in Ontario alone. as oi 1989, there were 7,800 tonnes oi high-level PCBs
and 13.300 tonnes oi low level PCBs in service. and 11,000 tonnes oi PCBs in storage (Dilon 1989). Equlvlent estimates tor
the United States have not been iound.
The uantities oi PCBs entenn the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem have iailen signiiicantiy over the past decade.
Levels oi P 83 iound in Great Lakes i and aquatic mammals have also been decreasing. But these declines wpear to be
levelling oil at undeslrmly h
levels. Fish in all oi the Great Lakes continue to be iound with PCB levels exceeding the

Great Lures Water Quality

greement obiectlve (0.1 mg/kgé (international Joint Commission) Greu Lakes Water Oudty

Board 1989). Concem over the continuing presence 0 P Bs throughout the Lates has led regulators to seek lurther
reductions in their discharge.

in deciding how to reduce discharges oi P083 to the Great Ldtes basin, regulators first have to identity where the PCBs

are coming irom. The answer to this question is iar trorn clear. PCBs are slightly heavier that waer. md so East discharges
have left large quantities oi PCBs deposited on river and 18m bottoms. About 50% oi PCBs now entering the rest Lures are
robwiy releases lrom those sediments. A iurther 30% are probdnty
the Ldies by means oi drborne deposition.
olatiiizatlon oi iiuids iedted lrom transiormers. electrical power generation
lndustrld fuel combustion are believed to be
among the main sourrns oi emissions oi PCBs to the air. The final 20% are airtuted to direct it
es and unknown
sources. Probably less than 5% at dlsdierges are directly irom point source disdierges to water. although is low number is
at least in part attrtutwie to very low levels oi monitoring. T e next section oi this chmter provides lurther detail on the
rather ragged state oi knowledge oi PCB discharges.

7.1 Sources at PCBs
Estimates oi the quantity oi PCBs discharged into the Great Lakes irom industry (deed disch

), sewage treament

plants. and atmospheric deposition 8e sunmutzed in Tales 7.1 to 7.7. The due are not con

ered complete or very

accurate but they 0 give some idea at the various sources.

Table 7.1 shows thl. emordng to Ddlt (1985). atmospheric deposition oi PCBs accounts ior about 60% oi the total.

The more recent iJC report (1988) wee e dlilerent impression and atrbutee 28% to atmo

considered to be a more reesondile estimate. Uniortunetely. this report does nor provide e
account tor the rerh iihg 72%.

heric deposition which is

ates oi the sources that

TABLE 7.1 Sources at PCBs to the Gred Laces (Tot!)

SOURCE

Tonnes/year

Doian 1985

lNDUSTRlAL OUTFALLS
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION
TRIBUTARIES
OTHER

0,04
NA
0 81
0 45

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

1 30

Sources: Dolan 1985; MC 1988

Tonnes ear

IJC 198

1.944

5.043
6.987

Tonnes/year

W08 1989

0.15

Percentggg

Doian 1

3%
N/A
82%
35%

100%

Percentage

U0 1988

28%

72%
100%
45

Tonnes/year
Doian1985

SOURCE
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT

Wisconsin

American Can

SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS

TonneS/year
IJC 1988

0.00
N/A

ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION
TRIBUTARIES
-Ontario
LIttIe Pic
Pic
OTHER

0.12
0.03

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

0.15

Kilograms/day Percentage
Doian 19 5
DoIan1985

Percentage
IJC 1988

0%

0.0041

N/A

0.545

80%
20%

0.029

0.048

0.061
0.606

100%

90%

10%
100%

Data Sources: Doian 1985; IJC 1988

TABLE 7.3 Sources 01 PCBs to the Great Lakes (Lake Michigan)
Tonnes/year

Doian 1985

SOURCE
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT
Wisconsin
Badger Die Cast
Ber srtom Pmer
Fort award Pwer
Kimberiy Ciark
Scott Pwer
Wisconsin Tissue
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION
OTHER

0.03

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

0.03

N/A
N/A

Tonnes/ ear

IJC 198

Kilogram/day Pementgge

Doian 1985

Doian 1

5

Percentage

IJC 1988

0.0000
0.0024
0.0492
0.0025
0.0040
0.0261

0.397
0.288

58%
42%

0.685

100%

Sources: DoIan 1985;1JC 1988.
TABLE 7.4 Sources 01 PCB: to the Great Lakes (Lake Huron)

Tonnes/ ear
Doian 1 85

SOURCE
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT
Michigan
GMS~Chev MetaI
GMS-Chev Motor
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION
TRIBUTARIES

Ontario

Saugeen

OTHER

0.01

N/A
0.56

0.05

Severn

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

Tonnes/ ear
IJC 198

0.0118
0.0048

0.496

0.636

Percentage
IJC 1988

2%

N/A
90%

0.039
0.140

0.62

Kilogram/day Percentagg
Doian 19
DoIan 1985

0.108

78%
8%

22%

100%

100%

A
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Data Sources: Doian 1985; IJC 1988
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TABLE 7.2 Sources 01 PCBS to the Great Lakes (Lake Superior)
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TABLE 7.5 Sources of PCBs to the Great Lakes (Lake En el
T onneS/year

SOURCE

Dolan 1985

INDUSTRIAL DIRECT

Michigan
Ford WIxom
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION
TRIBUTARIES
Ontario
Big Otter
Grand

Tonnes/year

IJC 1988

0.00

N/A
0 12
0.09

Percentage

IJC 1988

0%

N/A
57%
43%

0.328
0.020
0.125

13%

0,080

Kettle

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

Dolan 19 5

0.0001

Thames

OTHER

Kilogram/day Percenta 9

DoIan 1985

2.192
0.21

0010

87%

2.520

100%

100%

Kilogram/day Percenta 9

Percentage

Data Sources: Dolan 1985; IJC 1988

TABLE 7.6 Sources 01 PCBs to the Great Lakes (Lake OntarIo)
Tonnes/year

SOURCE

DoIan 1985

INDUSTRIAL DIRECT
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION
TRIBUTARIES
-Ontario

OTHER

Don
Etoblcoke

N/A
N/A
0.01
0.28

Humber
Twere MIle
Welland Shlp
[Nlagara River]

TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA

Toma/gear

IJC 1

Dolan 19 5

0.178
0.009
0.005

2.362
0.29

DoIan 1985

N/A
N/A
3%
97%

0.016
0.367
0.364
[10.541]

2.540

IJC 1988

-

7%

93%
100%

100%

KIIogrems/day Percentggg
DoIan 1
DoIan 1985

Percentage
IJC 1988

Data Sources: DoIan 1985; IJC 1988;
Note: OTHER attributed but non-momma to Ilsted sources.

TABLE 7.7 Sources 01 PCBs to the Great Ldtes (St. Lawrence)

Tonnes/year
DoIan 1985

SOURCE
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT
-New York

Chev Motor

SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION
SEDIMENTS
GROUNDWATER
TRIBUTARIES

WP+51 (August 2. 1991)

Tonnes/gear
IJC 198

0.0001

47

TABLE 7.8 PCB Pathways to Lake Michigan
Pathways

Kg/yeer

Percent

Tributaries (include sediment releases and direct dumping)
Atmospheric

1.150
380

75.0
24.7

TOTAL

1.535

100.0

Direct Discharges to Lake (industry & STPs)

5

0.3

Source: National Wildliie Federation and Canadian Institute ior Environmental Law and Policy (1991).

Acc0rdlng to Lamay (1990), 76.4% oi all tributary loadings to Lake Michigan is "sediment-bound" and so considered to be
deposited to the Lake irom the sediments as o osed to irom current discharge sources. No individual discharger to Lake
Michigan is releasing more than 2 kg/year. A iu her bredtdown 01 Lake Michigan tributary loadings is given in Table 7.9.

TABLE 7.9 Lake Michigan Tributary Loads
Pathways
Fox
Grand Calumet
Kalamazoo

Kg/year

Percent

520
191

38.0
14.0

20

1 .5

845

61 .2 /.'

1 14

Waukegan
TOTAL

'

8.4

.' Note that Shebo gan Harbor, whose sediments are heavily contaminated with P083. has been omitted. "because oi cleanup activities aire y under way. Source: National Wildiiie Federation and Canadian institute tor Environmentai Law and Policy
1991.

7.1.1 SoreueeiWDWchh
Atmospheric
osition accounts for a smaller proportion oi total PCB: entering the Great Lakes than tor mercury.
However. it is still 3
ientiy important to examine its origins. Tables 7.10 to 7.12 gives estimates oi air emissions oi PCBs
in Ontario and Eastern N. America

TABLE 7.10» Air Emissions oi PCBs in Ontario and Eastern North America in 1985 (kg/yr)

Emission Category
Stationary Fuel Combustion
Solid Waste incineration

Ontario
6.9
1.2

Eastern
North America
446
42

Open Sources

36.9

517

TOTAL

45.0

1.005

Source: Ortech 1990
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The importance oi tributary loadings oi P085 is Suggested by some estimates oi PCB pathways into Lakes Michigan that
are summarized in Taste 7.8.

IIIIIIIIIII I I I I I I

TABLE 711 Ontario Air Emissions oi PCBs in Detail. 1985 (kg/yr)
CATEGORY/SECTOR
Stationary Fuel Combustion

POINT
Electrical Power Generation
industnai Fuel Combustion

Sub-Total

Solid Waste Incineration

Municipal Waste incineration

Sewage Sludge incineration

industrial Waste incineration
Commercial institutional Waste incineration

Sub-Total

Open Sources

6.8

6.8
0.4

0.3

0.0

0.7

Transiorrner Leaka 9

Munic'pal Reiuse-Land ill
Sub-Total

TOTAL

7.6

AREA

TOTAL

RANK

0.1

6.8
0.1

2
6

0.1

6.9

0.5

0.8

0.4

S

4

0.0

0,0
0.0

7
8

33.6

33.6

1

0.5

1.2

3.3
36.9

3.3
36.9

37.4

44.9

3

Source: Ortech 1990

TABLE 7.12 Eastern North America Emissions 01 P083 in Detail. 1985 (kg/yr)

CATEGORY/SECTOR

EMISSION

Stationary Fuel Combustion

Electrical Power Generation
industrial Fuel Combustion

Solid Waste incineration

Sub-Total

445.7

Municipal Waste incineration
Sewage Sludge incineration

11.2
3.6

Waste Oil Combustion
Sub-Total

17.0
41.5

On-slte incineration
Transtormer Lear a
Munlc'pai Reiuse-Landi
Sub-Total

8,2
440.5
68.7
517.4

Industrial Waste incineration
Commercial/institutional Waste inc.

Open Sources

337.6
108.1

TOTAL

6.9
3.0

1,004.7

Source: Ortech 1990
Data for 1989 iron the US. EPA Toxic Release inventory Data (TFil) shows that total air emission releases from "Lake

Michi an Slates'. (Western Michigan. Wisconsin. indiana and llilnols) totalled 8.56 it yr. TFti includes only manutacturin

iaciiites that produce.Tgraces: or use over 10.000 lbs oi one oi the 332 TFii listed

chemicals combined.

ese data are presented In Table 7.13.

emlcais or over 50.000 be oi all TR

Given the estimated air emissions oi 350 kg/yr (Lamay 1990) these point source loadings in the TFil account ior under
3% oi atmospheric loadings.
Lamay cites an estimate by Murphy et ai (1985) that the contribution of MSW plants. due to the lack ot restriction on
burning oi materials containing small quantities 01 P063 (such as carboniess copy paper. capacitors on uorescent light
ballasts. starting cwacitors on reirlgerator and washing machine motors is .25 kg/yr per stadr. Lamay (1990). without
knowing the actual number oi incinerators In the region. estimates total MS emissions a about 120 k Iyr with 13-117 kg/yr
deposited to Late Michigan. Sewage sludge incinerators are estimated to emit 50 kg/yr oi which 0- 2.5 kg/yr enter Lake
Michigan.
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STATE
lllinois

Wisconsin

FAClLlTY

RELEASE
(kg/yr)

SCA Chemical Services
Album. Inc.
AMCE International

1.09
.09
.1 8

Northwestern Waste Ener y

540

ntercommunity Incinerator Dist.

.63

City oi Sheboygan Department oi Public W0 3
City oi Waukasha
East Chicago Municipal

lndiana

8th Adhesrve

TOTAL

.54

.18
.18
.27

8.56

Source: TRl; Lamay 1990

7.2 The Control of PCB Discharges
Proven chemical and incineration technologies are available to remediate and treat PCB i uids and solids. industrial
wastewater. and groundwater. Techno ies are also availwie to treat soil contaminated with PC 5 but these are expensive.
PCB contaminated sediment is more dill ult to treat and eiiectlve techno les have not yet been demonstrated on a large
scale. Removal and treatment oi subsurface contamination may not be techn ly leasbie.
Prevention rather than treatment is likely to be the most cost-eiiective woach ior reducing PCBs entering the Great

Lakes. This requires a reduction in the use at PCBs and the elimination oi stocks in storage.

7.3 Applicability of Economic instruments
As in the previous chapter on mercury. this section iollows the ana lcal iramework oi Chwter 5 in assessing the role that
economic instruments might play in achieving the virtual elimination oi CBs entering the Great Lures.
PCBs are one oi the 11 critical llutants identified by the lJC and. as a persistent toxic that bioaccumulates in iatty tissue.
indeed. the ban on the production, importation and sale oi PCBs in Canada and the
the goal oi virtual ellrnination
the commitment that governments in both countries have made to eliminating
demonstrates
1970s
late
the
in
States
United
PCBs irom the environment. However. as the previous sections have shown. signi cant quantities oi PCBs continue to enter
the Great Lakes environment irom a variety oi sources. the most important oi which are believed to be irom contaminated
sediments in tributaries and deposition irom the air.

Even though there is ample opportunity to improve the data on PCB loadings entering the Great Lures. and such
improvements are a pro-requisite ior introducing any type at economic instrument, it is unlikely to aiiect the overall picture
at PCB sources are not readily mantle to economic instruments. The single largest category
which shows that the m
Ldtes is irom contaminated sediments which may account ior 50% or more oi total loadings.
reat
the
in
oi PCB loadings

These sources are beyond the control oi economic instruments and direct regulation unless the sediments are the legal

property or responsblllty at a corporalon. municpality or individual. This is seldom the case.

An unknown proportion oi the trbiltary loadings, perhng as much as 25% at total loadings. come irom point source

discharges. These could be amenable to economic instruments ii detailed lnionnatlon on them was available.

Some 25-30% oi total PCB loadings in the Great Lakes come irom air emissions. Transiorrner leakages and municipal
iandiills are believed to represent about 50% oi these emissions and these could not easily be controlled through economic
instruments. Stationary iuel combustion, especially ior electrical power generation. creates about 45% oi the total air
emissions and incineration tutes care oi most oi the remainder. Economic instruments could be mplied to these last two
categories oi sources but their combined contribution to the total PCB loadings is only about 15% oi the total. Most oi the
remainin PCBs entering the Great Lates wpear to come irom municipal sewage treatment plants which might also respond
to centre through economic instruments.

in summary. therelore, less than 40% (possibly much less) oi the total PCB loadings in the Great Lakes can even be

considered as

tentlaiiy sultaile i0r control through economic instruments assuming that let better data than are currently

available coulrfobe obtained on the speciiic point sources res nslble. Furthermore, as with mercu , the situation is
complicated by the tact that many at the sources oi airborne emis ns oi PCBs are situated outside oi the reat Lakes basin.
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TABLE 7.13 Air Emissions oi PCBs in the Lake Michigan States

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

in view oi the fact that PCBs are no longer permitted to be manufactured. imported or resold anywhere in Canada
or the
United States twlth minor exceptions lor researchl there is no need to rely on economic instruments to provide incentives to
develop less harmful substitutes or alternative production processes. Likewise. there is little opportunity for economic
instruments to capitalize on differences in abatement costs for P083 given that strict controls on emissrons are already In
existence The problem seems to be those at monitoring and enforcement which would not be lessened by the introduction of

tradeable permrts or effluent charges.

Given the current state of knowledge it seems that the greatest reductions in discharges can probably be achieved by

cleaning up the more severely contaminated Great Lakes basin sediments. However. such clean ups are currently quite
expensrve. Accelerating the removal of PCBs irom electrical egu' merit through regulation. supported by lines or financral
enlorcement incentives. would also reduce future emissions signi cantly providing the P083 so removed are disposed of
effectively. The exemption allowing wastes containing under 50 pans per million of P085 to be exempted from strict PCB
disposal controls. found in both in Canadian and US. aw. could be removed Other reductions could be achieved by tighter
control of direct discharges to water and discharges to sewa e treatment plants. strict quality control at PCB destruction
facilities and other currently permitted 'ciosed' system uses of 083 could be restricted or eliminated. Actions such as these
can be best be implemented through direct regulation.
in summary. even if better data on sources were available. the prospects for using economic instruments to achieve the
virtual elimination oi PCBs in to the Great Lakes, except in a supporting role of nancial enlorcement incentives. seems limited.
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8.0 AN ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE PULP AND
PAPER INDUSTRY IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN
V
The pulp and paper industry has historically been characterized by slow. steady market growth and limited technological
innovation. Recently. however. the industry has been showing signs of moving into a period of rapid technological change.
The globalization of pulp and paper markets. involvin free trade between Canada and the United States as well as
the emer ence of low cost third world reducers is bringing eavy pressure on the industry to become more efficient. The
advance age and relatively small sc 9 of Ontario s pulp and paper facilities make them particularly vulnerable to these
pressures.
The need to reduce acute and persistent toxic emissions from pulp and paper mills will require this industry to make

significant process changes. in particular, new chiorine~free bleaching technologies may have to be adopted. New air and

water pollution control equrpment will also have to be purchased.

Growing pressure from governments and consumers to increase the recycled fibre content of paper products is

increasing the need for mills which can reuse waste papers. in combination with demand for reduction in the over all use of
packaging materials. the demand for recycling may also reduce the market for pulp and pater products made with virgin fibres.

While the need to adapt to new circumstances will create financial risks. it will also present innovative pulp and paper
producers with great opportunities. Currently many companies. particularly those operating in Canada. are suffering the
effects of a recession. but on the whole the industry is believed to be generally sound and healthy (Pulp and Paper. January
1991; US. Department of Commerce 1990; Value Line. Janua 1991). Companies are believed to be in a position to make
the investments that will be necessary to survive in a global. ecorzigicaliy sustainable market.

8.1 Pulp and Paper industry Products
Pulp. paper and board making constitute the most important sector of the North American forest products industry. in
terms of tonnes of product as well as dollar value. The sector also serves the lumber and plywood manufacturing sectors as a
maniet for by-products of their production.

For most purposes. pulping processes can be categorized as either chemical or mechanical. although the two
processes are sometimes used in combination. The levels of use of these methods of pulping in the United States. Canada
and the rest of the world can be seen in Tables 8.1. 8.2 and 8.3. respectively.
Mechanical pulping involves fuming wood into fibre by means of grinding or beating. Between 85 and 95% of the wood
furnished to a mechanical process is actually used in the product. As a result of retaining most of the wood content, individual
tibres retain a high ilgnln content and are relatively stiff. The resulting pup has relatively few contact points between fibres
and so produces paper with a relatively low strength.
Chemical puping can produce a relatively strong product from virtually any sort of wood. Lignin and some

hemiceiluloses are removed from the wood by chemicaidpuping, producing more fiexbie and better bonding fibres. Typical

kratt pulp uses about 45 to 55% of the wood fumishe to the process. Sottwoods produce stronger kratt pup than do
hardwoods.

Mechanical pub is characterized b its opacity. ink absorbtivity. resilience and stiffness. These characteristics make

mechanical pup desirable as a source

newsprint (typically containing 80 to 100% mechanical pu i. printing and writing

pa rs (including supercalendered m azine paper). lightweight coated paters (typically containing 0 to 60% mechanical
pug, and folding caton boards (norm
30 to 50% mechanical pup).
Semlchemlcal pup is used mainly for corrugating medium. Semlchemlcai pop is desirable for this use due to its ability
to resist compression and crushing.
Recycled fibre has most commonly been used as a furnish for padraging papers and boards. if is also used in sanitary

and creped fpapers. The use of recycled furnish for making newsprint is rqoidly increasing. Some use is now also being made
of recycled ibre in printing papers.

Chemical pulp is distinguished by its length and strength and is used as a reinforcement fibre in nearly all 'wer and
board grades. Softwood chemical pub is stronger than hardwood pup. Hardwood chemical pu . on the other h
is slightly
cheaper and has good surface formation characteristics. About 50% of chemical pup used w
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TABLE 8.1 United States Woodpub. Paper and berboard Production and Owacity

(Thousands 01 Short ons)

1990

1.301
1.425
50.640
50.181
1.554
1.565
(incl. in bleached

1.495
52.518
1.433
189

1.495
54.510
1.433
189

26.979

27.100

27.876

29.217

5.700
Total Woodpup 60.239

6.029
61.998

6.292
62.643

7.327
66.265

7.585
68.554

5.842
1.498
6.860
10.966
5.301
4.955
1.798
Total Paper 36.876

6.088
1.743
7.215
11.081
5.636
4.925
N/A
38.256

6.499
1.751
7.312
11.498
5.733
4.669
N/A
39.009

6.808
1.808
8.499
12.403
5.972
5.475
N/A
42.649

7.123
1.877
8.903
13.022
6.127
5.600
N/A
44.342

19.490
4.521
5.691
8.754
38.456

19.996
4.474
5.708
8.742
38.921

21.482
4.838
6.003
10.029
42.352

22.409
5.051
6.010
10.370
43.840

134.557 138.710

140.573

151.266

156.736

1989

capacityl
WOODPULP
Dissolving 8. Special A ha
Chemical Pulp. Paper rades

1,311
48.293
Sulphite. bleached 1.269
Su hite. unbleached 171

Kraft and

Semichemical

da, unbleached 21.442

Kratt. bleached and semibleachod 25.411

Groundwood and Thermomechanlcal
PAPER
Newsprint
Groundwood Printing and Converting
rs
Coated P
Uncoated ree Sheet
Tissue
Packaging 8 industrial Converting
Other

PAP ERBOARD

Unbleached Kraft Pwer ooard
Solld Bleached Pmemoard
Semichemlcal Paperboard
Combination Furnish Board

GRAND TOTAL

1991
pract.

1990
1631.)

1987

4.246

18.898
4.406
5.536
8.601
Total Paperboard 37.442

21.648

4.363

21, 14

4,409

23.020

4.929

(max.

23.671

4.964

'

. Source: Lockwood-Post 1990
TABLE 8.2 Canada Paper and Paperboard Production and Capaa'ty
(Thousands oi Short Tons)

1991
pract.

1989

1990
test.)

1990

Kraft. semi-bleached 10,338

301
13.738
458
1.335
1.481

10,464

254
12.792
455
1.156
1.345
9,836

278
15.368
530
1.422
1.720

11,696

12.199

389
10.764

374
11.538

433
11.784

565
13,760

565
14,609

25.965

25.271

29.971

31.290

1987

(max.

Capacity)
WOODPULP
Dlssolving 8 Special A ha
Chemical Pub. Pmer rades

Semichemical
Mechanical

266
13.890
Su hite. bleached 500
Su h e. unbleached 1.428
ratt. unbleached 1.624

Total Woodpulp 25.328

278
15.838
530
1.389
1.720

Continued
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TABLE 82 Canada Paper and Paperboard Production and Capacity (continued)

(Thousands of Short Tons)
1987

1989

1990

1990

test.)

PAPER
Newsprint
Printing 8 Writing)
Kralt Packaging apers
Tissue 8. Specialty
PAPERBOARD
Containerboard
Boxboard

1991

(max. pract. capacrty)

Total Paper

10.653
2927
625
503
14,708

10.667
3.515
579
537
15.298

10.400
4,076
567
535
15,578

12.161
4,453
576
722
17,912

12.744
4696
594
752
18,786

Total Paperboard

2.154
818
2.972

2.143
803
2.946

2.244
783
3.027

2.483
1.005
3.488

2.507
1.073
3.580

43,008

44,209

43,876

51,371

53.656

GRAND TOTAL
Source: LockwoodsPost (1990)

TABLE 8.3 Global Share 01 Production. Papermaking Flaw Materials. 1985
Raw Material

Share (°/.)

Chemical pulp. softwood
Chemical pulp, hardwood
Mechanical pulps (mainly softwood)
Semichemical pulps (mainly hardwoods)
Recycled libre

32
13
16
4
22

Chemicals. tillers, synthetic fixes

7

Pulps irom non-woody plants

6

TOTAL

100%

Source: Ebellng 1987
Table 8.4 indicates the levels 01 global consumption 01 various sorts at over and paperboard products. Tailes 8.1 and

8.2 may also be reterred to for levels 01 production oi those products within the United States and Canada
TABLE 8.4 Total Global Consumption oi Paper and Board, 1985

Consumption

Paper Board Grand

(million tons/year)

Printing and Writing

New

49

rint

28

Soft issue Paper
Sad Paper
Linerboard
Corrugating Medium (lluting)
GRAND TOTAL

11
6

Total Paper (55%)

105

_
Total Board (45%)

30
15
86
190

Source: Ebellng 1987
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The pulp and paper industry is one oi Ontario s most important industries. In the past several years the industry s

growth has been slower than that oi the provincial economy as a whole. resulting in a decline in the industry's share 01 total

provincial production and employment. Nevertheless. changes in demand ior its oducts still have widespread implications
tor the Ontario economy. In particular. communities in Northwestern Ontario and a rip the shore at Lake Superior are heavily
dependent upon pulp and paper production

Employment
In 1985. the "Paper and Allied Industries. comprised oi pup. pagzr and pwerboard makers as well as manuiacturers

oi asphalt rooting, directly employed approximately 41,000 people in

tario. This amounts to aproximateiy 1.2% oi the

Ontario workforce. Oi these. wpmximateiy 20,000 were employed in the pub and pwer sector. 11,000 were employed in the

specialty and iine paper sector {not included in pulp and paper), 10.000 were employed in the paperboard and bag sector and
600 were employed in asphalt rooting manuiacture (Coke 1988).
Employment in the Paper and Allied Industries has been declining slightly over the past twenty years. This change is

largely attributable to the modernization oi the pulp and newsprint muting sectors. Statistics Canada estimates that a further
57.000 jobs are indirectly stimulated by the Ontario Paper and Allied Industries (Coke 1988).
v

Provincial Gross Domestic Product

The Paper and Allied Industries contributed about C325 billion to the province s total manuiacturin value-added in
1985. Oi this, wout 031.5 billion came irom the pu and pwer sector, C3534 million irom production oi i he and specialty
irom the paperboard and pater bag sectOr and C361 million from
papers (not included in pup and paper), C3431 mill
asphalt rooting manulacture.

Approximately 2.7% 01 the Ontario Provincial Gross Domestic Product has historically been generated by the Paper and

Allied industries (Coke 1988).

National Pmer and Allied industries

in 1987, Ontario produced 24% oi the total value at Canadian pulp and pmer shipments (034.2 billion). as well as 23%
oi the value added and 25% oi total national employment in the industry (Canadian Pub and Paper Association 1989).
-

.

Exports

In 1985, Canadian exports oi pup and paper products earned 0310.3 billion dollars. C354 billion (031.1 billion from
Ontario came irom the export oi newsprint, 033.4 billion $030.5 billion irom Ontario) irom the sale 01 pup and C315 billion
1030.5 iliion irom Ontario) irom the sale at other paper an paperboard products (Coke 1988).
'

Regional Economies

Needy hail oi the value added by the Pater and Allied industries In Ontario is created in Centai Ontario. while about
one quarter is generated in Northwestern Ontario. About ten percent each are produced in the Northeast and East oi the
rovinoe. About three percent oi total vane-added is generated in the Southwestern portion or the province. However, over
0% 01 all manuiacturing activity in the Northwest and about 20% 01 that In the Northeast is generated by the Paper and Allied
industries.

Employment created directly by the Pwer and Allied industries is distributed across the province in proportions almost
Identical to those ior meneratton oi value added. Similarly, over 60% ct manuiacturing em oyment in the Northwest oi
Allied Industries. as is about 15% at Northeastern manuiaauring ernp yment (Coke 1988).
Ontario is in the Pmer

ion currently being studied at the Ontario Class Environmental Assessment tor Timber
Within the larger
(all oi Northern Ontario but tor the north most portions oi Kendra and Cochrane Districts and
Management on Crown La
bordering Southern Ontario Counties where there Is significant logging activity), the Piper and Allied Industries are the third
iaTrgést grsivate sector employer, the second largest source oi income. and tirst in terms 01 value oi sales per full-time employee
( a e . ).

8.2.2 WM
Detailed inionnation on the importance oi the pulp. p? and pqterboard industries to the regional economies oi the
Great Lakes states was not iound. As a whole, the United tales pulp, paper and paperboard industries em loyed 195.000

Benpie. and

roduced value added equal to U.S.323 billion, irom shipments oi a total value ol US.

7 billion (US.

epartmento Commerce 1990).
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8.2 The Economic Significance of the Pulp and Paper Industry
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In Michi an, during 1987, the production oi Paper and Allied Products directly created 20,600 )obs (3% of state total)

produced US, 17 billion dollars in value added (3% of state total) and shipped US$36 billion worth of products (2.5% oi
state total) (US. Department oi Commerce 1990).

in WlSCOHISln. '0 1987. the Paper and Allied Products Industry employed 43.000 people (8% oi state total). produced

U 8.939 billion in value-added (12% 01 state total) and shipped products with a value oi US$88 billion (13% of 81818 total)
(U 8, Department oi Commerce 1990).

TABLE 85 Direct Economic Contribution to the Area of the Undertakln tor the Ontario Class

Envrronmental Assessment oi Timber Management. Made by the Forest.
Tourism and Fur Industries, 1986

EMPLOYMENT
(person-years)
Forest industry

Logging

7.470

Forestry Servrces
Wood industry

3,865
9.500

Paper 8 Allied industries
-

15.045

VALUE OF SALES
VALUE OF SALES
OR EXPENDITURES
(SC-millions)

2.475

Total

Tourism
Fur industry

13.335

16
128

2.430

15.745

Mines

132

60
1,215

4,690

Primary Metals

VALUE OF SALES
PER FULL-TlME
EQUIVALENT
(SC-0003)

985

35,880

Mining and Primary Metals

Total

ining and Primary Metals.

162

131

157

29.080

1.665

4, i 40

125

Total

27,100

1 ,310

48

Total

700

14

20

142

Source: Peat Marwidr 1989
In Ohio, durl

1987. the production oi the Paper and Allied Products Industry employed 30.000 people (3% oi state

total). produced US. 1.9 billion in value-added (3% ol state total) and sh'pped products with a value 01 US$44 billion (3% oi
state total) (US. Department 01 Commerce 1990).
In New York. during 1987, the

created US$22 billion in value-a

oduction oi Paper and Allied Products employed 40.000

rsons (3% 01 state total).

(3% 01 state total) and produced shipments worth U.S.$4. billion dollars (3% oi state

total) (US. Department of Commerce 1990).

While the Michigan pub and pater indust

Ohio and New York's pub and paper
portion at pulp and paper industry 1

is located entirely within the Great Lutes basin, on

it acllities are within that area. in llinois. lndiana and
are located in the Great Ldres basin.

a part 01 Wisconsin,

innesota. only a small

Table 8.6 indicates the total levels 01 pulp, paper and Paperboard production in the region which includes the Great

Lakes basin, as well as giving an indication ot the importance 0 the region to the U3. pup and purer industry as a whole.

TABLE 8.6 Pwer. Pwerboard and Woodpulp Productlon, North Central Region
(Thousands 01 Short one, 1987)

North Central
Total US.

Paper

Pwerboard

Pup

8,076
36.134

4,949
36,990

4.647
62357

Source: Lockwood-Post (1990)
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8.3 Industry Structure
Production iaciiities in the pulp and pmer sector tend to be very large due to the capital intensive nature oi new

capacity construction. Environmental. energy and automation costs per unit of output are generally lower In larger mills.

Increasingly, logging. puping and papenndring facilities are being integrated to take advantage oi economies in transpon and
materials costs.

Investment In such large inte rated facilities carries an inherentl high investment risk not easily borne by smaller
companies (Table 8.7). In addition. t 9 high canal costs oi these large acilities leave them relatively inilexlble in the face of

demand changes induced by the business cy . As a consequence 01 these factors. the North American pulp and paper
industry shows strong signs oi increasing concentration of ownership. This is particularly true of the pulp and newsprint
sectors oi the industry

TABLE 8.7 Capital Cost 01 Pulp and Paper Facilities. 1984 (1984 US dollars)
Facility Size

Facility Type

Pulp Mill

(tons/day)

Cost

(1984 U.S.$)

Unbleached krait
Bleached irraft mill
Bleached sultlte
Thermomechanical

1.000
1.000
1.000
1,000

338500.000
414.500.000
407,100,000
171 £00,000

Newsprint

1.000

254000.000

Paper Mill

Fine paper

1.000

280.100.000

Source: Tillman 1985

Competitive efforts in the industry tend to focus on reducing manuiacturlng prices and cited

advertised prices. There has historicaliy been little com

discounts on publicly

tltlon for technical leadershp in the in ustry. The industry is

characterized by relatively old technology. Pup and wet ndustry products are also considered by the industry to be more or
less substitutmle within each product grade. it is not entirely clear why the pup and paper industry has shown so little

competitiveness in dist uishlng products. A number 01 iactors are cited as possble explanations: the industry s basic
y is relatively o and available to anyone; customers consider the roducers products within each category to be
techn
close s stltutes: markets are well estdsiished and growing steadily. showng consumers' contentment with the types of

- products they are receiving.

Low levels of technological innovation and new product creation are also ascrbed to a number oi other causes. In
articular: high cwital risks involved in wptylng new manuiacturlng processes-- as developin a production techno y from
costly
moralmy testing to bench scale, pilot scale. prototype and llnaiiy established use typically is a rig (5 to 10 years)
process; reductions in cash flows resulting irorn the lad that the pup and pater industry had about ten lean years beiore a
profit jump in the late 1980:. The fact that equ ant and process development tends to be by equbment builders rather than
the pulp and paper industry may also be oi slg
mce.
The dttierent sectors oi the pup aid paper industry reflect varying degrees at concentration.
Newsprint

The North American newsprint market can be characterized as oiigopollstic. Ten firms control 67% 01 newsprint

capacity and six companies control 47% (Mccwbln 1990). A total oi 62 mitts are operated in North America by 31 companies.

Increased use 01 recycled newsth will offer 3 nliicant opportunities for new entrants. New recycling mills can be

located close to urban areas and are economical to bur d on a smaller and less expensive scale. This may well attract new
entrants into newsprint production.

Short term overcwacity oi virgin fibre newsprint capacity may prevent producers irorn usingotheir oiigopoiy situation to

pass on price increases in the short term. But in the longer run. oiigopolistlc conditions should at w producers to pass on a
significant portion oi environmental control costs.
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Market Pulp

Market pulp production is also characterised by an oligopollstic structure. Within Canada 28 market kratt pulp
producing mills are controlled by 'roughly 20' com antes (McCubbin 1990). Across North America. levels 01 concentration
Similar to those in the newsprint sector are found: T 9 top five companies in the industry control 39% 01 market share and the
top ten companies control 59% (Pulp and Paper. October 1990).
Capital costs 01 building an optimally sized new kratt pulp mill. which would produce 1200 tonnes of pulp per day. are In
the area 01 031.4 billion (McCubbin 1990). This is a signi cant barrier to entry. Environmental control costs may also
contribute to the dittiCUlty ol entry. in addition. a mill must have access to a very large area of forest. over a long period of

time. in Northern Ontario. McCubbin estimates that an optimally sized pulp mill would require access to about 63,000 acres 01

forest every year.

-

Printing and Writing Papers

The printing and writing papers sector is lar less homogeneous than the newsprint and pulp sectors. producing a wide
variety of product types. However. market niches within this larger sector tend to be dominated by small numbers 01
companies. For instance. in the North American market lor coated tree-sheet paper (used in magazines. catalogues.
commercial printin and some books) three com antes hold 53% oi the market share. the largest live hold 66% and the top
ten companies hot 99% (Pulp and Paper, July 1 90).

U 8. production in this sector is tar larger than Canada's. Trade between Canada and the United States in this sector is

relatively small. although this may be attributable to the past existence at significant tariti barriers.

-

Other Sectors
Like the printing and writing sector. the rest 01 the pulp and paper indust

shows a significant level of diversity while at

the same time small numbers at companies dominate the production 01 individua products (Taste 8.8).

TABLE 8.8 Market Share in Selected U.S. Pub and Paper Markets
MARKET
SHARE

TOP FIVE
MARKET
SHARE

Stone Contalner

23.1%

69.0%

lntemational Pmer

19.7%

Stone Contalner

MARKET AND LEADING PRODUCER
Kralt Paper
Bleached Paperboard
Kratt Linerboard
Tissue

Corrugatlng Medium

TOP TEN
MARKET
SHARE

TOTAL MARKET
CAPAClTY
(000 short T/y)

96.0%

2,745

65.4%

92.4%

4,838

14.0%

49.7%

78.4%

20.339

Scott Pqeer

19.1%

75.1%

92.2%

6,113

Georgia-Pad c

19.5%

47.9%

67.9%

8.200

Source: Pulp and Paper, various issues.
-

Companies

The overall North American pub and pater market is spread across a moderately large number at companies (Table
8 9). These are. however, large and olten regionally very in uential. The market power ot these companies is signitlcantly

magni ed by the tact that the industry ls lraotured into a large number 01 specialty pqaer and board manulacturing sectors.
Each 01 these sectors tends to be dominated by a small number at producers.
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TABLE 8,9 The 20 Largest North American Paper Companies. 1989
(millions of US Dollars)

A
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Bowater
Abltibi-Price

dM

Temple-inland

. .as
wwew .moo
99r9mdwom
§3§3
33§2Do. ONN
dmou

Union Camp

Westvaco
Mead
Canadian Paciiic Forest Products
MacMIllan Bloedel
Domtar

(II
.

Great Northern Nekoosa
Weyerhaeuser
Noranda Forest
Boise Cascade

RANK BY
TOTAL SALES

TOTAL SALES
9 999WMT
NT T NPNPP NPP99 mA-oow
uro (a
\IAm- NAO M \ew-e
\I

Georgia-Paci c
Champion International

o'o xiiu'o'mmbnio'AL-A m'o o mia d'oo

Kimberly-Clark
Stone Container
Scott Paper

T NPNE"NS"5"?. 9 f-". "!~"S"
m unooo muuuooo- mrom
gN
(Q
$NA DQN mmumm
A

International Paper

James River

bbln

95093.05???)pr

m.._._._._...d_._._.

SOWNQ QPQNT

PAPER AND ALLIED
PRODUCTS SALES

Source; Lockwood-Post 1990

Ownership oi individual pup and pwer com anies is more widely held in the United States than in Ontario. In Ontario,
control oi pulp and paper companies tends to be eid by small numbers of investors (Twle 8.10). Some oi the larger US.
companies have dominant shareholders: the Stone iamily hold 25% of Stone Container, Warren Buitett and Laurence Tisch
have taken sizeaiie positions in Champion lntemational. the We erhaeuser lamiiy maintains a slgnillcant stake in
Weyerhaeuser -- but most at the larger US. companies appear to be in ly held.

TABLE 8.10 Ownership 01 Ontario Pub and Paper Mills. 1990

Mills
Abitibi Price
Beaver Wood Fibre
CPFP (Thunder Bay Mills)
Domtar
ES. Eddy
Fraser

James River (Marathon Mill)
Kimberly Clark oi Canada
Macmillan Bloedel

Quebec 2; Ontario Paper
St. Marys Papers
Trent Valley Paperboard

Principal Shareholders
78%
100%
85%
56%
44%
100%

Olympia and York
Ge Ia Pacitic
Canad an Pacific
Public
Quebec Government
George Weston

-

James River

-

Kimberly Clark

-

100%

-

100%
75%
25%

Noranda

Buchanan

Noranda

Chicago Tribune
Private
Rauma Rapola

-

-

-

-

100%

80%

20%

50%

N/A

Source: McCubbln 1990

Table 8.11 Indicates which oi these companies are operating mills in the Great Lakes basin and gives some description

01 the mills.
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TABLE 8.11 Pup. Paper and Paperboard Mills in the Great Lakes

RECEIVING
MILL TYPE
WATER

LOCATION AND MILL

PROD.
lt/d) TREATMENT

NOTES

LAKE am BASH

Oralio
Thunder Bay Abrtibi-Price Fine Papers

Thunder Bay Groundwood

125

P

Total, 442 W line and

Thunder Bay

Abitbi Price, Ft-Wiiliam

Thunder Bay gagndwood

21;:

P

Total, 383 W newsprint

Thunder Bay Abitibi-Prioe, Thunder Bay

Thunder Bay Groundwood
Suiphlte

320
120

P

Total, 442 W newsprint

Thunder Bay

Kaministirwia Groundwood
River
Subnite
Kraft

910
300
1,300

P

Total, 1,170 t/d newsprint

600
Kraft
Groundwood
150
Semi-bleached kralt 50

P

Total, 600 W iinerboard
200 Ud newsprint

Red Rock

CPFP

Domtar Packaging

Kimberly-Clark

Terrace Bay

James River

Marathon

Harbour

Nbigon Bay

1

P. S

coated papers

Total. 1200 W bleadred

Jaddlsh Bay Kralt

1.200

Kraft

«0

P

140

P: Closed Hardboard, 140 W

Peninsula
Harbour

Wt Pulp

Total, 440 t/d bleached
kralt pup

Whoa-it

Superior

Superior Fibre

(Subs. ol Georgia-Paci c)

James River

Ashland

Lake Stperior Detbratlng
Chequarnegon Deirir and Bleach

Bay

system

65

P, S

Tissue, Napkings. 65 W

575

P, S

Corrugan Medium. 550 W

P

Specialty Pm. 98 W

will

Ontonagon

Stone Commr

Munising

Kimberly-Clark

Ontonagon
River

Lake Slperlor(Pmer Mil)

P . Primary; S - Secondary; tld - tonnes/day
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RECElVlNG
WATER

LOCATION AND MILL

MlLL TYPE

PROD.
(t/d)

TREATMENT

NOTES

LAKE MDHIGAN BASH

Wiscms'n

Industrial and personal
service paper, 7 ud

Green Bay

Fort Howard Paper

Fox River

Deinking

N/A

P.S

Green Bay

Green Bay Packaging

Fox River

Semi-Chemical

220

P: Closed Corrugatlng medium.

James River

Green Bay

Fox River

Green Bay Proctor & Gamble Paper Fox River

Nicolet Pmer
De Pete
(Division oi intemationai Pwer)

Fox River

Kaukauna Thilmany Pulp and Paper Fox River
(Division oi international Paper)

(NSSC)

Suiphite

Sulphite
Groundwood

P, 8'

Tissue. towel, napkin

expanding to 700
470 t/d

Tissue, household paper

P

Specialty krait papers
140 t/d

Krait

420

P, S

Krait. converting and coated
papers. 550 W

180

P, 8

Book and specialty paws,1,14O t/d

P, 8"

Fine papers, 120 W

Mldtec Pater

Fox River

Groundwood

Appleton

Kerwin Pwer

Fox River

Bleach & Deink

Combined Locks Appleton Papers

Fox River

Chemi-mechanic

, LOCATlON AND MlLL

specialty board. «110 t/d

(idle)
(idle)

(Paper Mill)

Kimberly

(Subsidiary at Riverside Paper)

160

system

200

P, S

RECEiVlNG
WATER

NOTES

LAKE mm BASH. CONNIE)

thunsit all W

Kimberly Clark
Wisconsin Tissue Mills
Ber irom Pm

leton
About 5-10 miles mstmam oi
Fox River
About 5-10 miles instream oi Appleton (opposite eeneh)
Fox River
Above Late Oshkosh, thence to Fox River
Lake Butte Des Mortes

Shawano Pwer
Shawano. Wl
Badger Pmer
Peshtigo, Wi
Scott Paper
Oconto Falls. Wi
Minominee Paar
Minominee, Ml
Scott Pater
Marinette. WI
Niagara
Niagara. Wl
Champion
Dickenson County. Ml
Manistique Put: a PQO!
Manistique, Mi
Mead
Escanaba. Ml
Filer City, Ml Packaging Corp. oi America

Distant tributary oi Fox; over 70 miles upstream oi Oshkosh
Woli River
A iew miles upsatream: into north end at Green Bay
Peshtigo River
About 15 miles wstream; into northern part at Green Bay
Oconto Paper
At mouth oi Green Bay. north end
Monominee
site Menominee
Monominee
Over 60 miles upstream oi Marintette
Menominee
in same general areas as Ni ara
Trib. to Menominee
North and oi eke
Manistique River
Top oi Green Bay
Escanaba River
East-central lake
Lake Michigan

Allied Pwer
Mead
Menasha
Piainweil Pater
Wateriiet Pwer
French Paper

Osiego & Plainwell are 10-15 miles downstream oi Kalamazoo

Neenah. Wi
Menasha. WI
Neenah, WI
Neenah. WI

Kalamazoo, MI

Kalamazoo. Mi
Ostego, Ml
Ostego. Ml
Piainwell. Ml
Watervliet, Mi
Niles. Ml

K mberiy Clerk

Brown

Little Lake Butte Des Mortes

Kalamazoo River

Portage Creek
Kalamazoo River
Kalamazoo River
Kalamazoo River
Paw Paw River
St. Joseph River

Above Late Oshkosh. thence to Fox River

About 40 miles upstream oi east side of lake

South-east side oi lake
About 25 miles irom southeast comer oi lake

P . Primary; S - Secondary; i/d - tonnes/day; ' S at (omt municipal/industnal plant; '8 at munic'pal plant
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TABLE 8.11 Pup, Paper and Pwer ooard Mills in the Great Lakes (continued)

IIIIIIIIIIII I I I I I

TABLE 8.11 Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Mills in the Great Lakes tcontinued)
RECEIVING
WATER

LOCATION AND MILL

.
Ontario ind m

LAKE HUI-KN BASH

Sault Ste. Mane. ON

St. Marys

Espanoia. ON

220

River

EB. Eddy
Forest Products

Spanish River Kralt

MacmillanBioedel

Proctor and Gamble

oi Mackinac

Groundwood

St Marys Paper

Sturgeon Falls, ON

Cheboygan. Ml

NOTES

1,040

French River NSSC

Total. 350 t/d specialty

Groundwood
P. S. 02

200

Mechanical

Total. 900 t/d bleached kralt
120 Ud specialy, 20 t/d line

124 km to Lake Huron

via Lake Nipisslng. 200 Ud
co
atlng medium

110

I 10

Cheboygan River

d hardboard

Just southeast of Straights

Paper Products

Alpena. Ml
Alpena, MI

Abitibi
Fletcher Paper

Thunder Bay River
Thunder Bay River

West side at late

LAKE 81E BASH
Ohio ma W
Port Huron. Ml
Paimyn a. Mi

Port Huron Pwer

Ggpsum. OH
C agrin Falls. OH

Simplex Industries

US. Gypsum
Chase Bay

Black River

Beaver Wood Fbre

Thorold

Domtar Constmction

Twelve Mi. Creek

Domtar Fine Pmer

TwelVe MI. Creek

Fraser

waste

Thorold
St. Catharines

PROD.
lt/d)

MILL TYPE

Thorold

Thorold

Near Sandusky
Eastern edge oi Cleveland

TREATMENT

NOTES

LAKE MAM BASH

Orllio

St. Catharines

South oi Detroit; over 40 miles inland

Lake Erie
Chagrin River

RECEIVING
WATER

LOCATION AND MILL

into St. Clair River; over 70 miles to Lake Erie

River Raisin

Quebec and

Ontario Pwer
Kimberly Clark

Twelve MI. Creek (Pmemoard)

Twelve MI. Creek

Produce 273 W pwerboard
from purchased waste pwer

(Tissue/Fine)

540

Produce 50 W tissue. 35 W

1/2 W tine paper

Trenton

Domtar Pkg.

Trent River

Semi-chemical

Trenton

Trent Valley
Pwerboard

Trent River

(anerboard)

P a Primary; 8 - Secondary; t/d - tonnes/day;
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Produce 600 lid newsprint

460

Deinking

Canal

from purchased pup and

S

Twelve MI. Creek TMP
Old Welland

Produce 200 t/d line piper

P

Fine Paper)

Fine Pater

130

.

overy

Produce 282 W corrug.

medium

Produce 250 W pwerboard
from recycled pwer & board
Continued
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RECEIVING
WATEFI

LOCATION AND MILL

PROD.
It/d)

MILL TYPE

TREATMENT

NOTES

LAKE MARIO, WE)

Ornate, mired

Camden East Twp. Strathcona Papequmnee Ftiver

(Box board)

P, S

Produce 165 t/d box board
from waste paper & board

New York
Lyons Falls
Lyonsdale
Deteriet

Georgia-Pacific
Burrows Pmer
St. Regis P or

Croghan

Latex F or

Brownville
Richiand
Volney
Oaklleld

Latex Fiber
Schoeller Technical
Armstrong Cork
U.S. Gypsum

Black River
Moose River
Bladr Filver

Over 70 mi. upstream ol Watertown
Just upstream of Lyons Falls
About 30 miles upstream of lake

Beaver River

Flows into Black River about 15 mi. upstream of Detenet

Bladt Riover
Salmon River
Oswego River
Whitney Creek

At river mouth
Southeast comer of lake
About 10-15 miles upstream of Oswegho and lake
Between Buffalo and Rochester. about 20 miles south of lake

ST.LAWRB E RIVER

M
Cornwall, ON

Domtar

St. Lawrence
River

400

Kraft

.
Produces 600 W fine
paper, 200 W paperboard

P

New York
Gouvemour

Groveton Papers

Oswegatchie River

Over 50 miles upstream of St. Lawrence in at Ogdensburg

Newton Falls

Oswegatchie Fllver

Over 30 miles upstream ol Gouvemour

Newton Falls

Potsdam Pwer

Raquette River

Simplicity Pattern

Raquette Fliver

Potsdam

Norfolr

About 15 miles upstream through Messlna
About 10 miles upstream at Norfolk

P - Primary; 8 - Secondary; t/d - tonnes/day;
While the pulp and pmer industry already wpears to be let concentrated, further consolidation may lie ahead. Many
Canadlan mills are well below optimum size and use relatively an uated equbment (Tmies 8.12 and 8.13). Many of those
are also not integrated with pup producers (and so are vulneMIe to significant pup price lluauatlons). As tarii fs continue to
decline and as environmental costs 90 w, these smaller operations will be vulnerdue.
TABLE 8.12 Age of Newsprint Machines Operating in Canada, the United States and Scandinavia. 1983.
DATE COMMENCED
OPERATION

Prior to 1950
1950 to 1970
After 1970

CANADA

UNITED STATES

SCANDINAVIA

58%
19
23

28%
45
27

7%
50
43

wmsr (August 2. 1991)
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Source: Sinclair (1990)
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TABLE 8.11 Pup, Paper and Pwerboard Mills in the Great Lares (continued)
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TABLE 8.13 Annual Production capacity of Canadian, US. and Scandinavian Newsprint Machines. 1983
TONNES PER YEAR

CANADA

U.S.A.

SWEDEN

FiNLAND

NORWAY

50%

15%

0%

30%

40%

Under 100.000

100.000 to 150.000
Over 150.000

35
15

55
30

20
80

30
40

40
20

Source: Sinclair 119901

it should be noted that. the size and concentration of the pulp and paper industry may prove advantageous to the
industry if it is forced into large capital expenditures. if producers are able to influence market prices. the costs of
environmental protection measures are relatively more likely to be passed on to paper and board consumers rather than being
absorbed entirely by producers.

Ownership of Forests

in Ontario forest land used in timber dproduction is owned almost entirely by the

ovincial government. Allocation of

timber rights is normally non-competitive an involves long term supply arrangements. gs province deals with a number of
large purchasers who do not seem strongly motivated to compete with one another. The high levels of cwitaf invested in
production facilities Creates strong incentives to bid only for cutting rights on nearby lands.
The fees paid to the government for timber cutting rights, known as stumpage. have historically been too low to cover

provincial forest management costs. According to Atkin (1988). the Ontario government lost 03139 million or 054.79 per
cubic meter of timber arvested in the province during the fiscal year 1986-8 . Stum age revenues equalled C385 million
while forest management expenditures equalled C3224 million. Stumpage fees chargedpto pup mill owners in Ontario varied
between 031.04 and $4.55 at that time.
s
The government has been criticized for not monitonng harvesting activities more closely (Atkin 1988). Ontario is heavily

reliant upon information provided by the forest industry on actual harvesting practices. inspection of and quality control over

reforestation efforts has also been insufficient to revent a significant level of tree crop failure. However. Ontario does appear

to have adequate forest supplies to meet current evels of growth in the flare needs of the pth and paler industry iAtkin 1988).

Private ownership of forest land plays a much more si nificant role in the United States than in Canada. Originally, all
of the forest land was publicly owned in the US. but over i a years ownership shifted to private ownership in many areas.

Since about World War 1 the are of forest land in the US. has roughly stwifized and large shifts in the future are not expected.
iClawson 1979)

8.4 Pulp and Paper Market Trends
Pu
grades.

and pwer mariiets will have overcqiacity for several years in all but some coated
its total US. industry capacity is expected tgq/grow at a compound annual rate of 2.9

Broducf consumption is ex
apartment of Commerce 1

r and uncoated free sheet
over the next three years.

ed to grow by about
0 per year over the next five years Value Line 1991 and US.
1). Overall prices are expected to be restrained by recent and co nulng increases in capacity.

The share that Ontario producers will fate of any market expansion will be shaded by fluctuations in the price of the Canadian

dollar.

'

Pulp

High inventories. increasing cmdty Including significantI growth in low cost South American pulp production.
decreasing operating rates (percentage of meaty actually used) a sipping prices characterize the current state of the pulp
production business.

Chemical pulps sales are also increasingly being cut into by sales of mechanical pups. New developments in the

production of mechanical pups. also known as 'alphabet pups" because of the confusing array of acronyms used to describe
the various pulpingprocesses (CTMP, chemi~thermomechanlcalepuping; TMP. thermomechanicai pggalngé FtMP, refiner

mechanical pulping; and others). have increased their quality and w l as the cost effectiveness of their pr uc

n.

Secondary fibres will also be used increasingly. The relatively low costs of secondary and mechanical pup fibre will

create continuing pressure to keep prices low.

Pulp shipments are expected to increase b about 1% in 1991 and about 2% per year overthe next five years. Demand

for high quality bleached pub, in particular the orthem Bleached Softwood Kraft produced in Ontario. should be strong due
to growing demand for high grades of printing and writing paper.

we+51 (August 2. 1991)

s

64

'

Paper and Paperboard

Overall sales in this sector are exgected to inorease by 2.5% in 1991 and by 2.3% per year over the next iive years.

Coated paper. representing 20% oi U. . pwer shipments. has been in strong demand recently. However, Increases in

capacity will exceed Lgrowth and should lead to flat or declining pnces in the short term. Uncoated tree sheet paper.
representing 29% 01

.8. paper shipments. contains at least 90% krait iibre. and its use has also been growing taster than

overall growth in pwer consumption. Consum tion oi uncoated iree sheet pwer is expected to grow 2.9% in 1991. This
compares with projected GNP growth oi under /.. Newsprint production. representing 17% oi U.S. paper production. is iiat
with little increase loreseen in newspaper uses.

in general. while the recession ls likely to remain throu hout 1991. the industry is expected to recover and resume

steady growth over 1992-98. B the year 2001. global virgin fibre use is expected to rise worldwide by 85million tons and
waste paper use is expected to so by 55 million tons (Uutela 1990).
Areas in which growth in the demand lor virgin iibre is expected are: printing and writing

apers. with an increase 01 23

million tons (nearly two thirds oi the expected increase in demand): iinerboard and iiutlng, 6 m llion tons (largely unbleached
pulp): cartonboards, 9 million tons; newsprint. 2 million tons; tissue. 2 million tons. Demand tor use 01 virgin pulps in
unbleached grades is expected to decline by about 2 million tons (Uutela 1990).
This increase in the demand tor virgin iibre ulp will benelit both chemical and mechanical pulp producers. it current
met by bleached krait pulps, but increasingly stringent pollution controls
trends continue. most oi the increased demand will
may encourage a shift to modern mechanical pulp production.

Demand ior mechanical ulp will grow moderately and new mechanical putting cwacity will be constructed largely to
produce combined recycled an therrnomechanlcal pulp iumish (replacing sulilte-groundwood iumishes).
-

Markets ior Ontario Producers

The main markets for Ontario pub and 5pater products are the Northeastern and North central United States and
r production. Another 41% is consumed within
Ontario. Exports to the United States consume 6% of Ontario pup and p

Ontario. Only 3% oi Ontario production leaves North America. (Andersen 19

; 986 iigures)

t decade. US. demand lor
Per omits consumption oi pup and paper products has grown substantially during the
Demand ior printing
(14%).
7
19
in
person
per
kilograms
1
to
1981
in
person
per
kilograms
44
irom
grown
has
newsprint
and writing paper in the United States has grown irom 58 to 80 kilograms per person (27%) over the same period.
Ontario supplies about 13% oi the 123 million (metric) tonne United States newsprint market. shipping about 1.6 million
(metric) tonnes in 1987. Ontario's share oi the US. newsprint market has declined irom about 15% "1 1981. Ontario

consumes about 0.6 million tonnes oi newsprint

Ontario supplies about 3% at US. printing and writing pater demand, or moot 0.5 million tonnes.
Population growth is an important determinant oi demand tor pulp and pwer products. In the United States. the
ation increase oi 22 million people between 1988
population is expected to grow at a rate 01 0.72%lyear, producing a
and 2000, resulting in a total population oi 267 million in 2000. n anada. population is expected to increase at a rate oi
03.5% per ear. producing a populaion increase oi mout 3 million over the same period tor a total, in the year 2000, oi 29
m ion rnh

itants.

Production Costs

Current pup and p

operations are not easily a
can be developed. the vola

r mills are capital intensive and have iatriy constant runni costs. This means that mill
tails to market conditions. To the extent that new, less omita intensive puping technologies
oi proiit levels which characterizes the industry could be reduced.

Andersen (1988) has estimated the cost 01 production oi pulp and newsprint (Twles 8.14 and 8.15). In combination
with Table 8.16, which indicates commodity prices in the US. market. these tales indicate in rou h way the potential
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proiitabiilty oi the industry. Costs 01 environmental control can also be considered in the context oi these igures.

hJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

Employment levels in the sector are expected to decline siightiy or stay constant.

U

1
V
y
y
V
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TABLE 8.14 1986 Newsprint Production Costs per Metric Tonne

Wood Costs'

Energy

ONTARIO

CANADA

UNITED
STATES

U.S

SWEDEN

03157

03155

US$93

03109

SKl.061

C3222

120
65
416

113
68
413

67
80
315

79
94
370

408
425
2,432

85
89
508

75

86

27

32

381

80

74

Labour
Other
Total Mill Cost

Corporate

77

24

Delivery

Total Delivered Cost

27

515

Expressed in Canadian 3

' includes purchased kratt pulp
Source: Anderson 1988

526

88

16

526

515

031 assumed =

75

538

19

358

24

2.928

421

US$0.85

112

115

421

421

SWEDEN

612

612

612

SK4.78

Note: if the Canadian dollar was worth 80 cents US. as in 1986. the equivalent
cost of US. production would be 3449. At a Canadian dollar worth 70 cents

US, costs would be about equal.

ITABLE 8.15 1986 Kraft Pulp Production Costs per Metric Tonne
Eastern
Canada
(Hardwood)
Wood Costs

Eastern
Canada
(Softwood)

Interior
8.0.
(Softwood)

US. South
(Softwood)
(03)

Sweden
(Softwood)
(03)
.

03150

03206

03146

03134

03360

Chemicals
Labour
Other Materials
Mill Cost

47
58
45
335

55
62
45
398

51
61
52
348

42
53
48
312

40
58
42
517

Total Delivered Cost

379

442

428

370

551

Energy

Delivery

35

44

30

38

44

34

so

17

59

33

Canadian Dollar - US$0.85 - SK4.78. ll 03- U.S.3.80. U.S. cost - 03394.
Source: Andersen (1988)

TABLE 8.16 Commodity Prices (US. 3 per Metric Tonne)

Newsprint

Market Pub (Bleached
Softwood Northern Kraft)
Groundwood Printing
Paper (directory)

Printin and Writing
Paper ?bond)

1986

1988

1990

3545

3650

685

450

725

800

735

850

725

925

Sources: Andersen (1988) and Pup and Paper various issues
Profit levels in the pub and paler industry have historically been low relative to other manufacturing industries. Given
the level of risk involved in the industry. this is also an important influence on levels oi investment in the industry.

in the immediate future. industry profit leveis will be particularly low. Over the rest of 1991 many companies are

expected to show low profits or losses. A return to more normal profit levels is expeded in 1992 and 1993 as slack created by
recently created overcqiacity is taken w by a steady increase in demand (Value Line 1991).
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The recent downturn in pulp and pwer industry cash ilows has led to significant cuts in plans for capital spending in the
industry. However, cwiial spending plans continue to be high in comparison to the levels oi t 9 past ten years. According to
a survey done by Pug and

aper at the end oi 1990 (Pulp and P

irom that survey). U. . companies currently have plans to invest

r, Janua

1991. All figures in this section are derived

.S.$17.0 bi lion in mill improvements, which is 5.5% less

than was planned a year earlier. In Canada. companies have lane to invest 0510.2 billion on mill improvements over the

next two years. This is 21.1% less than spending plans ma e at the end oi 1989. Relatively deeper cuts to Canadian
investment plans are attributed to wedxness in markets ior Canada s two most important products, newsprint and market pulp,

as well as the high value oi the Canadian dollar.
These proposed capital ex

nditures are broken down as iollows (see also, Tables 8.14 and 8.15). Startups oi new

mills and new uipment in the .8. account ior U.S.S7.1 billion in 1990. iatlin to U.S.SSJ billion in 1991. U.S.52.4 billion in
1992 and U.S.s .4 billion in 1993. in Canada. startups consumed 034.6 bill on in 1990, and will shrink to 053.2 billion in
1991, 031.4 billion in 1992 and 051.0 billion ior 1993 and beyond. This is a reversal irom strong increases in investment in
new iaciiities over the past iew years.

Spendin driven by environmental concerns, in contrast, is expected to rise signiiicantly. in the U.S., spending on

environmental improvements to old mills will account ior 11.1% oi all new capital spendigg. This is w irom 6.9% in 1990 and

5.0% in 1989. In Canada, environment related investments are proiected to rise to 24.9 . oi all tanned investments. up irom
15.9% in 1990 and 5.5% in 1989. Canadian costs are driven by the need to install secondary reatment. already in place at
U.S. mills. as well as by the same pressure as exists in the U.S. to reduce toxic emissions.
Oi U.S. environment related spending over 1990-92, U.S.$1.1 billion will be ior water quality improvements (up 54%
irom 1990). U.S.STSB million will be ior air quality improvements (up 51.1%) and U.S.S74 million will be spent to manage solid
waste Sip 25.8%; in Canada, water quality related spendinfswiil total 031.9 billion (up 18.9% irom 1990, but up over 500%
irom 1 89), 055 2 will be spent on air pollution control (up 4%) and spending on solid waste disposal will be 0568 million
(down 2.9%). These ii res may be an underestimate oi lanned environmental spending in the sense that constniction oi
new mills and introduct n oi more modern production equ
environmental controls.

ent is olten at least partially driven by the need to meet tighter

in the U.S., pup mill expansion and modernization will consume US$62 billion, or 41% oi total 1990-92 cwital
spending. None 01 the malor cwaolty expansion protects planned to come into production behween 1990 and 1992 are

located in the Great Lakes region. However, a 200 (short) ton deinking mill ior market pulp production will be completed by
Fox River Fibre at Kaukauna. Wisconsin in 1991.

in Canada. 054.5 billion will be spent on pu mill expansion and modernization, oi which 05776 million will be zpent in
Ontario. With the possible exception oi a propose new 150,000 (metric) tonne per year CTMP proposed by Shin Ho anada
d 178,500 (metric) tonne per year proposed expansion oi the James
tor Thunder Bay and the recently
- River-Marathon krait mill at Marathon, Ontario, the Atlantic Packaging Mill which is about to open, is the only planned major
capacity expansion on the Ontario side oi the Great Lakes basin.
While virgin newsprint production cmacity is in excess oi requirements, demand ior secondary libre caused by solid
recycled lbre oviaclty. A 250,000 (short ton per
waste disposal problems across the continent is creating a melt to dev
Dunkirk. New ork (on Late Erie) and eilerson
or
Containerboard
Dunkirk
by
planned
is
mill
year recycled containerboard
Smuriit intends to build a 250,000 metric) tonne recycled newsprint mill at an unspeciiled location in New York state. Start up
acts. in Ontario, Atlantic Packaging Products will com to a new
dates have not been announced or the later two
newsprint (150,000 metric tonnes per year) mill in Wh y, on Lake
recycled tissue (35,000 metric tones per year) and recy
add deinklng cqmcity to its newsprint operations at Thunder Bay,
to
plans
announced
also
h
Ontario in 1991. Abltlbi-Prlce
Ontario.

Construction oi new pwer machkies will require 31% 01 U.S. spending between 1990 and 1992. Many 01 these new
mills are being constructed in the Great Lakes basin. in 1990, an 80.000 (short) ton per year recycled tissue mill was opened
by Chesapea e at Menasha. Wisconsin. Fort Howard paler is also planning cons ruction at a new recycled tissue mill at
ed to add a new p r machine at Duluth, Minnesota. Canadian expenditures
Green Bay and Lake Superioer has
on new paper machines are expected to total 081.3 billion over t

1990-92 period. with 03245 million oi that sum being

spent in Ontario. Canadian Pacilic Forest Products is replacing two older machines with a 240,000 metric tonne per year
paper machine (net capacity addition will be 60,000 tpy).

Spendin on paper machine modi cations and improvements in the United States will amount to U.S.52.5 billion over
1990-92 (up 3. %). in Canada. expenditures on machine modiiications over the same period will total 05725 million. oi which
03206 million will be spent in Ontario.
U.S. coniainerboard capacity is being increased largely by rebuilding old machines. installation 01 a new technology
known as wide-nip presses allows expansion at tar lower than could be achieved by building new lacilitles. Green Bay
Packaging. at Green Bay, Wisconsin is the only Great Lutes mill currently undergoing such modiiication.
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8.5 Capital Spending
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Power plant improvements will cost (1.3.51.1 billion (down 225%) over the 1990-92 period in (he Untied States. Lower

energy costs are seen as the reason for declining spending in this area. The purchase oi co eneratec power irom pnvate

producers has been a Stargicam factor in keep") power costs low. in Canada. energy productgon investment over the same
penod will total 03559 mi n. 01 which (3151 mi lon will be spent in Ontario.

TABLE 8.17 US, and East North Central Region Capital Expenditures ior 1990-92+, By Type ot Facility (in 0.8.3000)
East North Central

Production
Related Expenditures

Wood/Fibre
Pulplng
New Machines
Machine Modiiicatlon
Energy

Total US.

11.900 (4%)
255.941 (4%)
875.000 (19%)
416.666 (17%)
174.250 (17%)

284.624
6165.478
4.670314
2451.789
1.053.542

(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)
(100%)

Miscellaneou3/Piant
Total

129.233 (25%)
1.862.990 (12%)

512.727 (100%)
15.138.474 (100%)

Water

109.905 (10%)

1.055.489 (100%)

Environmental Spending

Air
Solid Waste
Total

Grand Total

20.135 (3%)
7.785 (11%)
137.825 (7%)

758.350 (100%)
74.131 (100%)
1,887,970 (100%)

2.000.815 (12%)

17.026.444 (100%)

Source: Pulp and Paper (January 1991)
TABLE 8.18 Ontario Reported Capital Expenditures tor 1990-92+. By Type oi Facility (in C3000)

Ontario
Production-Related

Expenditures

Wood/Fibre

Canada

12.100

(4%

1.500

(1%)

119.601
16.020
510
136.131

6%)
3%)
1%)
5%)

301.775

100%)

Pulping
New Machines
Machine Modliication
Energy

775.829 (17%
245.000 (19%)
205.530 )28%
151.250 27%

4,471,525 100%)
1.320.200 (100%)
724.561 (100%)
559.061 (100%)

Total

1.391.209 (18%)

7.629.363 (100%)

Miscellaneous/Plant

Environmental Spending

Water
Air
Solid Waste
Total

Grand Total

1.527.340 (15%)

252.241 (100%)

1.893.684
561.830
67.835
1.527.340

(100%)
100%
100%
(100%)

10,152,712 (100%)

Source: Pulp and Pmer (January 1991)
'

Trends in Mill Modernization

The age oi North American and. in particular, Canadian newsprint machines has already been noted in Table 8.11.
Most oi the pulp and paper mills in the Great Lakes basin are comparatively small and are older than might be desiraiie.
Overcapacity and generally week long term performance have encouraged modernization at existing plant over new mills. in
iuture. priority will be placed on increasing the scale oi production iacllities as well as on modemlzing production equipment to
make more eiiiclent use oi wood 32mins. Mills will also emphasize the production of higher value grades oi paper. the use oi
recycled ilbres and the use oi iowent technologies.
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The market share of mechanical puip share is expected to increase significantly. This will occur as a result of a number

of advantages which mechanical pu ing processes have over chemical pugng. Mechanical pulping makes relatively ef cient
use of fibre, using wout 90% of all i re got

into the mill, as opposed to

out 50% for chemical pulping. The capital cost of

constructing a new mechanical mill is about % of that oi a new chemical pulp mill. Mechanical pulping cqaacity can also be
added in smaller increments than can chemical pulping capacity.
improvements in the strength characteristics of mechanical puips may allow a reduction in paper basis weight. which

would mean that less material would have to be used to produce a given product. The high strength of the newer mechanical

puips also means that there will norrnaliy be no need to add any semi- bleached softwood pup to reinforce it for newsprint
use. as was required for earlier mechanical grades.
Mechanical mills are also more amenable to automation, producing lower labour Costs. and they are better able to meet
more stringent environmental r ulations. Chlorine bleaching is not necessarily required. reducing dioxin, iuran and
organochlorine emissions and tota levels 01 releases of conventional and acutely toxic substances are signiiicantly lower than
with chemical pulping liar ely because more fibre is used and less is released as effluent). Already mechanical pulp is often
the least expensive virgin urnlsh for newsprint.

Technological advances in mechanical pulping and use of recycled fibre iinciuding declining manufacturing costSi and
chemical pulp overcapacity may induce innovation to decrease chemical puping manufacturing costs. Capacity increases at
chemical pulp mills are likely to be restricted to expansion of existing mills.

As a result of these developments, the use oi wood has become significantly more efficient. Much oi the recent growth

in pulp and paper manufacturing has been accomplished simply by increasing the use of logging and wood mili residues.
inte ration oi sawmililng and pulping mills makes use of wood wastes easier and more economical. Improvement in the
qual y of mechanical pulping also promises to reduce wastage of wood fibre. Better pxier machines are also reducing the
need for pulp and paper strength. w ich will allow pwers to be lighter in weight.

Changes to bleaching technologies are considered in Chapter 9.

'

as.1 Wefrecydig
Atkin (1988) estimates that Canada's p

r recovery rate is under 30%. in the United States the recovery rate is

n (93% of all newsprint and 75% of container

estimated to be 42%. These ii ures compare w h an 82% recovery rate in J

grade paper). It Japanese leve s at recovery could be achieved in
be dramatic.

the efiect on markets for virgin paper could

orth Ame

Worldwide use of recycied fibre is expected to grow from 75 million tons in 1988 to 100 million tons in 1996 and to 130

million tone by 2001. This would mean that recycled iibre would account for 41% oi all flare use in the year 2001 (Uutela

1990).

in general. because mixing recycled fbre into pwer threatens the strength of the resulting paper product. reCycilng will
increase the use of iong-iibre rather than short-flare pups. This is someth of an advantage for the Northern Bleached
Softwood Kraft pup produced in the Great Lakes beam and in Ontario in part

far. However. improvements to mechanical

pulping techniques as well as innovations in the production of fibre-bonding chemicals may reduce this advantage.
fibre.
'

The different sectors oi the pub and paper industry will be affected in diverse ways by the increased use of recycled
Newsprint

Major changes are coming? North American newsprint production due to an increase in the demand ior post-consumer
a consequence of the fact that discarded newquiers make up wproximately 6-7% oi all
waste content in newspmers.
solid waste disposed of in North American landfills. many jurisdictions are acting to reduce the disposal of old newspmers. A
number of US. states have already passed or are in the process of passi minimum secondary ibre requirements for locally
sold newspwers. Toronto is seriously considering a 30- 50% secondary lbre requirement ior all newspapers sold in street
vending machines.

Approximately 845% of recycled newsprint ends up as sludge after deinking. The remainin 85-92% is reusable. As it
is technically feasible for newsprint to be produced entirely from old newsp era the potential re uctlon in demand ior virgin
fibre newsprint of an increase in recycled content is dramatic. Northern

ntario newsprint mills will suffer the additional

problem that waste newsprint is generated largely in the United States (Canada consumes only about 1.1 of the 10 million
ions 8; news nnt that it is canals of producing annually); the cost of sh'pping that waste pater to Thunder Bay or Marathon
may

proh

ive.

in practice. mills are expected to operate with something closer to 50% waste gwer. Waste pmr collection may also

continue to leave a si niticant

rtion of used newspaiers uncoilected the Canadian

u

and P

er Association protects that

and ii . in 1988; US. recovery is
old newspaper coile on efiic ency will increase to 46% in 1993--up mm 25% in 1
projected to be 52% by 1995--up from 38% in 1989i. But the threat to distant. old newsprint mills is unmistdteabie.
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Printing and Writing Pmers

Only a small lncreasa in the use oi wastepaper is seen ior supercalendered or lightweight coated papers. The demand

for high brighiness and 900d Printability qualities currently makes the incorporation oi waste papers into these grades difficult.
Advertisers and other users continue to demand higher quality standards lrom these papers.

opportunities lor the sale oi recycled papers in this sector are for listing paper. envelope paper. paper for 'a small.
environmentally conscrous part ol the business papers market. largely lor public authOrities' (Uutela 1987).

However, the pure potential for recycling oi pnntin and writing paper sis high. According to the Canadian Pulp and

Paper Association. 37% oi the solid waste stream in No
America consists ol these high iibre quality papers. A signiiicant
upgrade ol collection of these papers. in particular from oiilce waste streams, could provrde the lumish necessary to produce
a high quality recycled wntlng or printing paper.
~

Tissue

The use oi wastepaper is already high in the manufacture of tissue grades. In luture. waste paper is expected to be
used across a wider range oi tissue grades and the overall use oi secondary iibres in tissue-makln is expected to increase
signriicantly. As a result. many virgin ibre based tissue mills are expected to be required to invest in sinking plants.

-

Linerboard and Fluting

Kraft liner is expected to include a higher proportion oi old corrugated containers as more waste material becomes
available. The number ol grades oi iinerboard may also increase to accommodate the various types and qualities ol wastes
which will become available.
-

Cartonboards

Recycled libre is already heavily used in cartonboard production. Growing interest in waste grade loldlng cartonboard
ma lead to the development ol new waste-based grades. At the same time, the use at virgin libre is actually increasing at the
hig -end oi the cartonboard market. due to a demand lor brighter wpearance and improved periormance characteristics, A

growing market lor liquid packaging boards also iavours virgin ilbre. Generally. lood packaging legislation currently inhbits
the use ol recycled fibre lor lood padtaging.
~

Wastepaper Business

A growing demand lor waste paper content is encoUraglng s tiers to secure supplies oi waste paper. This is
improving wastepwer business prospects as well as creating iurther mand lor waste papercollection. An increase in
sorting at source will also improve waste paperquality and value. The long term pr
ct ls lor tar greater price stability.
partlculariy as mills try to lock in supplies at wastepaper. In the short term. until adequate mill emotty is available. increasing
numbers ol waste separation and recycling programs may produce an oversrpply of some grades at paper.

The export oi old wastepaper lrom U.S.A to Canada is expected to provide new opportunities.

High quality old

corrugated cardboard and deinking grades at waste pwer may also be imported to North America to help meet demand.
-

Equpment and Chemical Scppliers

Waste aper deinklng is expected to increase signiiicantly worldwide. Much oi the growth will be at US. and Canadian
newsprint mils. As a result. demand lor delnklng chemicals is lorecast to grow by 8 to 0 percent per year. Fibre cleaning
and upgrading equ'pment will also be in demand, as will improvements to pmer machines to accommodate waste paper.
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9.0 ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND THE VIRTUAL
ELIMINATION OF PERSISTENT TOXIC DISCHARGES
FROM THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY
9.1 The Pulp and Paper Industry Persistent ToxIcs Problem: Emission Sources
The pulp and paper industry discharges a wide range oi toxic substances to the environment. Most prominent
among
these discharges are the class 01 substances known as organochlorines. Normally measured as adsorbabie
or anic halide

iAOX), chlorinated organics include large numbers oi known toxins as well as a wide range 01 poorly understood su stances.

01 the organochiorines, two highly toxic dioxin and iuran cogeners 2.3.7.8- tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin i2.3.7.8- TCDDZ

and 2.3.78 tetrachlorodibenzoiuran (2.3.7.8-TCDFi have been singled out by the intemationat Joint Commission as 'Criticai

pollutants in the Great Lakes basin. This Chapter iocuses on the possibilities oi using economic instruments to virtually
eliminate the discharge oi those two substances and AOX in general.
The critical substances list oi the NC is intended to be representative oi classes at pollutants and sources oi pollution in

the Great Lakes basin. in this case. the presence of 2.3.7.8- TCDD/TCDF is associated with the presence oi other persistent
toxins iTabie 9.1). Emissions oi dioxins and iurans as well as organochion nes in general are associated only with those mills
at which chlorine is used to bleach pulps. Norrnaliy these are krait mills, although chlorine is also used to brighten suilite and
other pulps.

The number oi miiis using 31 niiicant quantities oi chlorine in the Great Lakes basin is relatively small (Table 9 2i.
Notably. with the exception ot two m is in Thunder Bay. each 01 these mills discharges to a different area oi the Lakes and no

two ml is are known to impact on any one particular area.

TABLE 9.1 Priority Pollutants Detected in Ontario Kraft Mill Eiliuents. 1990

FREQUENCY OF
DETECTION (°/.)

AVERAGE
CONCENTRATION
( g/L except
ioxin/Iuran
EB. EDDY
ng/L)
ESPANOLA

JAMES RIVER
MARATHON

PERSiSTENT BIOACCUMULATIVE SUBSTANCES

Total Tetra- Furans
Total Oota- Dioxins
Nickel
2.4.5- Trichlorotoiuene

Camphene
Mercury
Hexachiombenzene
Pentachiorobenzene
1.2.4.5- Tetrachlorobenzene
Total Hexa-7- Dioxins
Total Penta- Furans
Total Tetra- Dioxins
1.2.3.4- Tetrachlorobenzene
Total PCB
Fiuoranthene
Pentachiorophenoi
Total Penta~ Dioxins
1.2.3.5- Tetrachlorobenzene
Pyrene
Total Hexa-6- Furan
Total Octa- Furan
Total Hexav6- Dioxin

67%
54
43

.14
.20
11.09

.03
ND
31.50

.49
.60
8.33

34
33
30
23
20
19
19
19
15
13
11
11
11
9
9
9
7
7

5.36
.09
.15
.09
.02
.02
.04
.03
.02
.03
.42
.17
.00
.03
.25
.01
.01
.01

ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
.18
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND
ND

3.08
.68
.01
ND
.01
.18
.29
.07
ND
ND
.40
.20
.04
.01
ND
.08
.05
.07

35

.15

ND

.01

Continued
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TABLE 9.1 Priority Pollutants Delecled In Ontario Kraft MIII Ef uenls. 1990 (continued)

FREQUENCY OF
DETECTION (%)

AVERAGE
CONCENTRATION
(pg/L except
dloxIn/Iuran
EB. EDDY
ng/L)
ESPANOLA

i

.

JAMES RIVER
MARATHON

'

PERSISTENT BIOACCUMULATIVE SUBSTANCES. CONTINUED

6

2.3.7.8- Tetra- Dloxin

ND

.05
.03

ND
ND

ND
ND

8.49
18.30
29.36

55.66
203.67
41.78

6

.01

Benzlalanlhracene

2

.02

4
2

Chrysane
Anthracene

.02

.00

Tolal Hexa-7- Furan

ND

ND

.06

ND

In mg/L

GENERAL PARAMETERS
Adsomable Organlc
Halide (AOX)
BOD, 5 day
Total Suspended Sollds

21.75
131.14
65.00

100
100
100

ACIDS

.01

.47

85

Dehydroablellc

.06

Chlorodehydrowletlc

68

.09

.00

.25

Made
Ablellc
Olelc

66
64
64

.04
.23
.08

.00
ND
.01

.03
.14
.14

.01

35

Lavopimaric

.00

.19

60

Neoablellc

.00
.00

.14
.06

68
66

Isopimanc
Dichlorodehydroablellc

.06
.07

.09

ND

.06

In pg/L

OTHER PARAMETERS

Chloro1orm
' Aluminum
Phenol

100
100
47

437.71
1,834.52
19.20

17.08
930.31
.25

1,126.67
258.40
1.93

51
51

4.56
2.08

3.47
.37

ND
ND

246- Trlchlorophenol
2.4- chhlorophenol

ND

.26

8

Bromodlchloromelhane

ND

Source: Ontarlo Mlnlstry ol the Envlronmenl 1991
TABLE 9.2 Chlodne Using M1113 In lhe Great Lakes Basin
2.3.7.8
TCDD
(PPO)

MILL AND LOCATION

2.3,7,8
TCDF
(PPO)

46

Total
PCDD
(pg/L)

n.a

T0181
PCDF
(pg/L)

n.a.

Cl uet MN
Lake manor

24

CPFP

Thunder Bay ON
Lake swerlor

ND'

ND'

190

60

AblllbIPrlce

Thunder Bay ON

ND'

ND'

4,780

1,230

Pollalch

Lake Superlor

NOTES
Municipal
secondary

treatment.

Process only
52% kralt.
Bleached

groundwood
989°13-

Continued
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TABLE 9.2 Chlorine Using Mills in the Great Lakes Basin (continued)
2.3.7.8
TCDD
iPPQ)

MILL AND LOCATION
:

I

i

Domtar

James River-

240

ND

Terrace Bay ON

ND'

ND'

690

410

Marathon ON

ND'

ND'

960

970

Escanaba Mi

ND

51

n.a

n.a

Ouinessec MI
Lake Michigan

9

66

na

na

Muskegon Ml

ND

42

na

n.a

Lake Michigan

Champion
international

1

ND'

Lake Superior

Mead Paper

Scott Paper

Lake Michigan

James River

19

Espanoia

ND'

Lake Huron

Comwali. ON
Lake Ontario

ND'- Not detected, but Ontario detection level
Sources: MlSA H991), NCASl (1990)

NOTES
Process 6%

bleached.

Oxygen deilg.
being installed.

Eiliuent

discharged by

spray irrigation

Green Ba Wi
Lake Mich an

6.8. Eddy

Domtar

Total
PCDF
lpgiLi

ND'

Lake Superior

Marathon

Total
PCDD
(pg/Li

Red Rock ON

Lake Superior

Kimberiy-Clark

2.17.8
TCOF
iPPOi

72

n.a.

na

Municipal
secondary

treatment.

ND'

ND

30

Oxygen deilg'n
and other

measures.
ND'

ND'

200

40

Flow diluted by
newsprint

effluent.

' 1 ng/L is approximately equal to 1 ppt (part per trillion)
1 IL is mproximately equal to 1 ppb (part per billion

1 ugx. is wproximately equal to 1 ppm (part per million

it should be noted that the pup and pan industry persistent toxlc emissions problem goes beyond the 2.3.7.8- dioxin
and turan cogeners. Other dioxin and iuran oogeners are also significant health risks (Table 9.3). Levels oi AOX and some

_

other toxic substances remain signi cant even where dioxins have been virtually eliminated. (See, ior instance, E.B. Eddy, in
Table 9.1)

'

TABLE 9.3 PCDD Toxic Equivalencies
Cw
2,3.7,8- TCDD
Other TCDD
1.2.3.7,8 PeCDD
12.16.70 HxCDD
1.2.3.703 HxCDD
1.2,3.4,7,8~ HxCOD
Other HxCDD
0000

We M
1
0.01
0.5
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.0004
0

Source: Exner (1987)
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Source specific information on other sources of dioxin and furan emissions to the Great Lakes has not been found.

although emissions are associated with wood preserving facilities, hazardous waste sites (des Rosters 1987). and air

emissions from municpai and industrial waste incineration. residential fuel wmbustion and power generation (Ortech 1990).
Kraft pulping black liquor recovery boilers are also significant sources of PCDDs and PCDFs (Ortech 1990).

9.2 Mill Processes and Persistent Toxic Discharges
in kraft pulping a liquid containing Nazs and NaOH. known as white liquor. is used to separate llgnin and related
materials from wood cellulose fibres. The materials thus separated along with the spent cookin liquor. known at this point as

or otherwise unsatisfactoriiy
black liquor. are washed away from the remaining wood cellulose and any partially cook
wastes being incinerated.
with
recove
chemical
for
treated
then
is
material
bleached material is screened out. This effluent

Black liquor not removed is ultimately discharged to the mill sewers. It is highly toxic to aquat life and is also difficult to treat

biologically.

Losses from the washing area vary widely with the quality and age of the washing and screening processes used in a
mill. Older mills may have losses ten times higher than those of new mills. Spills and other plant upsets may result in from

one third to one half oi all black liquor releases to surrounding waters (Sinclair 1990). Accordingly, sp ll control procedures are

of great importance in reducing emissions. Spills of any size may also incapacitate a mlll's biological treatment system for a
number of days.

Washed pulp is bleached to remove the remaining iignin content. typically about 7% of the fibre at this point. Normally.
chlorine is used to separate out the lignin and then it is washed out with caustic sodium hydroxide. This process is then
repeated. often with chlorine dioxide or h ochiorite. All oi the organochiorines found in mill ef uents are produced at these
stages. as is approximately one half of e uent biological oxygen demand (BOD).

The level oi brightness to which pulp must be bleached has a very significant effect on effluent lavels. Pulp used in
integrated processes is generally bleached to a brightness of 85 lSO units. Market kraft. on the other hand. is normally
bleached to 90 180. in part this difference is accounted for by the fact that stored pu will gradual lose some brightness.
But to some extent this difference would wpear to result simply from attempts to d erentiate pr ucts for sales purposes
rather than because of any real difference in usefulness or quality of the product (McCubbin 1990). Designing a processes for
producing pulp with low organochiorine effluent levels is significantly easier if the required brightness is only 8 rather than 90.
Effluents from sulfite chemical

uplng and the various forms of mechanical puplng are presume to vary proportionately

with the percenta e of the incoming ibre that is actually used. While this relationship is known to exist for 800 levels. there

is insufficient ev ence to prove that toxicity levels are actually similarly proportional. Typically, sulfite processes yield just

under 50% of the wood processed, while mechanical pulping yields on the order of 90%. As a result. sulfite puplng is a far

more heavily polluting process. Any additional use oi chlorine in bleaching of sulfite or mechanical pulps will 0 course add to

resulting pollution. T e efficiency of chemical recovery systems in sulfite mills is also relatively lower than in kraft mills.

. Recycled fibre pulping produces relatively low levels of effluent. Corrugating and board mills which recycle fibre without
deinking are of little environmental concern. De-inking effluents. although not comparwle to virgin mill effluents. continue to
be difficult to make non-toxic.

9.3 Abatement Technologies
Pr osed new Canadian regulations under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act will require that the release of
2.3.7.8- T DD or 2.3.7.8- TCDF be prohblted above an as yet undefined level of detection. Meeting these regulations is also
expected to reduce AOX discharges below 2.5 kg oper tonne of product. McCubbln (1990) estimates that new Canadian
met by the installation of clariilers. activated sludge systems or aerated
Re ulations relating to 800, TSM and toxicity can
sta ilizatlon basins and props placed outfalls. He also believes that the mp0s Canadian dioxin and iuran regulations
chlorination stage of soft wood bleaching to
of of dilorlne dioxide substitution in the f
can be met by increasing the
upwards of 70%; improving chlorination stage mixing and control equipment; as well as using certain site-specific equipment.

Abatement measures to lower or eliminate the formation of furans and dioxins emphasizes lowering the amount of
chlorine used in bleaching. The problem is that reducing chlorine causes a reduction in pup brightness. Chlorine is used for
its ability to separate lign n from pup while removing or damaging only a relatively little of the more useful cellulose. Chlorine
also has a relatively low unit cost.

Bleach plant effluents typically contain between 3 and 8 kg of organochiorines per tonne of pulp production. Essentially,
these concentrations are directly proportional to the levels of ch brine used in a given bleaching process. Biological treatment
can reduce these quantities by between 30 and 50%. However there are some individual organochiorine compounds which
are not reduced at all by biological treatment. Further reductions in effluent organochiorine levels are achievable only by
reducrng the level of chlorine actually used in bleaching.
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The substitution of chionne dioxide lor elemental chlorine In the bleaching process produces si ni cant reductions in

organochlonne effluents. in particular dioxins and furans. while maintaining brightness levels. The EB. ddy mill at Espanola

Ontano has increased chlorine dioxide substitution from 10 to 50% at its 975 tonne kraft mill after determining that si niiicant
reductions in organochionne and dioxin and furan production would result. Resulting brightness is unchanged (8 +l and
paper strength actually increased.
TABLE 9.4 Reductions in AOX and Dioxins and Furans from Chlorine Dioxide
Substitution at EB. Eddy. Espanola. Ontario
Chlorine Dioxtde

AOX Ikg/tonnel

substitution level

AOX (kg/tonne)

Untreated Effluent

2.3,7,8-

Treated Eftluent

TCDDippt)

2.3.7.8

TC DFlpptI

10%

3.42

1 39

2.2-3.6

7 1-110

48%
52%
58%

2.31
-1.38

1.15
-0.68

ND
ND
ND

ND-6.2
ND
ND

28%

--

ND . Below detection limit.
Source: Munro (1990)

u

1.8

6.4

Untreated effluent AOX is low due to oxygen delignification, hardwood-softwood mix,

. and other process modernization; treated effluent AOX Is low due to primary and
secondary treatment.

Chlorine dioxide substitution methods are quite well known and proven in practice. The addition of small amounts of
oxygen or hydrogen peroxide Into later chlorine bieachingn/stages can be used to reduce chlorine use and may produce

organochlorlne discharges to water by as much as 15 to 2 o. x gen delignliioation can be used as a substitute for part of
the chlorination process. Resulting reductions in organochlortne ell uents are estimated at 40%.
9.4 Abatement Costs

Estimates of the costs of reducing dioxin and furan emissions to non~detection levels at Great Lakes pulp and p er
mills are shown in Table 9.5. The total
ai cost for dioxin and turan control In the Canadian portion oi the Great La es
basin is estimated at 03568 million and th emails no slgnilicant change in direct grated costs. In Ontario, which hasa
total chemical pulp production level oi tout 6000 tonnes per day, total costs wi be C 84.7 million, or 034.51 per ton
i amortized capital cost). By roduct. costs will be 034.76 for market kratt, C5476 for integrated kratt and C3203 lor sulphite
pulp. Adding oxygen delign' Ication will reduce the cost or traditional external treatment systems. canal costs and operating
costs would fall in the range of 20 to 25%.
TABLE 9.5 Ontario Great Lakes Basin Dioxin /Furan Control Costs, By Mill
CHEMICAL
PULP
PRODUCTION
(Tonnes/day)

MILL AND LOCATION

Canadian Pacitic Forest Prod.
Domtar
Kimberly Clark
James River-Marathon

EB. Eddy Forest Products

Domtar

GREAT LAKES TOTAL/AVERAGE

Avera e, Excluding EB. Eddy
CANA A TOTAL

Thunder

Red
Terrace Bay
Marathon

Espanola

Cornwall

1.323

CAPITAL COST
(CS millions)

8.7

50
1,200
433

1.3
16.1
14.0

450

1.3

910

0.0

AMORTIZED
CAPITAL
(CS/Tome)

$1.63

$6.45
33.33
38.02

$0.00

$0.72

4,366

41.4

32.35

(45 Mills)

30,808 567.6

34.48

$2.97

Source: McC ubbin 1990
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capital investments which are being planned by the industry in the near term abatement costs. they are relatively modest.

Table 9.6 ives representative costs for the control costs of traditional pollutants (e.g. 800 and suspended solidsi. Since the
xin and Man control are relatively minor there is little reason for concern that these costs alone would be
costs of
of
disruptive any mill which was not alread in serious financial dif culty. indeed. far higher abatement costs than even those
shown in Table 9.5 which were met by U. . mills during the difficult times of the early 9803 did not a single operation out of
business.

it is not expected that these requirements would put any mill out of business either.

Furthermore. capital expenditures for abatement measures at all Ontario facilities will be reduced significantly by the

ssibility of fast tax write offs. This assumes that the firms have sufficient existing cash flows to use the write offs.
cCubbin estimates that this will reduce actual costs to the companies by roughly 20 to 25% over and above the cost which

would result where normal tax depreciation rules wplied.

In the United States, revision of the Clean Water Act will involve setting similar standards for emissions of 2.3.7.8TC DD and TC DF and the implications for the mills of the associated dialement costs are believed similar to those described
for Ontario.

9.5 Applicability of Economic Instruments
As with mercury and PCBs, the contribution that economic instruments (especially emissions trading and effluent

charges) can mate to achieving virtual elimination of persistent toxics from pulp and pwer mills in the Great akes basin is
limited by the extent ol the regulatory actions that have already been tdren. in terms of the decision tree in Figure 1. Canada
and the US. are on the verge of declaring that virtual elimination of these persistent toxics is to be achieved within a very
short time frame. Hence, an outright ban (or. at any rate, no emissions move the detection level) through direct regulation is
the best option. Emissions trading and effluent charges can only play a useful role if the objective of virtual elimination is to be
achieved over a considerable period of time. Only t on can advantage be taken of differences in control costs and the added

stimulus that these instruments can give to the development of new, cost effective technologies to be developed.

in view of the fact that these contaminants have been given such high priority by the public and the regulatory agencies
in both countries, and that the technical means for their virtual elimination are proven and affordable. it is unlikely that there

will be any retrenchment in the urgency now being given to eliminating them from the waste streams of and pwer mills.
Consequently. the role of economic instmments n achieving the virtual elirnlnation of 23,7,8- TCDD C F from pulp and

paper mills may be limited to supporting corrrpiiance with regulations. Under these circumstances there would seem to be no
role for emissions trading. (in any case. any proposal to allow trades in emissions of dioxins and furans would doubtless run
up against immense opposition.)

An effluent charge levied on detectable emissions could be a most effective way of introducing a financial enforcement
incentive and demonstrating the supportive role that economic instruments can mate in achievi and maintaining the virtual
elimination of persistent toxics. Such a compliance incentive should be based on the quant discharged, not just the
concentration. Since concentration will have to be measured merely to test compliance with the proposed r ulations and flow
measmements are common place, the imposition of a per unit dragg'e on dammed emissions of 2.3.7.8- COD/TCDF from
e level of the per unit penalty should be at least as high
pulp and paper mills should be com aratively simple to implement.
as the control costs to remove any i ancial advantage that mills might have for not incurring the necessary costs of complying

with the regulations.

One problem with defining virtual elimination in terms of concentrations is that dilution of the mill effluents offers a

means of compliance even though the total loadings may still be undeslrdily high. This is not to say that mills will rely on

dilution to meet the standards, only that it may be used as one com nent of a compliance strategy. An additional problem
that remains is the possbiiity of spills and leaks that are hard to etect and may be consistent with the legal test of due
diligence. These concerns can best be met by taking further steps to reduce the use of chlorine in the bleaching process.
Regulation offers one way of lirnfting the use of chlorine but, as usual. it suffers from the indiility to make proper
allowances for the different opportunities and costs of each mill. The two main possbilities for using economic instruments to
reduce the use of chlorine are a chlorine tax and tradedile chlorine permits (com rails to the tradeabie lead pennits
described in Chapter 4). These meaures would not only reinforce the regulation of 2. ,7,8- TCDDfTCDF but they would also
help reduce the emission of all organochlorines from pup and paper mills.
Referring to question 4 in the decision tree and the associated criteria for deciding whether a quantity limit is preferable
to a change. there is no information to suggest the existence of thresholds in the damage functions that would favour a trading

system over achlorine tax. (Even if such nforrnation did exist. it would hardly support trading over acharge on chlorine since
there is only an indirect relation between the amount of chlorine used and the amount of organochlorines in the waste
stream.) On the other hand. a chlorine tax has the advantage of limiting in advance the additional costs that such a measure
would impose on any mill.
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These costs varY mnsldefabiy among companies but, in comparison with the costs of secondary treatment and other

«IIIIIIII

A determmed effort to reduce the chlorine used by mills in the Great Lakes basm could best be accomplished In a
cost-effective way through. a system of tradeabie chlorine permits based on the proven success of the lead trading system

amon U.S. petroleum refineries. The total quantity of chlorine used by mills in the Great Ld<es basin lTable 9.2) would be

limits and this limit would decline over time aocordin to a prede ned schedule. not necessarily to zero. For simplicrty and
ease of acceptance by " 9 co"Wattles concerned, the initial allotment of chlorine permits should be based on recent historical
usage, The only complicating factor might be that mills out3ide of the Great Lakes basin would have a competitive advantage
over those within the basin unless they were also to be included in the scheme. This consideration goes beyond the mandate

oi the IJC but could be of concern to the regulatory agencies that would have to implement the scheme and they might be
advrsed to extend the chlorine trading market to pulp and paper mills throughout Canada and the U.S.

A system of tradeable chlorine permits would help reduce the discharge of all organochlorines into the Great Lakes
basm. However. the reduction of chlorine used b pulp and paper mills is only indirectly related to the generation oi
organochiorines in the waste stream. A more direct application of economic instruments to this problem could be
accomplished by introducing emissions trading or an effluent charge for AOX. Under an emissions trading System involving
such highly toxic contaminants it would be essential to review and approve all potential trades. Furthermore. there is a reat
deal of variation from mill to mill in the specific organochlorines measured as AOX. Hence. trades in AOX emissions cou?d be
hlgé'ily problerrctjatic in that there would be little assurance that the overall level of environmental impact does not increase when

tra as are ma 9.

Finally, there is no information about the respective abatement cost and damage functions to suggest that tradeable
emissions are better than an effluent charge for reducrng the emission on AOX from pulp and paper mills.

For all these reasons an effluent charge on AOX that increases over time seems to be a more effective way of using

of
economic incentives to achieve the virtual elimination of or anochlorines in general as measured by AOX. Further analysis
of
rate
required
any
induce
to
likely
is
that
charge
effluent
an
a
0
level
the
AOX control costs will be required to estimate

reduction in emissions.

9.6 Social, Economic and Financial Impacts
in section 9.4 it was suggested that the costs required to virtually eliminate 2.3.7.8- TCDD/TCDF from pulp and paper
to
mill effluents were modest in comparison with the statement costs that mills in Canada are lire to have to incur merely
all of which
deal with the traditional pollutants. Similar costs have. by and tarps, already been incurred by .S. mills almost

organochlortnes
have already installed secondary treatment. in both cases. there ore. it appears that these two most toxic
located. Far
can be virtually eliminated without imposing significant burdens on the industry or the towns in which they are

the
more important for the future prosperity of the mills and the towns that depend on them will be their ability to adapt to
trends in recycling that were discussed in Chapter 8.

The impact oi tradeable chlorine permits and/or an effluent charge on AOX is more difficult to determine. Some mills
others can
have already taken steps to significantly reduce their use of chlorine and. hence, generation of AOX. Presumdaiy.
ioliow without incurring particularly onerous costs. The complete elimination of chlorine from bleaching may be more
n mills.
demanding thou h proven chlorine free bleachingaprocesses exist and have been implemented in some Scandinavia
Much will depen on the rate at which the total lev
on AOX and rate at which it is increased.

of chlorine used by the mills is reduced and the level of an effluent charge

incur a
While Canadian pup and pwer mills is somewhat behind U.S. mills in terms of secondary treatment. and will
by
faced
those
than
stringent
less
typically
are
ent standards in both countries
competitive penalty as they try to catch i4),
in
sooner
force
into
come
will
and
ter
t
are
standards
AOX
ed
P
competitors.
Swedish
their European, particularly
already
oducers
Swedish
the
Since
.
19
Graham.
and
Sweden than those proposed for Canada and the U. . (Bemda
and US.
face the prospect of effluent charges, with AOX one of the parameters under consideration. the impact on anadian
on.
modernizati
from
funds
divert
however,
may,
it
e.
mills of such a charge is unlltely to U! them at a competitive disadvantag
the implications of which are beyon the seq of this study.
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10.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter Summarizes the recommendations that have been put forward in the previous chapters. Despite the
considerable effort that has me into assembling data on emissions. abatement technologies and costs there is much that is

not known especraliy in relation to the discharge of mercury and P085. The absence of this information makes it difficult to

develop firm recommendations for the implementation oi economic instruments for achievrn virtual elimination of these
selected persistent toxics in the Great Lakes basin. This tactor should be born in mind since a ough the recommendations
that are offered are not likely to cause a severe impact on the industry when considered on their own, their impact could be
signi cant in conjunction with other requirements ior abatement and the concerns expressed in Chwter 8 about the lack of
competitiveness of some mills.
Gerrard
1.

Efforts should continue to enhance the information on sources, abatement costs and damages that is necessary for
the further appraisal and design of economic instruments.

Maury

2

For mercury. priority should be given to economic instruments that will reduce the use of mercury in manufacturing

process that are not closed cycles. Measurement of the use of mercury is far more relimle than measurement of the

sources and fate of mercury discha as. A tax on mercury might be the simplest incentive to administer. though to be
helpful, it would have to apply to all inns throughout Canada and the U.S. and possibly to imports lrom other countries
as well.

3.

The feasibility of a deposit/refund System for batteries containing mercury over 30% at all mercury used in consumer
roducts) should be investigated. n particular. the prospects or develop
the necessary infrastructure should be
ooked at in detail.

4.

Mercury emissions from electrical utilities, copper smelters and incinerators (over 85% of all industrial sourcesi in
Canada and the US. could be subjected to an efiluent charge if the reliability oi monitoring is improved. Revenues

could be used to deal with contaminated sediments in the Great Lakes basin and other bodies of fresh water.

P083
5.

P083 should be dealt with through regulation. There is no obvious role for the use of an economic instmment.

MN?!
6.

it is in this sector that economic instruments appear to have the most to otter. Priority should be given to the detailed
design and lurther analysis of a program at economic instruments for the pup and pmer industry consisting oi:
-

Financial enforcement incentives to sipport regulations designed to virtually eliminate 2.3.7,8- TCDD/TCDF.

-

A tradeabie permits scheme to reduce the use of chlorine.

-

An ef uent charge on AOX.
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ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN USE (BASED ON OECD 1989; Written June 1988)

MEDIUM COUNTRY
EFFLUENT
Air

SINCE PURPOSE

USE OF FUNDS

TARGET

FEE

REVENUE

EVALUATION

Stbsidy for air pollution

Power generation:

ECU 19ftonne

ECU 13 million

Charge too low to have incentive
impact.
Estimated that charge would have to

CHARGES

France

1985

Revenue

control equ pmem (90%). emacity over 50 mw.

Government technological
research (10%).
$01 or NOx discharge:

equal ECU 12 billion to induce

over 2,500 fairies/year

achievement of govemment targets.
Moderate effect on innovation.
About 400 plants are affected

Simple system: overhead is
less than 3% of revenues.

Waer

France

1969

Revenue

agencres.

Fee per unit of:
1. Suspended matter

local and industrial
ef uent treatmem.

4. Inhbiory matter

Operate river basin

Agencies finance

Varies

ECU 240 million

2. Oxidizdile manor

3. Soluble salts

(inth STP function)
5. Ammonia, nitrogen

Rates have not kept pace with

in ation.

6. Phosphorous
(3.4 not for households)
waer

Germany

1 981

Fee per unit of:

1. Settling smstances
2. Oxidizing substances
3. Mercury
4. Cadmium
5. Chromium

6. Nidrel
7. Lead

8. C
9. A0

10. Toxicity to fish

Water

Italy

1976

lncerlive

$1/Canadian a 0.65 ECU = $1/U.S. (June 1, 1987)

Varies with plant

Low incentive effect.
Subsidies lower industry abatement
cost by anaverage of 12%.
Subsidies do have incentive effect
on some firms.

ECU 19.20!
damage unit
(unit varies
with substance)

Fee reduced
if meet or exceed

standard

or if use

'state of the
art technology'
(See. text)

Fees 9X higher if

left to comply
with standards

ECU 135 million

(I 984)

Average treatment costs are about
4 times average charges.
There is evidence of incentive
eflects: Many firms have increased
abatement to earn lee discounts and
one-third of municipalities claim
to have improved treatment in
response to charge system.
German water quality is said to
have improved considerably Since
charges were put into effect,
Too little information.
Charge is intended to end upon
achieving full compliance
with standards.
Continued

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS lN USE (BASED ON OECD 1989; Written June 1988)
MEDIUM COUNTRY

EFFLUENT
Water

SINCE PURPOSE

REVENUE

USE OF FUNDS

TARGET

FEE

Sibsidy tor maemem
(direct dischargers).
Pay lul cost at STPs
(indirect dischagers).

Fee r unit of:
D/COD
1.
ndable solids
2. S
3. T esmstances

Households: set lee ECU 473 million
Medum-size firms: (1985)
per unit, set

EVAL UATlON

CHARGES,

Netherlands

1972

Revenue

4. Heavy metals

vn tti coefficients
Large firms:
direct monitoring.
Pretreatmem may

Covers 35% cl 3th waer 37 srbstances,
including mercury, PCBs
pollution program costs.
Revenue

USA.
(Wisconsrn)

Administrative costs are low (7%).

Waste

Belgium

1981

Incentive

W$l0

Denmark

1987

Incentive

U.S.$ 1.2 million

Varies

parameters are significantly lower.
Charges have risen steadily.

Anticipation oi lurther increases
has a significant incentive eitect.

reduce charge

waer

Strong incentive impact on certain
industries.
Pollution levels for included

Not a disincentive to pollute.

ECU 0.02-2.15/
All solid waste
Recycled material exempt tonne or cu. m.
Varies with type
Incineraod and
composted waste
discounted.
All non-hannless waste
Exam tions include
demo" n waste,

ECU 5.20/tonne

Restoraion oi closed
chemical waste sies.

Hazardous waste

ECU 1.85Iton

Hazardous waste

Varies:

unpainted wood and straw

Waste

USA.

Waste

USA.
(20 states)

1%3

Revenue

ECU 0.12/ton (WI)

Little incentive.

to

ECU 0.60/ton (MN)

Sl/Canadian a 0.65 ECU = $1/U.S. (June 1, 1987)

Continued
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ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN USE (BASED ON OECD 1989; Written June 1988)

MEDIUM COUNTRY
PRODUCT

Medium

SINCE PURPOSE

USE OF FUNDS

TARGET

FEE

REVENUE

EVALUATION

Use at Funds

Target

Fee

Revenue

Evaluation

Non-retumable
beverage containers.

ECU 0.07 beer
ECU 1.6 million
ECU 0.58 salt drink
(in glass/metal)
ECU 0.20 solt drink

plastic bottles is growing.

ECU 29nonne

Collection and reprocessmg have

CHARGES

Country

Since Purpose

Flnland

1 976

Incomive

(other containers)

ECU 3 million

Market share of non retumahle

bottles 15 low (5%).

But the market lor non retumzmle

Finland

1987

Revenue

Libricant oils

Finland

1972

Revenue

Crude oil and products

France

1981

Revenue

Infrastructure for
primer dsposal.

Libncant oils

Up to ECU 6/tonne ECU 3.8 million

Charge too low to be incentive.
70% 01 waste motor Oil is collected.
1 1% 01 total orl sold is recycled.
Administrative elliciency IS high.

Germany

1969
to
1 989

Revenue

lnlrastmdure lor
proper rispos'd.

Libricant oils

ECU 96/ tonne

High incentive etlect'rveness.
Charge replaced by regulations
which adequately control waste oil.

ECU 63 million

increased.

System subsidization no longer seen

to be necessary.

Italy

1985

Revenue

Infrastructure for
proper disposal.

Incentive
Nether

lands

1988

Revenue

Finances majority ol
lederal environmental

programs.

Libncant oils

ECU 3.20/tonne

Consumer plastic bags

ECU 0.06/bag

Gasoline (unleaded)
Gasoline (leaded)
Light Iuel oil
Libricaing oil (auto)
Libricaln oil (other

ECU 0.10/ 100 litre
ECU 1.74/ 100 Litre
ECU 0.10/ 100 litre
ECU 0.70/ 100 litre
ECU 0.10/100litre
ECU 251/ 1,000 kg
(rebate it install
ue gas desuph.)

Heavy lue oil/coal

V3
I

$1/Canadian a 0.65 ECU =31/U.S. (June 1, 1987)

ECU 2.3 million

Tax equals 5X manutmtunng cost.

But reduaion in use has been low.

Continued

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN USE (BASED ON OECD 1989; Written June 1988)

MEDIUM COUNTRY

SINCE PURPOSE

USE OF FUNDS

TARGET

FEE

REVENUE

EVALUATION

ECU 1 1 million

Tax too low to affect

PRODUCT CHARGESM
Sweden

1973

Revenue

General revenue

Non-retummle
beverage containers

ECU 0.01 to 0.03/

USA.

1981

Revenue

Hazardous wate site

Petroleum

ECU
ECU
ECU
ECU

clean up.

Base chemicals
Derivatives

container

0.07/ bbl.(dom)
0.10/ bbl.(imp) ECU 487 million
0.02 0.09! ton ECU 244 milion
0.02- 0.09/ ton ECU 52 million

choice at containers.

Low charge level results in minimal
effect on chemical use.
Does not distinguish between better
or worse management.

ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES
Sweden

Revenue

Regulation ot

polluting activiies.

All polluting activities requiring permits

ECU 55 to 78/hour ECU 3 million

Expenditures, estimated at
ECU 12 million/year were expected
to be balanced by revenues.
But only ECU 3 million was raised.

Civil servants, unused to billing

tor services, were either unable

or unwiling to charge lor full
time spent.

Change to a xed yearly charge
is expected.
St/Canadian x 0.65 ECU = $l/U.S. (June I, 1987)

Continued
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ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN USE (BASED ON OECD 1989; Written June 1988)

MEDIUM COUNTRY

SINCE PURPOSE

USE OF FUNDS

TARGET

FEE

Beverage containers

ECU 0.06 to 0.30/
container

REVENUE

EVALUATION

DEPOSIT-REFUND
Various EC,

Canada.

Incentive

USA.
(some states)

EMISSIONS

Air

U.S.A.

Initially, manufacturers encouraged
container reuse to save money
Return oi deposit bottles is
normally in the 80957.; range.
Higher dwosits are required ior
relatively higher priced beverages.

TRADING

1977

Incentive

Permits not auctioned.

Particulates, SOx.
CO, 03, N02

lmprecise emission inventories make
assessment of effect on emrssrons
highly uncertain.

Cost savings, otten of signi cant

magnitude, are frequently reported.
Administrative eiticiency is low.

$l/Canadian . 0.65 ECU = suns. (June 1, 1987)

Continued

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN USE (BASED ON OECD 1989; Written June 1988)

MEDIUM COUNTRY

SINCE PURPOSE

USE OF FUNDS

TARGET

REVENUE

FEE

EVALUATION

ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES,continued

Revenue

Sweden

Registraion and control
01 pesticides.

New pesticides

Pesticides

TAX

ECU 1.400 (no new ECU 0.5 million

Nearly covers cost at registration

active substance)

More personnel hired,
reducing wait tor ermits.

active swstance)
ECU 5,600 (new

ECU 700 annual lee)
ECU 420 change use)

and control (ECU 0.65 million).
Yeany lee is bur

some tor some

highly specialized products.

DIFFERENTIATION
Incentive

Germany
Netherlands,
Norway,
Sweden

1985
to
1 989

Van ous EC

Incentive

Phased out in 1989, when all new

Automobiles.
larger or
higher emitters

medium and large cars in the EC

were required to meet minimum air
pollution standards.

Successlully used to speed
application at regulation.

Leaded gasoline

ECU 0.02- 0.05/ I.

In mod countries, differentiation
has been Iollowed by abolition.

Differentiation has had some
incentive ellect. easing and
speeding transition to a new rule.

$l/Canadim a 0.65 ECU = $1/U.S. (June 1. 1987)
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